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Abstract 
This thesis comprises, firstly, a careful and detailed description of the institutional 
workings of the Chinese stock market; secondly, a literature review of the Chinese 
segmented markets and dual- listed shares price premium; and thirdly, three evidence-
based contributions designed to cast new light on the Chinese A-shares premium 
puzzle. Publicly- listed firms in China, under certain criteria, can issue two different 
types of shares, namely A-shares and B-shares, to local and foreign investors 
respectively. These shares carry the same rights and obligations, but are however 
priced differently due to market segmentation. After a review of the literature on 
determinants of the premium, the first contribution offers a complementary 
explanation. I propose that the premium reflects the difference in valuation 
preferences between the local and foreign investors, i.e., local investors pay more 
attention to stock liquidity, while foreign investors pay more attention to firm’s 
intrinsic value, and so firms having more favorable fundamentals tend to have lower 
premia. The second contribution involves the examination of a controversial question 
that which investor group is better informed about local assets, by testing the direction 
of information flows between the A- and B-shares markets. Both time series methods, 
and panel data techniques which are used for the first time in this context, are 
employed, in order to get a distinct and more ins ightful picture against the current 
literature. The third contribution compares and contrasts institutional settings of China, 
Singapore and Thailand which have similar market segmentation and dual- listing 
systems; examines whether or not the premia in the three countries are caused by 
same factors; and tries to answer why foreign investors in China pay less, rather than 
more, as commonly observed in other segmented markets, for identical assets. It 
provides the first cross-country comparison evidence after 1999 with updated data. 
Keywords: Stock market segmentation, dual- listed shares, Chinese A-shares 
premium 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Foreign Ownership Restrictions and Chinese Stock 
Market Segmentation 
Although it has been asserted in the finance literature (e.g., Levy and Sarnat, 1970; 
Solnik, 1974; Grauer and Hakansson, 1987) that investors should diversify 
internationally because the risk of their portfolio can be reduced without sacrificing 
the expected return, the reality is more complicated. Two kinds of capital control are 
commonly observed in practice: restrictions on domestic investment in foreign capital 
markets and restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic equity. The first type of 
restriction refers to different degrees of limitation on capital outflows employed by 
domestic governments, preventing domestic investors from diversifying overseas. For 
instance, in South Korea, China, Taiwan and in many other developing countries, 
domestic citizens may have restricted access to foreign currencies and not be 
permitted to invest freely overseas. The latter type of restriction refers to the fact that 
many governments, in both developed and developing countries, often impose 
limitations on the maximum holding of domestic assets by foreign investors. The 
main reason behind this policy is that these governments hope to attract foreign 
investment, while at the same time ensuring the domestic control of local firms, 
especially those considered as ‘strategically important to national interests’. Examples 
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of the latter type include Brazil where each foreign investor is limited to owning no 
more than 5% of any company’s voting shares; Australia, Canada, Malaysia and 
Norway, where foreign investors are limited to owning a certain percentage of local 
firms’ shares and the maximum percentage varies among industries; and China, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, where stock markets maintain separate listings 
for common stocks: one for locals and one for foreigners (see, e.g., Eun and 
Janakiramanan, 1986 and Ma, 1996). The research scope of this thesis is the effect of 
market segmentation on stock prices caused by the second type of investment barrier. 
Table 1.1 presents selected countries where the local governments impose ownership 
restrictions on foreign investors.  
 
Table 1. 1: Restrictions Imposed on Foreign Equity Holdings in Various Countries 
Country Restrictions on Foreign Ownership 
Australia 10% in banks, 25% in Uranium mining, 20% in broadcasting, and 50% in new 
mining ventures. 
Burma Investment is not allowed. 
Canada 20% in broadcasting, and 25% in banks and insurance companies. 
Finland Limited to 20%. 
France Limited to 20%. 
India Maximum of 49%.  
Indonesia Maximum of 49%.  
Japan Maximum of 25-50% in a group of 11 major firms. Acquisition of over 10% 
of the shares of a single firm requires approval of the Ministry of Finance. 
South Korea Maximum of 15% of the major firms eligible to foreigners for investment. 
Malaysia 20% in banks, 30% in natural resources, and a maximum of 70% in other 
firms. 
Mexico Maximum of 49%.  
Netherlands No restrictions in listed securities. Special permission needed if investment is 
in unlisted securities. 
Norway 10% in banking industry, 20% in industrial or oil shares, 50% in shipping 
industry, and 0% in pulp, paper, and mining. 
Spain Maximum of 50% with no investment in defence and public information. 
Sweden 20% of voting shares and 40% of total share capital. 
 -3- 
Switzerland A local firm can issue either bearer shares or registered shares. Foreigners can 
hold only bearer shares. 
Source: Eun and Janakiramanan, 1986. 
 
However, in a large number of sample countries, dramatic reductions in restrictions 
on foreign ownership took place during the decade of the late 1980s-90s, due to the 
need for financial market liberalisation. China still maintains a separate listing system 
for domestic and foreign class shares today. Chinese publicly- listed firms can issue 
multiple classes of equities to different types of investors and the Chinese stock 
market has thus been completely segmented into the domestic shares (which are 
named A-shares) market and foreign shares (which are named B-shares) market ever 
since its inception in the early 1990s. The dual- listing market structure meets the need 
of attracting foreign investment, which was in heavy demand at the beginning of 
China’s Reforms and Opening Up 1
                                                 
1 At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 
December 1978, the Chinese government decided to adopt a series of strategies designed to help China become a 
modern, industrial socialism nation with Chinese characteristics. It opened a new era in Chinese history and is 
known as the ‘Reforms and Opening Up’ to the outside world. 
 period,  while simultaneously keeping in hand the 
control of domestic industries. This strict segmented structure, where foreign 
investors can only trade B-shares and local investors are only allowed to invest in A-
shares, lasted until 19 February 2001 when the securities-governing authority China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced that individual Chinese 
residents would be allowed to trade B-shares. The opening of the B-shares market 
marked the prelude to a series of efforts the Chinese government made to bring the 
Chinese capital market to the outside world; however, even after the 2001  reform, the 
Chinese stock market is still in a situation of mild-segmentation in terms of foreign 
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investors still being kept away from domestic investment opportunity sets and the 
capital control imposed on domestic investors still limits their arbitrage oppor tunities 
with the B-shares. This mild-segmentation was then further released to some extent at 
the end of 2002 when the authorities expressed their willingness to open the former 
domestic A-shares market to certain qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) 
who have permission to participate in the A-shares market2
Interesting topics have been raised in the market segmentation context. The 
phenomenon of price differences between dual- listing equities is certainly one of the 
most challenging ones and has long been of interest to financial researchers, 
regulators and policy-makers (Hietala, 1989; Bergstrom et al., 1993; Bailey and 
Jagtiani, 1994; Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995; Domowitz et al., 1997; Bailey et al., 
1999; Su, 1999, 2000; Bergstrom and Tang, 2001; Chan and Kwok, 2005; Lee et al., 
2008). The dual- listing shares are identical in every aspect apart from who can legally 
own and trade them. Traditional financial theory sugge sts the value of shares is 
determined by the expected future dividends flow and the cost of capital. Shares with 
the same dividends-claim-rights (and so the same future cash flows) would 
accordingly be priced equally. But when market segmentation exists, a substantial 
difference is observed empirically in the price of different categories of shares with 
identical underlying assets. This research is motivated by the challenging puzzle of 
the price differences of Chinese dual- listed stocks caused by the segmented market 
structure. 
.  
                                                 
2 More background information on the market reforms will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
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1.2 Chinese A-Shares Premium Puzzle 
The following Table 1.2 shows the pr ice premium, which is the percentage of the 
price difference relative to the price of the domestic class shares, in selected markets 
which have a similar separate listing market structure to China.  Among all the 
selected segmented markets, China is an exception: instead of paying a premium, 
foreign investors in Chinese shares enjoy a large number of discounts. 
 
Table 1. 2: Foreign Premia in Selected Stock Markets 
The foreign premium is calculated as: (price of equity available to foreign investors – price of 
equity only available to domestic investors) / price of equity only available to domestic investors. 
Country  Source Period Average ‘Foreign Premium’ 
Finland Hietala (1989) 1984-1985 15-40% 
Sweden Bergstrom et al. (1993) 1980-1987 5-68% 
Thailand Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) 1988-1992 5-20% 
Switzerland Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) 1985-1989 10%-40% 
Mexico Domowitz et al. (1997) 1990-1993 4-10% 
China Chakravarty et al. (1998) 1994-1996 -60% 
Singapore Bailey et al. (1999) 1988-1996 32% 
 
This ‘strange’ phenomenon has led to investigations of the potential causes of the 
Chinese A-shares premium (Poon et al., 1998; Su, 1999; Eun et al., 2001; Bergstrom 
and Tang, 2001; Mei et al., 2005; Darrat et al., 2006) from crossed disciplines, e.g.,  
economics, financial economics, behavioural finance, corporate finance and 
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management. All these studies tried to look into the premium from their own 
perspectives and provided their own explanations. A review of the related literature 
will be provided in detail in Chapter 3.  
The Chinese domestic shares premium from March 1992 to February 2007 is 
calculated and provided in the following Figure 1.1. It can be seen that the premium 
phenomenon has been present through the entire sample period in both the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen markets. In the Shanghai market, A-shares were priced two-and-a-half 
times higher on average than the corresponding B-shares during the entire sample 
period. The premium was even as high as 1400% around March 1999, suggesting 
Chinese investors on average paying fifteen times the price foreign investors pay for 
identical assets. Before the opening of the B-shares market to domestic investors the 
mean premium ratio was around 386%, while after the reform, from March 2001 to 
the end of the sample period, it dropped to around 109%, and then dropped slightly 
further after qualified foreign institutional investors entered the A-shares market. 
Although it dropped significantly after the partial removal of the ownership constraint 
in early 2001, the premium continuo usly appears, suggesting that ongoing supporting 
factor s exist. The premium in the Shenzhen market appeared to be relatively less, but 
had the same trend. It averaged 148% over the whole sample period with the value of 
220% before the 2001 market opening reform, 74% after the qualified foreign 
institutional investors entered the A-shares market, and 100% in the time period 
between. Overall, the gap between the price paid by domestic and foreign investors 
narrowed as restrictions on ownership gradually were released, suggesting ‘hard’ 
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market segmentation imposed  by government policies is an important reason why 
such premium exists.  
 
Figure 1.1: Average Price Premium of Chinese A-Shares Over B-Shares 
Note: This figure presents the monthly average A-shares premium in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
respectively, from March 1992 to February 2007. The data is obtained from the Datastream. The average price 
premium PRE is defined as: 
1
N
it it
t
i it
Pa PbPRE
Pb=
−
= ∑ . Pbit has been converted to Chinese currency based on the 
same-day spot exchange rate at time t. Observations contain all the Chinese publicly listed firms which have dual-
class shares listed. The number of observations changes through time because of companies listing and d elisting.  
 
Besides the variation through time, the premium also varies greatly across firms. The 
summary statistics of the averaged Chinese A-shares monthly premium over the 
period of March 1992 to February 2007 is calculated and presented in Table 1.3. SHH 
stands for stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and SHZH stands  for those 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. It can be seen that the average premium 
varies from the minimum 0.21 to maximum 4.70 in the Shanghai market, and that the 
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standard deviation is as high as 1.26. In the Shenzhen market, the difference across 
firms is more modest, although still distinct: the minimum is 0.45, the maximum is 
3.68 and the standard deviation is about 0.67.  
 
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of the Chinese A-Shares Premium 
 SHH SHZH 
Mean 2.501197 1.675722 
Median 2.222562 1.599409 
Maximum 4.702727 3.680613 
Minimum 0.210292 0.450557 
Std.Dev.  1.263658 0.666318 
 
The following Table 1.4 provides information of how the monthly premium is 
distributed among firms. The sample period is split into three sub-periods based on 
the two open market reforms. It can be seen in all the three sample periods that large 
variation has persisted in both exchanges. The distribution also shows that the 
premium of firms listed on the SHSE is more spread out through the time period, 
against the premium of the Shenzhen- listed firms which is more clustered.  
 
Table 1. 4: Distribution of the Chinese A-Shares Premium among Individual Stocks  
a. February 1992 to January 2001 
 SHH SHZH 
Premium # Firms Percentage # Firms Percentage 
100%-200% 2 5% 8 19% 
200%-300% 9 22% 15 36% 
300%-400% 12 29% 15 36% 
 -9- 
400%-500% 7 17% 2 5% 
500%-600% 4 10% 1 2% 
600%-700% 7 17% 1 2% 
Total 41 100% 42 100% 
 
b. February 2001 to June 2003 
 SHH SHZH 
Premium # Firms Percentage # Firms Percentage 
0%-50% 6 14% 0 0% 
50%-100% 15 34% 21 50% 
100%-150% 18 41% 17 40% 
150%-200% 3 7% 4 10% 
above 200% 2 5% 0 0% 
Total 44 100% 42 100% 
 
c. July 20033
 
 to February 2007 
SHH SHZH 
Premium # Firms Percentage # Firms Percentage 
0%-50% 8 18% 15 36% 
50%-100% 14 32% 14 33% 
100%-150% 7 16% 11 26% 
150%-200% 13 30% 2 5% 
above 200% 2 5% 0 0% 
Total 44 100% 42 100% 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The thesis involves three pieces of research looking into the price disparity issue of 
dual- listed shares in the segmented Chinese stock market from three different but 
                                                 
3 Although the government announced the launch of the QFII programme at the end of 2002, the first transaction 
was carried out on 9 July 2003 by UBS Warburg. 
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related aspects. Based on the brief introduction to the Chinese A-shares premium, it is 
natural to ask generally whether existing factors that explain the dual- listed shares 
price premium in other countries are applicable in China; why the premium not only 
varies substantially through time, but also across firms; whether there are any 
additional factors contributing to the large price disparity; what the premium itself 
tells us; how the two markets interact with each other; why China is unique in that 
foreign investors pay less, rather than more, than domestic investors for identical 
underlying assets; and, given the recent institutional changes initiated by the Chinese 
government, how the premium is affected by these open market reforms. Motivated 
by the above thoughts and questions, I have organised this research into three main 
sections :  
 
A. A complementary explanation of the Chinese A-shares premium - from the 
perspective of investors’ valuation preferences.  
(i) My investigation is constructed on the main hypot hesis that besides the ‘hard’ 
segmentation, which is caused by the government’s institutional setting, the 
premium is also a reflection of different investors’ equity valuation 
preferences, which I have called ‘soft’ segmentation. It is documented widely 
in the recent literature that foreign investors, who are mainly institutional 
investors, are more rational than Chinese investors, who are mainly individual 
investors (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Kang et al., 2003; Mei et al., 2005; 
Chan and Kwok, 2005; Chiang et al., 2008). I hypo thesise that instead of 
being short-run liquidity-driven investors, as the majority of the local Chinese 
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individual investors may be considered, foreign investors care more about a 
firm’s intrinsic value, and so they would like to pay relatively more for firms 
whose fundamentals, such as financial leverage, profitability, future prospects, 
dividend policy, corporate governance and size, are more favourable. Hence, 
the premium is lower when a firm is backed by better fundamentals, given that 
other factors are comparable. 
(ii)  As mentioned earlier, the A-shares premium varies substantially across firms. 
Prevailing factors that influence the premium which have been put forward by 
previous studies are mainly market-oriented, for example, the different market 
liquidities of domestic and foreign class shares, different attitudes held by 
domestic and foreign investors toward risk, and the different information held 
by local and foreign investors about the Chinese economy and listed firms; 
however, the premium has never been looked into from a more 
microeconomic aspect, e.g., firm-specific characteristics. This research also 
provides evidence of how firm-specific attributes relate to the premium for the 
first time. 
(iii) The event study of the 2001 open market reform has been well documented in 
previous research; however, the recent QFII event has never been included in 
market segmentation studies. Although not as notably as it did around the 
2001 event, the premium of the Chinese A-shares reduced after the QFII 
programme was launched. The belief that foreign investors are more rational 
was indeed one of the essential considerations when the authority decided to 
introduce foreign institutional investors into the domestic A-shares market.  
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The Chinese stock market has been criticised for not operating its capital 
reallocation function properly, but being flooded with speculation behaviour 
characterised by liquidity-driven trading. As a result, the capital raised is not 
allocated to firms which have best performance. Besides being a step towards 
a free market system where capital can flow freely, the government also hopes 
the QFII can bring more advanced investment perceptions to the A-shares 
market and improve the efficiency of the market. This chapter also provides 
empirical evidence of how the relaxation in market segmentation regulation 
affected the valuation preference of the local Chinese investors. If the QFII is 
indeed successful in bringing Chinese investors value investment perceptions, 
the premium should drop, and the relationship between firm fundamentals and 
the premium should disappear, or weaken, if the relationship does exist, after 
the programme been introduced. 
 
B. Interactions/ information flow pattern between the Chinese A- and B-shares 
markets. 
(i) This chapter is motivated by a well-known question in the finance literature:  
are foreign investors really less well informed than domestic investors about 
local assets? One of the prevailing explanations of the Chinese A-shares 
premium, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, attributes the 
premium to the information asymmetry between local and foreign investors 
groups and bases the theory on the condition that Chinese investors are better 
informed about local assets. However, I feel the condition itself is a 
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controversial argument which needs  further conside ration. I f the condition that 
local Chinese are better informed regarding local assets does not hold, then it 
will be more appropriate to understand the commonly used information 
asymmetry proxy, company size, as a measurement of something else, say, the 
firm fundamental characteristics proposed in Chapter 4.  
(ii) By comparing the extent of market segmentation/ integration in different time 
periods, this chapter also sheds light on research area concerning the 
effectiveness of the institutional changes in reducing the segmentation 
between the Chinese A- and B-shares markets. Previous research suggests 
since the B-shares market opened to local Chinese individuals in 2001, the 
linkage between the A-shares market and B-shares market strengthened. I aim 
to find out how the QFII reform acted in reducing the segmentation as policy 
designers anticipated. The A- and B-shares markets are supposed to be driven 
by same forces and there suppo sedly has been more closely information 
diffusion between the two markets in the post-QFII period.  
(iii) On the econometrics front, besides the popularly used methodologies in 
previous studies, I make use of the recently developed Toda-Yamamoto (1995) 
causality test, and panel unit root and panel cointegration tests allowing for 
heterogeneity in coefficients and dynamics across units, which enable me to 
discuss the long-run structure of the relationship between the share classes, 
and a traditional panel causality test, to provide more robust results. The use of 
panel data techniques in this context is the first in the research field, and 
provides more comprehensive insight into the topic.  
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C. Why is China unique in that foreign investors pay less, rather than more, as 
commonly observed in other segmented markets, for identical underlying assets? 
(i) This question has been raised for a long time and mentioned frequently in the 
existing literature, but as we shall see in the literature review of Chapter 3, has 
never been resolved satisfactorily. It then makes one ask whether the domestic 
class shares premium in China and the foreign class shares premia in other 
countries, which are subject to similar market settings, are caused by the same 
set of factors; if yes, then why do the same set of factors causes foreign shares 
premia in other countries, but a domestic shares premium in China; otherwise, 
the question would relate to a consideration of what is different about the 
Chinese segmented market compared with other countries. Having these 
questions in mind, I compare and contrast the institutional setting of China 
with two other Asian markets, Singapore and Thailand, which are also subject 
to separate listing system; examine whether the prevailing explanations of the 
dual- listed shares price premium, namely the differential risks, liquidities, 
demands and information factors, can explain bot h the domestic class shares 
premium in China and the foreign class shares premia in Singapore and 
Thailand; and propose and test four potential reasons for the opposite Chinese 
premium. Although subject to many restrictions, it provides the first cross-
country comparison evidence after Bailey et al. (1999) with updated data.  
(ii) The study also enr iches the literature on the Singapo re and Thai segmented 
markets. More than 90% of empirical studies in the field of the dual- listed 
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stocks price premium are conducted with data from the Chinese market, while 
only a few works concerning other markets were written in the late 1980s 
and ’90s when foreign ownership restrictions were put in place in most of 
these countries. The majority of these markets relaxed the restrictions on 
foreign ownership because of the need for global market liberalisation, e.g., 
Finland relaxed the law concerning foreign ownership in 1993 and all shares 
have become ‘unrestricted’ since then. While a couple of them, such as 
Thailand, Philippines and Mexico, still have kept the system until today. 
However, no studies of markets apart from China have ever been done with 
up-to-date data. This chapter provides more updated evidence of the foreign 
class shares premia in the Singapore and Thai markets. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:  
An introduction to the background of the Chinese stock market is provided in Chapter 
2, includ ing the development of the Chinese stock market, classification of 
outstanding shares, state ownership structure characteristics, and relaxations in market 
segmentation regulations. In Chapter 3, related literature on market segmentation and 
dual-class shares pricing is reviewed in detail, including both overseas and Chinese 
theoretical and empirical evidence. In particular, four main factors proved in previous 
studies attributable to the dual- listing shares price disparity are introduced, namely the 
differential risks, differential liquidities, differential demands and asymmetric 
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information. The recently raised speculative trading and corporate governance 
hypotheses are also reviewed.  
The three main research sections are then presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
Chapter 4 proposes and examines a new hypothesis via firm specific characteristics: 
the Chinese A-shares premium is a reflection of the ‘soft’ segmentation caused by 
different valuation preferences that local and foreign investors hold, and firms which 
have better fundamentals tend to have lower premia. Following an introduction in 
Section 4.1, Section 4.2 discusses how the premium should relate to firm 
fundamentals measured by financial leverage, profitability, future prospects, dividend 
policy, corpo rate governance and size. Section 4.3 describes data sources and 
selection criterion, and summary statistics. In order to get a more robust result, the 
relationship between the firm fundamentals and the premium is examined from a 
variety of angles: in Section 4.4, a dynamic panel data estimation is conducted over 
11 years from 1994 to 2004; in Section 4.5, cross-sectional estimations are conducted 
in three sub-periods, i.e., pre-2001 event, post-2001 event, and post-QFII even; and in 
Section 4.6,  event studies are conducted to find out what fundamental features firms 
having larger declines in the premia around the events have. Section 4.7 summarizes 
and discusses.  
The existence and extent of the market segmentation and the direction of information 
flows between the foreign and local shares markets are examined in Chapter 5. 
Section 5.1 introduces the motivation and reviews related literature. Using time series 
techniques, i.e., unit root and cointegration tests, Granger causality test, Toda-
Yamamoto causality test and impulse response functions, Section 5.2 examines the 
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long-run price movement between the Chinese A- and B-shares, the direction of 
information flows and short-run interactions between them. Section 5.3 revisits the 
long-run relationship and information flows between them using panel data 
techniques, i.e., panel unit-root and cointegration tests and panel causality test. A 
summary is provided in Section 5.4. 
A cross-country comparison among China, Singapore and Thailand is presented in 
Chapter 6. Following an introduction in Section 6.1, Section 6.2 introduces and 
compares the institutional settings in China, Singapore and Thailand. Section 6.3 
introduces data source and selection criterion. A preliminary description of the premia 
in the sample countries is provided in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 examines whether the 
domestic class shares premium in China and foreign class shares premia in Singapore 
and Thailand can be explained by same set of factor(s). Section 6.6 raises and 
examines four possible causes of the opposite premium in China. Section 6.7 
summarizes and discusses. 
Finally, a conclus ion and some evaluation of the contribution in the thesis are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND ON THE CHINESE 
STOCK MARKETS 
2.1 Introduction 
As one of the most successful emerging stock markets around the world, the Chinese 
stock market has some unique characteristics which are different from any other 
developed stock markets well documented in finance literature. To better understand 
the price behaviour of the segmented Chinese A- and B-shares, this chapter aims to 
provide relevant background information of the Chinese stock markets, based on 
which analyses and arguments which will be discussed in latter chapters could be 
made. The organization of this chapter is as follows: Firstly, the development of the 
Chinese stock markets from a historical perspective will be reviewed in Section 2.2. 
Section 2.3 introduces the classification of Chinese publicly- listed shares along with a 
brief comparison among the different classes. A very important characteristic of 
shares ownership structure in China, state owned non-tradable shares, is introduced in 
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses recent regulation changes in removing the 
ownership restrictions and opening the markets. 
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2.2 The Development of Chinese Stock Markets 
It is widely noticed that China’s recent history of economic expansion is spectacular 
among developing countries. Following Deng Xiaoping’s reopen-door speech and 
economic reforms launched in 1978, China’s GDP has been consistently achieved 
double-digit growth. The 11.4% annual growth rate in economic output for  the 2007  
period even kept China on track to surpass Germany as the world's third- largest 
economy in 20081
The development of the Chinese stock markets has been particularly remarkable. Prior 
to 1978, China adopted a planned economy system and the entire financial system 
was controlled by state owned banks. The major, if not the only, source for 
enterprises’ finance was through state-funded direct budgetary grants or  government 
allocated bank credits. During the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, these 
traditional channe ls became a restriction in meeting companies’ financing need for 
further development. The reform of China’s stock market, after around one century’s 
abandonment, can be traced back to the early 90s, when the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) established. This was quickly followed by the opening of the other stock 
exchange, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in July 1991. Since then, China’s 
stock market has been experiencing tremendous development. The following Table 
2.1 provides a historical perspective of the development of the Chinese stock markets.  
. The success of the Chinese government’s economic policies has 
brought China attention from all over the world, both academic and practical, and it 
has become a referential model for other emerging markets.  
 
                                                 
1 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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Table 2. 1: Development of the Chinese Stock Markets  
Year Number 
of Listed 
Firms 
Total Issued 
Capital 
(Billion of 
Shares) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(Billion of 
Yuan) 
Trading 
Volume 
(Million of 
Shares) 
Yearly 
Transaction 
(Billion of 
Yuan) 
Opened 
Accounts 
(Thousands) 
1992 53 6.89  104.81  3795.39  68.13  2166.5  
1993 183 38.77  353.10  23422.17  366.70  8351.7  
1994 291 68.45  369.06  201333.91  812.76  11077.6  
1995 323 84.84  347.43  70547.06  403.65  12941.9  
1996 530 121.95  984.24  253314.06  2133.22  24220.8  
1997 745 194.27  1752.92  256079.12  3072.18  34802.6  
1998 851 252.68  1950.56  215411.00  2354.43  42598.8  
1999 949 308.90  2647.12  293238.88  3131.96  48106.3  
2000 1088 379.17  4809.09  475840.00  6082.67  61232.4  
2001 1160 521.80  4352.22  315228.76  3830.52  68986.8  
2002 1224 587.55  3832.91  301619.49  2799.05  68418.4  
2003 1287 642.85  4245.77  416308.40  3211.53  69812.4  
2004 1377 714.94  3705.56  582773.29  4233.40  72157.4  
2005 1381 762.95  3243.03  662373.20  3166.48  73360.7  
2006 1434 1492.64  8940.39  1614522.62  9046.89  78540.0  
       Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 2007. 
 
By the end of year 2006, the number of listed firms has increased from 53 in 1992 to 
1434, and the capital issued has increased from less than 10 billion shares to more 
than 1400 billion shares. During the same period, the market capitalization has 
increased to nearly 86 times the initial amount. Market liquidity also has improved 
greatly: trading volume increased 400 times in 15 years. Yearly transactions expanded 
rapidly from about 68 to 9,000 billion Yua n from 1992 to 2006, and the number of 
opened accounts also experienced sustainable growth.  
Until December 2006, the year-end market capitalization of both exchanges has 
reached RMB 8,940.39 billion, which equals 42.69% of the annual GDP. China’s 
stock market has become the third largest in Asia and the ninth largest in the world in 
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term of year-end market capitalization2
 
. The significant success of the Chinese stock 
markets has attracted the attention of bo th direct and portfolio investors from overseas.  
Figure 2.1: Ratio of  Chinese Market Capitalization to GDP 
 
          Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 2007. 
 
Most of the listed companies on SHSE are based locally in the Shanghai area, while 
those listed on SZSE are mostly based in industrial and commercial cities in inland 
China (see Su, 2003). The two exchanges are subject to similar trading process and 
regulations. Both exchanges operate under an auction market environment without 
market makers. Companies are not allowed to list across exchanges.  SHSE and SZSE 
run their clearing and settlement and maintain their trusteeship under their own 
systems. They both adopt a non-profit corporate membership system and recruit 
members nationwide. Only members have the right to enter orders directly into the 
trading system. 
                                                 
2 Source: Summary for Chinese Securities Market in 2006, CSRC. 
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2.3 Classification of Listed Shares 
China’s equity market began to open to the outside world when the foreign shares 
market was introduced. In the early stage of the development of the Chinese stock 
markets, the central government hoped to prevent foreign investors influencing share 
prices and to maintain domestic control, meanwhile to solve the demand of foreign 
exchange for domestic enterprises. A separate foreign shares marke t, B-shares market 
was therefore established in February 1992, when the Shanghai Vacuum Electronics 
began issuing B-shares on the SHSE, and this was quickly followed by the listing of 
the China Southern Glass B-shares on the SZSE on 28 February 1992.  
The B-shares are denominated in the Chinese currency, RMB, but traded in foreign 
currencies: the ones traded in the SHSE are quoted in U. S. dollars, and the ones listed 
in the SZSE are quoted in H. K. do llars. Dividend payments of the B-shares are also 
carried out in foreign currencies based on the same-day official exchange rate. 
According to China’s Corporate Law and Securities Law, the A-shares and B-shares 
are legally identical in terms of their voting power and dividends claim rights, at the 
same time, B-shares holders bear the same obligation as A-shares holders. The 
difference between the A-shares and B-shares only comes from who can legally own 
and trade them. For both types, dual- listing across exchanges is not allowed.  By the 
end of December 2006, there were 1434 companies listed on the SHSE and SZSE, 
and of which 109 companies issue the B-shares and 86 companies of which have both 
the A- and B-shares. Companies that have issued foreign shares are usually large 
enterprises with heavy export orientation so that they have sufficient foreign 
currencies to implement dividend payments. 
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Table 2.2 provides a historical comparison of the Chinese A- and B-shares in respect 
of their number of shares issued,  trading and total market capitalization, annual 
transaction, trading volume, turnover rate and price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio.   
 
Table 2. 2: Comparison of Chinese A- and B-Shares 
Year  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of 
Stocks 
SHH_A 101 169 184 287 372 425 471 
SHH_B 22 34 36 42 50 52 54 
SHZH_A 76 118 127 227 348 400 450 
SHZH_B 19 24 34 43 51 54 54 
Trading Market 
Capitalization 
(Billion of Yuan) 
SHH_A 29.44 47.04 49.51 124.71 232.79 284.69 410.99 
SHH_B 12.95 11.66 9.20 16.17 18.56 10.05 13.98 
SHZH_A 38.86 34.35 29.59 126.70 252.82 270.31 382.75 
SHZH_B 4.91 3.84 5.53 19.13 16.27 9.50 13.67 
Total Market 
Capitalization 
(Billion of Yuan) 
SHH_A 206.77 248.35 243.37 531.61 903.25 1052.54 1444.07 
SHH_B 12.80 11.66 9.20 16.19 18.56 10.05 13.98 
SHZH_A 125.10 103.25 87.69 413.24 812.17 877.39 1172.69 
SHZH_B 8.43 5.80 7.18 23.21 18.94 10.58 16.38 
Annual 
Transaction 
(Billion of Yuan) 
SHH_A 226.17 562.67 304.26 902.02 1355.02 1230.42 1682.62 
SHH_B 7.89 10.84 6.08 9.46 21.29 8.19 13.96 
SHZH_A 126.09 237.64 91.60 1203.21 1674.50 1111.35 1422.34 
SHZH_B 2.58 1.62 1.70 18.53 21.37 4.46 13.05 
Trading Volume 
(Billion of 
Shares) 
SHH_A 13.37 63.43 49.45 107.40 116.60 108.54 148.83 
SHH_B 1.37 2.24 1.93 2.79 4.97 4.25 7.21 
SHZH_A 7.55 35.37 18.66 139.09 130.53 100.71 132.15 
SHZH_B 0.37 0.29 0.50 4.03 3.91 1.91 5.05 
Turnover Rate 
(%) 
SHH_A NA 1471.48 630.32 1035.55 758.07 475.55 483.73 
SHH_B NA 88.04 58.34 74.57 122.62 57.23 116.19 
SHZH_A 464.41 638.39 268.10 1295.32 813.95 396.09 399.09 
SHZH_B 86.80 35.13 37.28 139.26 99.88 34.10 86.63 
P/E Ratio 
SHH_A NA NA NA 32.65 NA NA 38.14 
SHH_B NA NA NA 14.04 NA NA 10.05 
SHZH_A 44.21 10.67 9.8 38.88 42.66 32.31 37.56 
SHZH_B 20.11 7.02 6.01 14.07 10.67 5.71 10.38 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of 
Stocks 
SHH_A 559 636 705 770 827 824 832 
SHH_B 55 54 54 54 54 54 54 
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SHZH_A 451 494 494 491 526 534 579 
SHZH_B 59 56 57 57 56 55 55 
Trading Market 
Capitalization 
(Billion of Yuan) 
SHH_A 814.68 772.61 702.50 779.69 705.06 651.46 1593.39 
SHH_B 33.45 65.61 44.23 40.43 30.03 24.01 49.44 
SHZH_A 737.74 561.88 469.38 450.91 394.79 351.39 779.74 
SHZH_B 22.88 46.22 32.35 46.83 39.00 36.20 77.80 
Total Market 
Capitalization 
(Billion of Yuan) 
SHH_A 2659.63 2693.45 2492.14 2940.07 2571.41 2285.61 7111.80 
SHH_B 33.45 65.61 44.23 40.43 30.03 24.01 49.44 
SHZH_A 2085.94 1531.11 1260.51 1211.98 1059.53 895.45 1699.60 
SHZH_B 30.07 62.06 36.03 53.30 44.60 37.97 79.55 
Annual 
Transaction 
(Billion of Yuan) 
SHH_A 3102.97 1987.68 1644.17 2054.12 2622.93 1906.15 5724.51 
SHH_B 34.42 283.25 51.74 28.29 24.13 17.87 57.15 
SHZH_A 2924.90 1336.52 1070.03 1072.87 1534.69 1203.79 3197.20 
SHZH_B 20.38 223.06 33.10 56.24 51.65 38.67 68.03 
Trading Volume 
(Billion of 
Shares) 
SHH_A 231.09 142.97 169.35 263.26 355.09 392.69 1012.43 
SHH_B 12.68 39.03 8.76 6.01 5.69 5.97 15.97 
SHZH_A 224.71 103.37 116.60 135.96 212.20 254.40 568.43 
SHZH_B 7.36 29.86 6.91 11.07 9.80 9.32 17.70 
Turnover Rate 
(%) 
SHH_A 506.33 216.67 208.74 268.58 288.71 290.70 564.50 
SHH_B 145.13 452.26 95.99 64.26 58.29 58.49 149.81 
SHZH_A 496.58 190.30 194.37 219.74 311.78 350.64 671.34 
SHZH_B 115.30 423.47 83.55 138.17 110.04 88.21 154.65 
P/E Ratio 
SHH_A 59.14 37.59 34.50 36.64 24.23 16.38 33.38 
SHH_B 25.23 43.39 30.61 30.32 20.15 12.40 23.97 
SHZH_A 58.75 40.76 38.22 37.43 25.64 16.96 33.61 
SHZH_B 13.06 25.30 17.51 20.92 12.90 9.11 21.01 
Source: Summarized from the China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook in various years. 
 
Observations are drawn as following: 
a) In contrast to the consistent steady increase of the A-shares, IPO of the 
B-shares became slow down from 1998; and especially after 2001, the 
IPO of the B-shares stopped in both exchanges. The long standing 
liquidity problem of the B-shares and the therefore debate that whether it 
is necessary to keep the B-shares market possibly is the main reason of 
this. 
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b) The market size of the B-shares is much smaller compared with their 
counterpart A-shares. Through the years, the total trading market 
capitalization of the B-shares never exceeded 10% of the A-shares’ in 
either exchange after 1997. As of the end of 2006, the total trading 
market capitalization of the B-shares only accounts for about 3% of the 
A-shares’ in the Shanghai market and 9% in the Shenzhen market. The 
same observation is found with the total market capitalization. At the end 
of 2006, the B-shares market size is less than 1% and 5% of the A-
shares’ in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets respectively.  
c) The yearly transaction of the B-shares has been around 1%-3% of the A-
shares’ through the time, apart from one exception of year 2001 when 
Chinese residents rushed into the former restricted B-shares market and 
pushed up the B-shares transaction sharply. For the year 2001, the B-
shares transaction takes up 14% and 17% of the A-shares’ in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets respectively. 
d) The B-shares market has suffered from a sever liquidity problem ever 
since its inception. Apart from 2001, the trading volume of the B-shares 
only takes percentages ranging from 1% to 9% of the total market 
trading volume in the rest of the years. 
e) At the inception of the Chinese stock market, turnover rate of the 
Shanghai- listed A-shares was as high as 1471.48%, suggesting a lack of 
alternative investment vehicles in the Chinese domestic market. 
Although the turnover rate of the A-shares has been dropping through 
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the time, the B-shares are consistently much less liquid in all years 
except 2001. The turnover rates of the B-shares in the pos t-2001 period 
increased significantly since more Chinese individuals took part in. The 
same trend is observed in the Shenzhen marke t apart from the peak 
liquidity of the A-shares occurred in 1996 when the market went through 
an up-trend.  
f) Except for the years 1994 and 1995 when the Chinese stock market went 
through its first bear market, the PE ratio of the A-shares has been 
consistently higher than the average level in mature markets and even 
other emerging markets. Given the A- and B-shares are subject to same 
earnings entitlements, the PE ratio of the A-shares has been consistently 
higher than the B-shares’. Comparing between the exchanges, the 
Shenzhen- listed A-shares started to have consistently relatively higher 
ratios than the Shanghai- listed A-shares from 2001; while the opposite 
trend is observed as for the B-shares.  
In 1993, additional classes of stock were created to facilitate the direct listings of 
Chinese companies on foreign stock exchanges. They are known as H-shares (listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange), N-shares (listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange), L-shares (listed on the London Stock Exchange), and S-shares (listed on 
the Singapore Stock Exchange). The H-, N-, L- and S-shares carry the same rights and 
obligations as the A- and B-shares, but they can only be traded in overseas markets. 
These overseas shares constitute only a small proportion of a company’s shareholding, 
and are not included in the study of this thesis. 
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Table 2. 3: Comparison of Chinese A-, B-, and H-Shares 
 A-shares B-shares H-shares 
Differences 
Trading 
Market 
Shanghai A-shares market  
Shenzhen A-shares market  
Shanghai B-shares market 
Shenzhen B-shares market 
Hong Kong securities 
market 
Legal 
Investors 
Chinese citizens, 
corporations and other 
organizations. 
(i) Foreign countries’ 
citizens, corporations 
and other 
organizations; 
(ii)  Citizens, corporations 
and other 
organizations in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and M acao; 
(iii)  Chinese citizens 
inhabited overseas;  
(iv) Other investors 
permitted by the 
State Secur ities 
Committee. 
(i) Foreign countries’ 
citizens, corporations and 
other organizations; 
(ii) Citizens, corporations 
and other organizations in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macao; 
(iii) Chinese citizens 
inhabited overseas;  
(iv) Other investors 
permitted by the State 
Secur ities Committee.  
Quoted 
Currenci
-es 
Renminbi 
Shanghai market：U. S. 
Dollars 
Shenzhen market：H. K. 
Dollars 
H. K. Dollars 
Similarities The rights and obligations of the A-, B- and H- share are identical, including voting rights and dividends. 
 
2.4 Non-Tradable Shares 
An unparalleled feature of ownership structure of the Chinese stock markets is the 
presence of non-tradable shares (NTS). Chinese enterprises were run by the state 
under a planner economy system before the 1980s. Ever since the launch of the 
privatisation reform, selective previously state-owned enterprises have restructured 
and have issued shares. In an attempt to preserve control, a large number of 
outstanding common shares are kept by the government or government agencies. 
These types of shares are not allowed to be traded on either of the exchange, but can 
only be transferred privately or through auctions. Concretely speaking, Chinese 
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domestic shares can be put into four classes, namely, (1) government shares, held by 
the government through a designated government agency, State Assets Management 
Bureau (SAMB); (2) legal entity shares, also called restricted institutional shares, held 
by other state-owned enterprises or other economic entities besides individuals; (3) 
employee shares, held by managers and employees; and (4) ordinary domestic shares, 
that is the A-shares. The first three types fall into the category of NTS. The 
government shares, legal entity shares, and employee shares are initially sold at 
share's face value, which is the book value of a firm's total assets divided by the total 
number of shares declared in the prospectus, while the tradable A-shares are typically 
initially sold through firm-commitment underwriting mechanism with a lottery to 
allocate shares or through auction mechanism. Although the NTS are not tradable, the 
employee shares are allowed to be listed after a three-year lock up period. Again, all 
the types of the domestic shares are entitled to the same voting rights and cash flow 
rights.  
The following Figure 2.2 provides a perspective of the outstanding shares Chinese 
publicly- listed firms issued by February 2006.  
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Figure 2.2: Outstanding Shares by Class (As of February 2006) 
 
          Source: Bortolotti and Beltratti, 2006. 
 
The presence of the NTS brings negative effects to the development of the Chinese 
financial market. For example, it harms market liquidity by reducing supply and 
pushing up the price of tradable shares since a large fraction of capital was suppressed; 
it is a major hurdle to market transparency; and it also leads to poor corporate 
governance. After some failed attempts, in April 2005, the Chinese authorities 
launched a structural reform programme aiming at eliminating the NTS. The first 
batch of trial companies started the reform on 19 May 2005. The reform allows shares 
held by the state and/  or legal person, which were prohibited from public trading, to 
be floated on the A-shares market after getting the consensus of the existing holders 
of the A-shares. The reform violates the legal agreement that the holde rs of the NTS 
made when companies went for IPOs. In order to make the go-public successful, the 
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NTS holders offer attractive compensations in forms of cash, shares, and/  or op tions 
to the existing A-shares holders. Until the end of 2006, there were only 18 firms from 
the SHSE and 22 firms from the SZSE which had not finished the reform3. Resulting 
from the successful reform, the Chinese A-shares started to recover from its five-year 
bearish market. The B-shares market also picked up the steam in early January of 
2006 and jumped up 20% in just half a month upon the rumour that the A-shares and 
B-shares markets may merge after China completes its non-tradable shares reform 
initiative 4
2.5 Regulations 
.  
In this section, I will briefly introduce some relevant regulations about B-shares 
listing, and then discuss three major recent regulation changes aiming to reduce/ 
remove the market segmentation. 
The state regulation authority for the securities market is the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which supervises stock listing, trading activities and 
settlement. A company which wants to issue and then list shares must apply for 
permission from the CSRC. Generally,  companies allowed to list the B-shares have to 
fulfil a greater number of requirements than when issuing the A-shares. In Shenzhen, 
among a number of additional rules, the return on capital in the year preceding the 
listing must be no less than 10%; in Shanghai, among other rules, B-shares issuers 
must have been operating profitably for at least two consecutive years prior to listing. 
Companies have the B-shares listed are subject to International Accounting Standards, 
                                                 
3 Source: http://www.p5w.net/stock/news/zonghe/200612/t699718.htm. 
4 See Tong and Yu, 2007. 
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and are expected to have more rigorous auditing process performed by international 
accounting firms operating in China.  
Individual investors are allowed to hold up to 25% of a firm’s B-shares, but the total 
foreign ownership of a firm cannot exceed 49%. 
2.5.1 2001 Open B-Shares Market Reform 
As suggested in Table 2.2, the B-shares market has experienced thin trading ever 
since its opening. This has concerned the government and CSRC for some time. 
Following the speech of Mr. Tu Guangshao, the President of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange on 17 April 2000 that the B-shares market would sooner be in the direction 
of internationalisation, and the announcement of Mr. Dai Xianglong, the Governor of 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) on 16 June 2000 that the difficulty in the B-shares 
market would soon be  solved 5, on 19 February 2001, the CSRC and the State Foreign 
Exchange Administration Bureau (SAFE) officially announced that domestic 
investors can open trading accounts for the B-shares, which previously were reserved 
for overseas investors since its inception 10 years ago6
                                                 
5 China Securities, 27 April, 2001. 
. A domestic investor has to 
open a bank account designated for trading the B-shares. The price of the B-shares 
jumped significantly immediately after the announcement. The B-shares market was 
then closed for a week after that and resumed trading on 28 February. Starting then, 
Chinese nationals with existing foreign currency deposit accounts with a domestic 
commercial bank were allowed to trade the B-shares. Those who opened a foreign 
currency deposit account with a domestic bank after 19 February would be allowed to 
6 More detail about the policy is available in the Appendix A. 
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trade the B-shares only from 1 June 2001 onwards.  
The policy is aimed at allowing a relatively huge amount of domestic money enter 
and improve the activities of the B-shares market. But the purchase of the B-shares 
can be made only under certain conditions, e.g., a domestic investor has to open a 
bank account designated for trading the B-shares; foreign exchange in such an 
account has to be transferred from foreign banks. Although the price of the B-shares 
increased dramatically following the announcement, given the capital controls in 
China, there were still not enough arbitrage opportunities between the A- and B-
shares markets, thus the price difference between the A- and B-shares still presented 
itself after the reform. The liquidity of the B-shares market did improve after the 
reform, however, the po licy only made progress on this front in the first few months, 
after then the Chinese stock market came into a five-year bear market.  
2.5.2 QFII Programme 
Opening the B-shares market created a new avenue for Chinese domestic investors, 
however, foreign investors were still kept away from the fast-growing Chinese 
domestic market. Another important stock market liberalization policy enforced by 
China in the last decade is the so called QFII programme. To speed up the process of 
market liberalization, on 7 November 2002, the CSRC and PBC jointly announced the 
Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments of 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (the QFII Provisional Measures) 7
                                                 
7 See the Appendix B for details.  
. The QFII 
scheme permits a QFII to invest in (i) shares listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges (excluding the B-shares), (ii) government bonds listed in the 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, (iii) convertible and enterprise bonds listed 
in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and (iv) any other financial 
instruments approved by the CSRC. Only foreign institutional investors, such as fund 
management institutions, insurance companies, securities companies, and other asset 
management institutions who satisfy a series of strict criteria and aim at long-run 
investment could be selected as QFIIs. Acceptable foreign institutional investors who 
have Securities Investment Licenses from the CSRC, and an invest quota from the 
SAFE need to deposit their investments which are exchanged into Chinese currency 
through their designated custodial banks and select qualified securities deals to make  
their investments. One QFII cannot own more than 10% of shares of one company 
and o ne company cannot have more than 20% of its shares owned by QFIIs. Officially 
acted from 1 December 2002, the scheme opens the door for foreign investors to 
participate in China’s major stock market, the A-shares market. As of 14 October 
2004, a total of 25 foreign institutions have received QFII licenses 8
 
 with quotas 
ranging from $50 million to $800 million, amounting to more than $2.8 billion 
authorized for investment in the Chinese markets.  
Table 2.4: QFII Qualification Criteria 
Category of Institution Operational Track 
Record 
Paid-Up Capital Assets Under 
Management  
Others  
Fund Management 
Institutions  >5 years  - >=US$ 10 billion - 
Insurance Companies  >30 years  >=US$ 1 billion >=US$ 10 billion - 
Securities Companies  >30 years  >=US$ 1 billion >=US$ 10 billion - 
Commercial Banks - - >=US$ 10 billion Top 100 ranking in the world on total assets  
                                                 
8 A full name list of licensed QFIIs as of May 2008 is available in Appendix C.  
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Source: Yeo, 2003, The PRC Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Market. 
 
The QFII scheme is considered to be one of the most important stock market 
liberalization policies enforced by China in the last decade. Chinese authorities 
wanted the introduction of the QFIIs to help solve problems in the domestic market 
caused by lack of mature institutional investors. And QFIIs are also considered 
helpful in improving the corporate governance of listed firms. Experience from 
Taiwan 9  and South Korea 10
2.5.3 QDII Programme 
 proved that after QFII programmes introduced, the 
perception of valuing blue chips, firms which return cash flows to investors and firms 
which concern long-term growth became prevailing, short-term speculation behaviour 
diminished and huge fluctuations, to some extent, have reduced. Through the 
introduction of the QFII programme, qualified foreign institutional investors would be 
attracted to take part in the Chinese domestic market and help establishing and 
improving the institutional investment culture in the market.  
QDII was initially proposed by the Hong Kong government to introduce mainland 
capital to the Hong Kong securities market and to attract more international capital, 
which was significant in helping the Hong Kong securities market get rid of the 
depression after the Asian Financial Crisis. When the scheme was firstly proposed, 
the CSRC was enthusiastic in promoting the scheme, while on the other hand, SAFE 
                                                 
9 The QFII Programme in Taiwan began in 1990 with the issuance of the “Regulations Governing Securities 
Investment By Overseas Chinese and Foreign Nationals”, which set out the basic rules dealing with foreign 
institutional investment. 
10 Korea announced guidelines for the limited opening up of its securities market to foreign investment in 1991. By 
1998, with the exception of certain key industries, full liberalization of all listed securities to foreign investment 
was complete. 
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was hesitate due to its concern on the foreign exchange control. On 13 April 2006, the 
Chinese government finally announced the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 
(QDII) scheme, allowing Chinese institutions and residents to invest in foreign 
securities markets via certain fund management institutions, insurance companies, 
securities companies and other assets management institutions which have been 
approved by the CSRC.  
The QDII scheme is considered to have made major progress in reducing the intens ity 
of controls, particularly controls on capital outflow.  With the same intention of 
introducing QFIIs, the QDII scheme is also a transitional system under the condition 
that the capital account is not completely open. Seeing successful experiences from 
other countries, policy makers believed that through the scheme, existing Chinese 
institutional investors could learn advanced skills from foreign investors and gain 
experience in investing overseas; Chinese individuals could find alternative 
investment opportunities; to a certain degree, the huge demand pressure of the 
domestic shares could be released; and the huge unbalance of the capital account 
could be improved.  
Two years after the announcement, granted QDII quotas have reached nearly half 
billion U. S. dollars, and half of which were targeted the Hong Kong market. 
However, as the pressure on the appreciation of renminbi grows, the attitude of 
various government departments is becoming more receptive to the scheme, and the 
CSRC is becoming more conservative because the scheme might affect the Chinese 
A- and B-shares markets.  
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To summarize, the following F igure 2.3 p rovides a timeline of the major events of the 
Chinese stock market, including its set up and recent ownership restrictions regulatory 
changes. 
 
Figure 2.3: Timeline of the Chinese Stock Market  
Chinese stock 
market opened to 
foreign investors 
Jul 1991 Feb 2001 Feb 1992 
A-shares market 
opened to foreign 
investors through QFII 
Dec2002 
B-shares market 
opened to Chinese 
domestic investors 
Establishment of the 
Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 
Apr 2006 
QDII allows Chinese 
investors to invest in 
foreign securities 
markets  
Dec 1990 
Establishment 
of the Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
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CHAPTER 3 
POSITED EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
PREMIUM IN THE DUAL-LISTED 
SHARES PRICE 
3.1 Introduction 
Why are shares owned by different kinds of investors priced differently? There have 
been various explanations put forward on the issue. Researchers, through studies in 
both Chinese stock market, which presents a relatively lower foreign class shares 
pr ice, and other countries whose markets are also segmented but prohibit an opposite 
premium phenomenon, proposed factors such as, different risk premia required by 
foreign and local investors (Hietala, 1989; Bailey, 1994; Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; 
Ma, 1996; Su, 1999, 2000; Eun et al., 2001; Bergstrom and Tang, 2001; Chen et al., 
2001; Chan and Kwok, 2005), differences in general supp ly and demand conditions of 
restricted and unrestricted shares (Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995;  Domowitz et al., 
1997; Poon et al., 1998; Bailey et al., 1999; Sun and Tong, 2000; Bergstrom and Tang, 
2001; Gordon and Li, 2003; Levi and Diao, 2005; Chan and Kwok, 2005; Yang and 
Lau, 2005), difference in market liquidities of the two segmented markets (Chen et al., 
2001; Chan et al., 2002; Karolyi and Li, 2003; Chan and Kwok, 2005), information 
asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors (Chakravarty et al., 1998; 
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Bergstrom and Tang, 2001; Chan et al., 2002, 2004; Karolyi and Li, 2003; Chan and 
Kwok, 2005), speculative trading component (Mei et al., 2005) and corporate 
governance (Tong and Yu, 2007; Lu, 2005; Darrat et al., 2006), may have significant 
explanation pow ers to the price difference of different categories of shares. In order to 
have a precise picture of the premium between dual- listed common shares, a review 
of the prevailing explanations to the observed effect of ownership constraints on stock 
prices will be provided in this chapter.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 will give a brief 
review of the differential risk hypothesis which argues that the premium is caused by 
different risk free rates and different attitudes toward risk between foreign and local 
investors; Section 3.3 will introduce the differential demand hypothesis which argues 
that foreign and domestic investors groups have different demand curves to the local 
assets and the one which is less elastic pays higher price; Section 3.4  introduces the 
differential liquidity hypothesis which argues that the premium resulted in different 
liquidities of the two share classes, and investors who can only trade the illiquid class 
require a lower price as liquidity compensation; a careful review of the information 
asymmetry hypothesis is provided in Section 3.5, and this hypothesis argues that the 
premium is caused by unequally information sets foreign and local investors have 
access to; Section 3.6 introduces other newly proposed hypotheses regarding the 
premium, including speculative trading hypothesis and corporate governance 
hypothesis; finally, Section 3.7 summarizes and discusses.  
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3.2 Differential Risk Hypothesis 
Hietala (1989) was the first author to attribute the premium between restricted shares 
and unrestricted shares to the different risks found by the two investors types. He 
extended the Sharpe (1964)-Lintner (1965)-Mossin (1966)’s Capital Asset Pricing 
Model to take into account the restrictions in the Finnish stock market, which, from 
1984 to 1986, was partially segmented by means of domestic investors being eligible 
for both restricted and unrestricted shares and foreigners being limited to unrestricted 
shares. This market setting parallels the situation of Chinese stock market after 
February 2001. His one-time period equilibrium asset pricing model implies that for 
stocks available to both investors groups, i.e., unrestricted shares, the equilibrium 
price will be determined solely by the demand from one investor group and the stock 
will appear overpriced to the other investor group. Moreover, the legal restrictions on 
the ownership will prohibit investors from shorting and thus there will be no pressure 
toward price revisions. Hietala (1989) pointed out that an unrestricted stock is traded 
at a premium if and only if the price of the unrestricted stock is determined by foreign 
investors who require a lower risk premium on this stock than domestic investors do. 
In a practical way, the model suggests that “the smaller the beta of the unrestricted 
stock calculated with respect to the foreign investors’ optimal portfolio relative to the 
beta of the restricted stock calculated with respect to the domestic investors’ optimal 
portfolio, the larger the equilibrium premium”. Alternatively, if the risk premium 
required by foreign investors is higher than or the same as the rate required by 
domestic investors, the unrestricted and restricted stocks should be traded at identical 
pr ices. His empirical test with the Finish data from January 1984 to June 1985 
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provides supportive evidence to the model: the price premium is positively correlated 
with t he do mestic betas while the international betas are insignificantly different from 
zero.  
Bailey (1994) was the first to uncover the Chinese A-shares premium with only 
preliminary data (two firms from the SHSE and six firms from the SZSE) at the start 
of the market (1992-1993). He attributed the higher A-shares price mainly to the 
difference of the returns that domestic and foreign investors required. Firstly, the cost 
of capital for the A-shares is relatively lower compared with their counterpart B-
shares, since the lack of alternative investment opportunities to low-yielding bank 
accounts for Chinese residents drives domestic Chinese savings into stock 
investments. Secondly, if B-shares investors are primarily Hong Kong residents 1
Both Ma (1996) and later Eun et al. (2001) extended the equilibrium international 
asset pricing model of Eun and Janakiramanan (1986)
, 
Chinese political and economic risks are perceived to be the non-diversifiable 
systematic risks which cause unrestricted B-shares to be priced lower. However, as 
the study was carried out quite early, it is not possible to draw strong conclusions 
given the small sample size covered by the preliminary research.  
2
                                                 
1 See Bergstrom and Tang (2001), their result also suggests that investors in the B-shares are likely to be active 
investors in the Hong Kong stock market. 
 to propose that the price 
difference may be influenced by the costs of capital of the two investors groups and 
investors’ attitudes toward risk. In Ma’s (1996) model, markets are perfectly 
segmented, in other words, domestic investors are only allowed to hold the A-shares, 
2 Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) considered the impact of capital outflow to the securities price. In their two-
country world model, domestic investors are only allowed to own a limited fraction of the number of shares 
outstanding from foreign firms. When this constraint is binding, two different prices occur in the foreign securities 
market. 
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foreign investors are only allowed to hold the B-shares, and no arbitrage is possible 
caused by government’s regulations. The price ratio of the B-shares and A-shares can 
be expressed in the form of: 
( )B d B F B B F BC C B
A f A D A A A
P r A N A N
P r A N
µ δ
µ δ
− Γ − Γ −
=
− Γ −
                                                                  (3.1) 
where Pi (i=A, B, C) refers to the vectors of the current pr ices of the A-shares, B-
shares, and foreign shares respectively; rd and rf refer to the risk free rates in domestic 
country and foreign country respectively; iµ  (i=A, B) refers to the vector of the 
conditiona l expected value of the end-of-period price of the corresponding shares; Ai 
(i=F,D) refers to measure of risk aversion of respective investor groups; iΓ (i=A, B) 
refers to covariance matrix of the prices of respective shares; BCΓ  refers to covariance 
matrix of the prices of the B-shares and foreign shares; Ni (i=A, B, C) refers to vector 
of the number of corresponding shares outstanding; iδ (i=A, B) refers to vector of per 
share trading costs of corresponding shares.  
It is suggested by (3.1) that the price ratio of the B-shares and A-shares is composed 
by two elements. The first element is the ratio of domestic risk free rate and foreign 
risk free rate. Intuitively, if the real interest rate in China is very low3
                                                 
3 See Gordon and Li, 2003.  
，the lower will 
be the yield on local bank accounts, the lower the ratio of the B-shares price to A-
shares price, and the greater the price premium is. The second element suggests 
various factors affect the relative price of unrestricted shares and restricted shares, 
such as liquidities and trading costs of different shares, diversification value of 
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unrestricted shares and investors’ attitudes toward risk. Since Chinese investors 
cannot diversify overseas, their relative smaller investment oppor tunity set makes 
them more willing to take on more risk in the A-shares market. Thus, the greater the 
divergence in risk exposures between the A- and B-shares relative to their own 
investment benchmarks (Chinese market and world market portfolio returns, 
respectively), the greater the A-shares premium will be. Their work, up to my 
knowledge, provided empirically testable foundation for the first time among 
literature in the Chinese context. 
Bergstrom and Tang (2001) investigated several factors, including the effect of 
information asymmetry between foreign investors and domestic investors, liquidity, 
diversification value of the foreign class shares, clientele bias, risk-free return 
differentials between foreign and domestic investors, as well as foreign exchange 
risks, in the context of cross-sectional and time-series analyses respectively, and 
provided empirical evidence to the differential risk hypothesis. They po inted out that 
while diversification benefits offered by the B-shares to foreign investors contribute to 
the relatively higher A-shares pr ice in China, risk-free return differentials between 
foreign and domestic investors and foreign exchange risk also play roles in explaining 
variations in the premium from time to time. However, the constant term from their 
time series regression was highly negative, suggesting that other factors influencing 
the time variations were omitted, and a rigorous treatment of which is needed to 
improve the explanatory power of the mode l. 
Su (1999, 2000) avoided problems in Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995)’s model that not  
accommodating the Chinese institutional settings by correcting the number of 
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outstanding shares as exogenously determined variable. By employing international 
capital asset pricing theory, he provided both theoretical and empirical explanation 
that why multiple investors pay different prices for domestic firms that issue the A- 
and B-shares at the same time. Under his model, the difference in prices for the A- 
and B-shares for the same firm can be expressed in terms of the difference in their 
expected excess returns: 
2 2 2
, , , , , , , , , , ,( ) ( )D b i F a i M D a M b i M F b M b i c M F c Mr rµ µ β γ σ β γ σ β γ σ− − − = − −a,i                          (3.2) 
where µa,iand ,b iµ are the expected returns for stock i which can be hold solely for  
domestic investors and foreign investors respectively; Dr and Fr are the risk free rates 
for domestic and foreign investors respectively; , ,a i Mβ is the A-shares beta with 
respect to the A-shares market return for firm i; , ,b i Mβ is the B-shares beta with respect 
to the B-shares market return for firm i; , , ,b i c Mβ is the B-shares beta with respect to the 
international capital market return, which measures the diversification value of the B-
shares for foreign investors; Dγ and Fγ are risk aversion coefficients; 
2
,a Mσ ,
2
,b Mσ and 
2
,c Mσ are the variances of corresponding markets portfolio returns.  
As the A-shares and their corresponding B-shares are subject to identical future cash 
flow, the difference in their expected returns should be able to explain the difference 
in prices. The model posits that cross-sectional variations in expected excess returns 
between the A- and B-shares depend on shares’ own market betas and betas with 
respect to the international equity markets. The lower the A-shares marke t beta, the 
higher the B-shares market beta, or the higher the beta of an individual B-shares with 
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respect to international financial market returns, the higher the foreign investor’s 
required B-shares premium, thus the lower the B-shares price. By testing weekly 
market data of 47 firms from April 1994 to September 1996, he found that the cross-
sectional excess of A-shares over B-shares average return is positively related to the 
A-shares market betas, as the model predicted, and is negatively correlated to the B-
shares market betas with respect to Hong Kong Hang Seng market index. He also 
found that non-beta risk variables, such as the variance of returns and firm size do not 
appear to systematically affect returns.  
Chan and Kwok (2005) asserted there is further evidence in support of the differential 
risk hypothesis. One of the important factors contribute to the dual class shares 
difference is that domestic investors may be highly risk tolerant because the Chinese 
stock market is highly speculative, thus they require a lower expected return, while 
investors in the B-shares markets are more mature and risk-averse, thus they require a 
higher risk compensation. Volatility of shares are used as risk proxy instead of betas 
since previous research suggests that total risk, i.e., variance or standard deviation, is 
more appropriate to use to measure risk in emerging markets. Their result shows that 
the variation in the A-shares price premium across firms is positively associated with 
the volatility of bo th the A-shares and foreign shares. Therefore, this constitutes 
convincing evidence that the A-shares price premium is related to risk as perceived by 
domestic and foreign investors. While in their work, they raised the question “…why 
the investors are willing to pay a higher price for more volatile stocks”, limited 
alternative investment oppo rtunities available to Chinese investors could be a possible 
answer to the question.  
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However, the empirical findings have been mixed. Bailey et al. (1999) investigated 11 
countries4
3.3 Differential Demand Hypothesis 
 whose stock market has restrictions on foreign ownership, and they found 
very little evidence that time-varying risk premia and risk exposures vary significantly 
across the two classes of shares, which suggests the unrestricted shares price premium 
(or unrestricted shares price discount in China) can hardly be explained by differences 
in required returns between domestic and foreign market participants. Chen et al. 
(2001) proposed a positive relationship between the A-shares premium and risk levels, 
which they proxied with the ratio o f A-to-B shares return variances, while they did not  
find empirical suppor t for this hypothesis. Eun et al. (2001) found empirical support 
that the A-shares premium is positively related to the covariance risk of the B-shares 
with the Morgan Stanley world market index and to the difference between world and 
Chinese risk-free interest rates, but no evidence of the negative relationship to the 
covariance risk of the A-shares with the Chinese market index was found. By 
applying the ratio of betas of the two classes of shares as a proxy of risk differential, 
Darrat et al. (2006) re-examined the risk differential hypothesis with both pre- and 
post-2001 open market reform data. While the impact of relative risk is consistently 
positive in the post- period, the panel regression result exhibits insignificant 
coe fficients in the pre- period. 
The differential demand hypothesis is based on the model developed by Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1995). Their theory proposes that the demand functions for domestic 
                                                 
4  These countries include: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, 
Switzerland, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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shares differ between foreign and domestic investors in term of price elasticity. Given 
the assumptions that the firm is a monopo list in the capital market and faces a 
downward-slop ing demand curve for the firm’s shares on a risk-adjusted basis and 
there are no perfect substitutes for the securities, their model suggests: 
1 1/
1 1/
U R
R U
P
P
ε
ε
−
=
−                                                                                                             (3.3)  
where PU and PR refer the prices of unrestricted and restricted shares; Rε and Uε are 
the pr ice elasticities of demands for restricted and unrestricted shares respectively.  
In order to maximize market value, the optimum choice for the firm is to discriminate 
between local and foreign investors. If the price elasticity of the demand from foreign 
investors is lower than the price elasticity of the demand from domestic investors, 
then it is optimal for the firm to sell shares at a higher price to foreign investors. In the 
Chinese case, foreign investors’ demand elasticity for local shares may be higher 
because they have easier access to diversification opportunities.  
Domowitz et al. (1997) provided early evidence of the suggestion of different demand 
elasticities. They examined the Mexican market where an individual firm typically 
issues multiple classes of equity that differentiate between foreigners and domestic 
traders and even, in the case of financial firms, between domestic individuals and 
institution. Their result shows that the price premium for unrestricted shares is 
positively related to proxies for foreign demand and is negatively related to the 
relative supply of unrestricted shares measured by the ratio of unrestricted to total 
shares outstanding. The effect of differential liquidities is also examined in their 
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analysis, while only little evidence of liquidity effects is found in a short-run term. 
They conclude that the documented premium reflects the relative scarcity of domestic 
shares, consisting with Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995)’s hypothesis.  
The framework on which Domowitz et al. (1997)’s work built follows Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1995)’s approach but with some modifications according to the nature 
of Mexico’s investment constrictions. One of the modifications also accommodates 
China’s reality. In Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995)’s model, ownership restrictions can 
arise endogenously because domestic entrepreneurs may choose to price discriminate 
between the two investor groups, while this assumption is against the reality in both 
Mexico and China. As firms in China do not have the right of shares issuing but the 
CSRC does, they may be binding even if they find it is not optimal, especially when a 
large proportion of outstanding shares are kept by the state for control purposes.   
Gordon and Li (2003) and Levi and Diao (2005) took into account of the above 
limitation into the Chinese case and modified previous studies by taking share supply 
as endogenous. They develope d a general equilibrium framework to show that the A-
shares premium is a natural consequence of the Chinese government acting as a 
discriminating monopo listic stock supplier in the segmented Chinese stock market.  
Poon et al. (1998) proved the demand curve for equity shares is downward sloping by 
examining the impact of the initial listing of the B-shares issues on the prices of 
already listed A-shares.  
Bergstrom and Tang (2001) argued that legal restrictions create the segmented market 
and limit investment opportunities. Thus, domestic investors have inelastic demands 
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for equity due to insufficient supply, pushing up the price of class A-shares.  
Bailey et al.  (1999) found increased flows of funds into internationally-oriented U. S. 
mutual funds are associated with larger foreign premium in their mixed countries 
database, while the case of China remains mysterious.  
Sun and Tong (2000) offered another potential path to explaining the seeming 
anomaly discounts for unrestricted Chinese shares. They reported that the H-shares 
and red chips markets in Hong Kong provide good substitutes for the mainland of 
China’s B-shares market, so that foreign investor demand for the B-shares is elastic. 
When more H-shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, foreign investors move 
away from the B-shares market and the B-shares discount becomes larger. Extending 
the work of Sun and Tong (2000), Yang and Lau (2005) found that the number and 
trading volume of Chinese firms traded in the U. S.5
Chan and Kwok (2005) conjectured that the cross-sectiona l variation in the A-shares 
premium is related to the relative supply of domestic A- and foreign B- / H-shares. 
They argued that in a perfect capital market world, asset value would be determined 
by the pr ice of the marginal risk, and not by the supp ly of the asset. This is because 
there are substitutes for every asset in the perfect world, so that there is no scarcity of 
supply. However, in China, the aggregate supply of stocks is small. A large proportion 
of stocks is held by government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As these shares 
are not traded on the two official domestic exchanges, the amount of shares floating in 
 are also significantly negatively 
related to the A-shares premium, and the subs titution effect from these stocks is even 
stronger than that from Chinese stocks listed in Hong Kong market.  
                                                 
5 When a firm cross-list in the U. S., it may list use its B-shares through an American depositary receipt (ADR). 
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the market is a small propor tion of the shares outstanding. The insufficient supp ly of 
shares in the market, coupled with huge demand by retail investors, fuels speculation 
and bids up the price of the A-shares.  
Darrat et al. (2006) employed the ratio of the outstanding B-shares to total 
outstanding shares to represent the relative demand factor across firms. It appears that 
the differential demand proxy contributes significantly to the persistent premium.  
In a sum, all empirical evidences commonly agree that the A-shares premium in 
China is rooted in two causes: heavy demand of the A-shares by local investors, and 
limited supply due to the legal feature of NTS.  
3.4 Differential Liquidity Hypothesis 
There is extensive empirical evidence on how illiquidity affects security values and 
hence illiquid securities offer large price discounts (Wruck, 1989; Silber, 1991; 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1991; Kamara, 1994; Boudoukh and Whitelaw, 1993; 
Longstaff, 1995a, 1995b, 2001; Gardiol et al., 1997). According to the differential 
liquidity hypothesis, the observed price premium is due to the B-shares’ lower 
liquidity and hence higher trading costs.  It is said that the A-shares market in China 
has been consistently and predominantly more liquid and active than the B-shares 
market given the constitution of the two markets, that the A-shares market is 
constituted by large retail investors, and the B-shares marke t consists of a small 
institutional investor base. In fact, as suggested in Table 2.2, the trading volume of the 
B-shares never reached 10% of the A-shares’ through years. 
Chen et al. (2001) found that the relatively illiquid B-shares have a higher expected 
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rate of return and are priced lower to compensate investors for increased trading costs. 
They computed the relative trading volume and relative turnover (trading volume 
relative to shares outstanding of the B-shares to the A-shares) and found that bot h are 
strongly negatively related to the premium, even after controlling for other factors 
such as the relative number of shares outstanding (which they related to the 
differential demand hypothesis), market capitalization and the volatility ratio of B-
shares to A-shares. They argued that the A-shares premium is “primarily due to the 
illiquid B-shares market”.  
Chan and Kwok  (2005) concluded there is evidence in support of the differential 
liquidity hypo thesis which shows that the A-shares premium is positively related to 
the trading volume of A-shares and negatively related to the trading volume of B- 
shares. Therefore, the A-shares price premium reflects the difference in liquidity 
caused transaction cost between domestic and foreign shares. 
Darrat et al.’s (2006) study showed the liquidity of the B-shares market did get 
improved in the post 2001 regulation relaxation period and a negative relationship 
between relative turnover and the premium is also found in bot h the pre- and post-
deregulation periods. 
Although the liquidity hypothesis is strongly supported by evidence from the above 
studies, there are different voices in literature. For example, Odegaard (2000) 
investigated price differences between different equity classes in the Norwegian stock 
market and found that liquidity does not seem to be a large factor in explaining price 
differences. Following C hen et al. (2001), Karolyi and Li (2003 ) did an event study on 
the 2001 open market reform. By proxying relative liquidity with the ratio of trading 
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volume in the B-shares over that in the A-shares, they found liquidity does not 
contribute to the premium decline after the B-shares market opened. 
Chan et al. (2002) also rejected the liquidity-based explanation in the case of China 
based on their spread decomposition model. They questioned that usual measures of 
liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, are themselves measures of information asymmetry. 
Rather than us ing bid-ask spread as other studies normally do, they, following Glosten 
and Harris (1988), separated out the bid-ask spread into three components: adverse 
selection cost which reflects information asymmetry, and inventory-holding cost and 
order-processing cost, which reflect the costs caused by liquidity issue. The result 
suggests the documented A-shares price premium is better explained by information 
asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors rather than differential liquidities.  
3.5 Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
Differences in information and information-processing ability can also segment 
investors by nationality. Merton (1987) models the situation where some investors 
pay a premium for assets which they are more familiar with. French and Poterba 
(1991) noted that difficulties in generating and interpreting information about foreign 
securities markets may explain the preference in investing in domestic assets. Brennan 
and Cao (1997) present a model in which local and foreign investors have different 
endowments of information about the local stock market. 
Many researchers (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Bergstrom and Tang, 2001; Chan et al., 
2002) argued that one reason for the large price premium of the Chinese A-shares is 
that foreign investors have less information on Chinese stocks than domestic investors 
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do. The information disclos ure quality of Chinese firms has been criticized especially 
in early years, though both local and foreign investors may not be able to get reliable 
information, local investors may have their own informal channels to get additional 
information about local economy and firms. Besides, foreign investors may find it 
more difficult to acquire and to assess information about local Chinese firms, relative 
to domestic investors, due to language barriers, cultural differences and different 
accounting standards (Kaye and Cheng, 1992; Sze, 1993). However, there are 
different views that information asymmetry not works against foreign investors all the 
time: the superior quantitative skills and experience of foreign institutional investors 
may give them an advantage in processing information.  
Bailey et al. (1999) examined 11 countries with China included, and found supportive 
evidence: good information in the form of a high country credit rating or large firm 
size is associated with larger foreign premium.  
Chakravarty et al. (1998) extended the asset-pricing model based on Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) for the case of China that incorporates asymmetric information and 
market segmentation in a noisy rational expectations framework. Their model predicts 
that whether cross-listing leads to a premium or discount in trading of the foreign 
class shares depends on the relative magnitudes of the information asymmetry effect 
and the diversification effect. The former effect leads to discounts for the B-shares, 
while the latter effect implies premium for the B-shares. Their theoretical argument 
also provided a possible explanation to the puzzle that why do foreign shares trade at 
such large discounts in China, but at premium in other markets. Empirically, a cross-
sectional analys is is conducted among 39 dually listed firms on the Shanghai and 
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Shenzhen stock exchanges. The covariance between A-shares and B-shares returns, 
the variance of B-shares returns, and the coverage of Chinese companies in the 
English press are used as measures of information asymmetry, and the test results are 
consistent with their model predictions.  
While applying Chakravarty et al. (1998)’s model to more firms (79 firms) and longer 
sample period (from January 1995 to August 1999), Bergstrom and Tang (2001) 
suggested that information asymmetry, although significant, does not demonstrate an 
overwhelming explanatory power. The information asymmetry hypothesis, therefore, 
should be of little relevance in explaining the A-shares premium.  
Chan et al. (2002) found that, as expected, higher differences in the adverse selection 
component lead to higher A-shares premium. Cross sectionally, 43% of the variation 
in the premium can be explained in this way.  
Karolyi and Li (2003) found evidence that foreign investors have less of an 
information disadvantage than local investors for large firms in China. Examined the 
event of the B-shares market opened to foreign investors, they found that the decline 
in the A-shares premium around this regulatory change is concentrated in small 
capitalization stocks.  
Chan and Kwok (2005)’s argued that if there is information asymmetry, then they 
should observe smaller price premium in companies with higher market capitalization. 
They used two measures of market capitalization: market capitalization of free-
floating shares and market capitalization of total shares in the companies. Based on 
the market capitalization of free-floating shares, the coefficient of the size proxy is, as 
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expected, significantly negative, though the coefficient is insignificant when using the 
market capitalization of total shares as the firm size proxy.  
3.6 Other Hypotheses 
Besides the above four prevailing explanations to the segmented assets pricing, there 
are other factor s raised recently. A novel approach in examining the A-shares 
premium is to check for evidence of ‘speculative’ behaviour of domestic retail 
investors. Despite firm’s fundamentals by which stock price is determined according 
to classic asset pricing model theory, behavioural finance supporters suggest 
speculative motive of investors is also an important determinant of stock prices. 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) used overconfidence, the belief by investors that their 
opinions are more precise than they actually are, to derive an explicit dynamics for 
heterogeneous be liefs among investors and a resulting speculative component for 
stock prices in a continuous-time equilibrium mode l with risk-neutral investors. Their 
mod el shows that cross-sectiona lly, there should be a positive association between the 
volume of speculative trading, the size of the nonfundamental component and the 
volatility of stock prices. Furthermore, Hong et al., (2006) showed that when 
investors have limited risk-bearing capacity, investors’ speculative motives amplify 
the effect of asset float (the amount of tradable shares) on stock prices. The features of 
the Chinese stock market provide a prefect opportunity to test their theory. Based on 
their previous model, Mei et al., (2005) conducted an empirical study using Chinese 
data. Their empirical statistics showed that the turnover rate of the A-shares is able to 
explain 20% of the cross-sectiona l variation in the A-shares premium, suggesting 
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speculative trading as an important determinant of stock prices. 
There is also evidence from Chan and Kwok (2005) that these retail Chinese investors 
are not rational and the premium can be explained by their speculative nature. 
Another alternative explanation to the premium is the corporate governance 
hypothesis, which is proposed by Tong and Yu (2007) and based on two assumptions. 
Firstly, corporate governance affects firm valuation; and secondly, the linkage 
between corporate governance and stock valuation is weaker in the A-shares market 
than in the B-shares market, in other words, foreign investors pay more attention to a 
firm’s corporate governance practice than Chinese local investors. The second 
assumption can be viewed as a reflection of the risk differential hypothesis that 
Chinese local investors are lacking an alternative investment opportunity set, and thus 
have higher risk tolerance and care less about the effectiveness of a firm’s corporate 
governance. They hypot hesized that the A-shares premium phenomenon is driven by 
the corporate governance quality of the Chinese firms. The corporate governance 
quality is proxied by ownership concentration in the hands of the controlling 
shareholder, ineffective boards of directors with higher proportion of directors 
nominated by the parent company, dividend payout, level of information asymmetry, 
and institutional ownership. The cross-sectional result showed consistent evidence. 
Moreover, they found that the average premium increased substantially during the 
Asian Financial Crisis, a period of heightened concern over corporate governance by 
foreign investors.  
Darrat et al. (2006) used floating ratio, i.e., the ratio of tradable shares to firm’s total 
outstanding shares, to measure corporate governance. They argued that firms with less 
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non-tradable shares face less political pressure from government policies. As a 
consequence, the firms with higher floating ratios tend to have better corporate 
governance. They expected foreigners would be willing to pay more for firms with 
better corporate governance. Their panel regression result confirmed it. Lu (2005), 
moreover, found supportive evidence that firms with higher A-shares concentration 
ratio tend to have higher premium.  
3.7 Summary and Discussion 
The main explanations in the literature of the price premium of stocks with ownership 
constraints in segmented markets have been reviewed in this chapter, namely the 
differential risk hypothesis, the differential demand hypothesis, the differential 
liquidity hypothesis, the information asymmetry hypothesis, the speculative trading 
hypothesis and the corporate governance hypot hesis. All these factors provide paths 
towards understanding the nature of the price premium in China, and also in other 
segmented markets. Interestingly, no single hypothesis for the existence of the price 
premium has come to dominate over others, but different factors, solely or  jointly, are 
shown to be potentially important in unravelling the price difference with different 
samples. We are left, therefore, without a definite explanation. Attempts of resolving 
the price premium puzzle have continued and researchers from a variety of different 
disciplines have been trying to provide possible explanations from different aspects. 
However, most of the existing possible factors are mainly founded at the market level, 
and a more micro-based examination, I feel, has not been given enough attention until 
the corporate governance hypothesis was offered very recently. In the next chapter, I 
will try to ascertain whether there is empirical evidence to support that Chinese and 
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foreign investors’ different perceptions toward firm fundamentals are contribute to the 
price premium. This examination will provide a new micro-based evidence of how 
firm-specific factors relates to the Chinese A-shares premium. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPLEMENTARY EXPLANATION 
OF THE CHINESE A-SHARES PREMIUM 
- FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
INVESTORS’ VALUATION 
PREFERENCES 
4.1 Introduction 
Have reviewed prevailing explanations of the price premium of dual- listed shares, I 
will provide a complementary explanation in this chapter. Extensive literature has 
provided empirical evidence that foreign investors, who most likely are institutional 
investors, are more sop histicated and show different preference in portfolio choice 
compared with local investors (see, e.g., Kang and Stulz, 1997; Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2000; Seasholes, 2000; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Aggarwal et al.,  
2005). It is indicated by a CSRC report in 2004 that the Chinese A-shares market has 
been dominated by domestic individual investors, while the B-shares market is mainly 
comprised of foreign institutional investors. The Chinese stock market had been 
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closed for almost one century before the new stock market was established in the 
early 1990s, and it is understandable the individual investors in this market have less 
experience compared with ones in other worldwide markets with relatively long 
histories. Also, compared with foreign institutional investors, Chinese individual 
investors who dominate the A-shares market are lacking a necessary reliable 
information channel, as well as advanced knowledge and techniques in processing 
information. Under this circumstance, herd trading, which consequently leads 
liquidity driven trading, is fairly common behaviour observed from the A-shares 
market. 
In addition, Chinese investors are lacking an adequate investment channel. Before the 
new Chinese stock markets were established, bank savings1 and treasury bonds were 
the only investment instruments available for Chinese residents. Because of the low or 
even negative real interest rates which resulted in the double-digit inflation in the late 
1980s and the existence of only a few alternative investment vehicles 2
                                                 
1 The gross domestic savings rate was reported to be 41.5 percent in 2000 according to Asian Development Bank’s 
Country Economic Review-the People’s Republic of China, November 2001, showing that China maintains one of 
the highest proportions of income savings in the world. 
, the 
introduction of stocks as a new investment option attracted a great deal of attention. 
This made the A-shares market the main if not the only place Chinese investors could 
put their money in besides bank savings. The lack of alternative investments plus 
inadequate supply of A-shares caused by the large propor tion of non-tradable shares 
owned by the government makes the liquidity driven of A-shares trading more severe. 
2 The bond market and derivatives market in China are still undeveloped and suffered from severe liquidity 
problem. For example, according to the Financial Times on 1 August 1998, the amounts of issued enterprise bonds 
from 1995-1997 are 21.6, 26.8 and 25 billion renminbi respectively, which take up only 1.9%, 2% and 1.7% of the 
total amount of capital companies raised during the time; the trading volume of bonds and derivatives has been less 
than 0.1% and 0.01% respectively of the A-shares’ for years. (Source: China Secur ities and Futures Statistical 
Yearbook, 2007) 
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The inadequate market regulations foster a speculative atmosphere in the stock market. 
Chinese investors are attested to the desire for quick gains from holding stocks 
according to a series of media reports. Based on interviews with individual investors, 
the Financial Times (11 July 1997) reports that interviewees often held shares for less 
than one month and that they acted on tips from friends, newspapers, and daily stock 
market programmes on the state-run television. Kang et al. (2003) concluded that the 
“supe r-speculative environment” in China results from “lack of reliable information 
on firms, the absolute dominance of individual investors who tend herd among 
themselves, the rampant market manipulation by syndicate speculators, and the lack 
of alternative means for building personal wealth”. They concluded that trading 
decisions of A-shares investors are based on sentiment and news from informal 
sources. 
In contrast, foreign institutional investors, who are better equipped and are more 
exposed to the world stock markets and therefore have more experience, tend to invest 
following the real value of the underlying assets. They seek the best investment 
oppor tunity as they see because otherwise they can always fulfil their diversification 
requirement from other markets. Chen et al. (2001) note that B-shares prices are more 
closely related to market fundamentals, i.e., common stream of cash flows, while A-
shares prices are more likely to be influenced by non-fundamental factors. Chiang et 
al. (2008) also a rgues that it is reasonable to classify B-shares investors as more likely 
to be rational traders who focus on economic fundamentals, while A-shares investors 
tend to act as noise traders.  
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Following the above background, I will, in this chapter, propose a new hypothesis:  
besides the ‘hard’ segmentation caused by the government’s segmentation policy, the 
Chinese A-shares premium also reflects ‘soft’ segmentation, caused by the different 
valuation preferences that local and foreign investors hold.  Foreign investors are 
assumed to be more rational than Chinese local investors, and so will care more about 
firm fundamentals and be more sensitive to changes in the fundamentals. In contrast 
to the foreign investors, local investors put more weight on a stock’s liquidity factor; 
the limited alternative investment opportunities made Chinese investors unable to care 
about firm fundamentals as much as foreigners do. As a result, firm fundamentals are 
expected to be negatively related to the premium. From the time-series perspective, 
when a firm’s fundamental becomes less favourable, compared with foreign 
institutional investors, Chinese investors react to it less given their limited investment 
opportunities. The decrease in the A-shares price will thus be more than the decrease 
in the B-shares price, and the price disparity between the A- and B-shares would then 
rise. From the cross-sectional perspective, given the market environment Chinese 
investors faced, they may still accept a high price for those firms with less favourable 
fundamentals; while foreign investors would only pay a low price for such stocks as 
they can easily find a substitution in other overseas market. Hence, the less favourable 
a firm’s fundamental is, the larger the difference between its A- and B-shares prices. 
This examination also provides a possible path in answering the question that why the 
premium varies substantially across firms, which was raised earlier in Chapter 1. This 
chapter can be viewed as an exploratory investigation of the role of firm funda mentals, 
such as, financial leverage, profitability, growth prospects, dividend payout, corporate 
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governance and size, which have been suggested both in industrial experience and 
academic literature to be important in stock valuation, in contributing to the premium. 
As an attempt to modernize China’s banking and financial systems, the QFII 
programme is viewed as a tool not only to improve the investment environment in the 
Chinese domestic market, but also to improve the quality of corpo rate governance of 
the listed firms. It is hoped that the participation of QFIIs will bring not just capital, 
but most importantly, more advanced investment skills and perceptions to the A-
shares market. The programme is designed to influence Chinese local investors’ 
investing habits and behaviour, promoting corporate governance within the listed 
firms, and spurring on more effective functioning of the A-shares market. However, 
the effectiveness of such a policy, to my best knowledge, still lacks adequate attention. 
By comparing the effect of the firm fundamentals on the premium before and after the 
policy change, I will complement, to some extent, research done in the area. 
Specifically, I will compare the explanatory power of the firm fundamentals to the 
premium before and after the policy, to see whether the explanatory power dropped 
after QFIIs entered the A-shares market, as the difference in stock valuation 
preferences between the A- and B-shares investors should be narrowed. I will also 
examine whether firms with favourable fundamental indicators tend to have larger 
decreases in the premium around the QFII programme. The findings can serve as 
preliminary empirical evidence on the success of the policy and provide hints on 
future direction of Chinese stock market liberalization.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the 
expected relationships between firm fundamentals and the premium based on the new 
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hypothesis. Section 4.3 describes the data source, sample selection criterion and 
summary statistics. Section 4.4 introduces a dynamic panel data estimation technique 
and provides empirical evidence.  Section 4.5 provides cross-sectional evidence 
before the 2001 reform, which opened the B-shares market to Chinese individual 
investors, after the 2001 event, and after the QFII programme respectively.  Section 
4.6 conducts event studies around the market reforms. 
4.2 Relationships between the Premium and Firm 
Fundamentals based on the New Hypothesis 
This section discusses the expected relationships between the Chinese A-shares 
premium and firm fundamentals. The firm fundamentals are measured by six 
indicators: financial leverage, profitability, growth prospects, dividend payout, 
corporate governance and size. 
H. I. Firms with higher financial leverage tend to be associated with a higher A-shares 
premium. 
Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) is employed here to measure firm’s financial risk. Whatever 
how the leverage affects firm value3
                                                 
3 Different opinions exist regarding how the capital structure of a firm influences its value: traditiona l Modigliani-
Miller theorem argues that in an efficient market without any form of friction, a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant 
to its value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), and it does not matter if the firm's capital is raised by issuing 
, the use of debt in companies’ financing concentrates 
stock or 
selling debt. Extension of the MM theory takes tax and market forces into consideration and suggests loans provide 
tax shields, thus the more a company borrow, the lower its weighted averaged cost of capital, and so the higher its 
value (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; Masulis, 1980, 1983; Long and Maltiz, 1985). 
Supportive evidence is found with Chinese data (see, e.g., Wang and Yang, 1998, 2002; Liu and Yuan, 1999; Hong 
and Shen, 2000). Other opinion argues that a firm’s financial leverage is negatively related with its value: the 
increase of debt brings in various costs, i.e., bankruptcy cost, agency cost, hence the value of the firm would 
decrease (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Supportive Chinese 
evidence is found by Lu and Xin (1998), Feng et al. (2000), Zhang et al. (2000) and Lu and Han (2001). Others 
argue the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and its value is not linear but a trade-off of various costs 
and benefit of debt financing exists: the firm’s value increases as the borrowing increases when the financial 
leverage is relatively low, but decreases when borrowing reaches an op timal level (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). 
The argument is also corroborated by Chinese data (Yan and Chen, 2002). 
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the firm’s business risk on its stockholders. Both in the pr icing mode l and the MM 
theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), borrowing, from whatever source, while 
maintaining a fixed amount of equity, increases the risk to the investor. It has been 
demonstrated, both theoretically and empirically, that beta, the systematic risk 
measurement, increases with financial leverage. As Hamada (1972) stated, the effect 
of financial leverage on beta can be expressed as the following equation: 
(1 (1 )( / ))Ub b T D E= + −                                                                                           (4.1)  
where Ub  is the firm’s unlevered beta coefficient, that is, the beta it would have if it 
has no debt; the term (1-T) puts the equation on an after-tax basis. The equation 
suggests that in the mean-standard deviation version of the capital asset pricing model, 
the covariance of the asset’s rate of return with the market portfolio’s rate of return 
(the proxy beta), which measures the nondiversifiable risk of the asset, should be 
greater for the stock of a firm with a higher debt-to-equity ratio than for stock of 
another firm in the same risk-class with a lower debt-to-equity ratio. Bhandari (1988) 
argues that a natural proxy for the risk of common equity of a firm is that firm's debt-
to-equity ratio and found supportive empirical evidence that the expected common 
stock returns are positively related to the ratio.  
Foreign and Chinese domestic investors are considered to have different attitudes 
toward risks according to the differential risk hypothesis. Given the fact that Chinese 
residents lack investment opportunities, while foreign investors pursue the best 
investment opportunities available (since they have much more chances to diversify 
their risks in overseas markets), I argue domestic investors are not as sensitive as the 
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foreign investors are to the firm’s financial risk. It is thus expected, cross-sectionally, 
that the A-shares price premium is higher for firms with higher financial leverage, 
holding other factors constant. In the time-series dimension, the change in financial 
structure shall not affect the amount or risk of the cash flows on the total package of 
debt and equity, but changes the risk of the individual securities. The higher financial 
leverage makes the equity riskier and increase the return that shareholde rs will require. 
Therefore, the extent of the influence on foreign investors’ expected return is likely to 
be greater than on domestic investors’ expected return. As a result, a positive 
relationship is expected to be observed between the price premium and firm’s 
financial leverage.  
H. II. Firms with better profitability have smaller price disparity in their A- and B-shares. 
Two measurements, the return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS), are 
employed here to proxy firms’ profitability. ROE measures a firm’s efficiency at 
generating profits from its common equity, and shows how effective a company is in 
using investors’ investment to generate earnings growth. According to Gordon’s 
Dividend Growth Model (Gordon, 1959), a stock price is determined by a firm’s 
future cash flow, which is further determined by the dividend growth rate, and its 
capitalization rate: 
0
0
(1 )D gP
k g
+
=
−
                                                                                                           (4.2)  
where P0 is the current stock price, D0 is the current dividend payment, g is the 
dividend growth rate which is assumed to be a constant, and k is the capitalization rate 
which investors required for their cost of capital.  
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If reinvestment is allowed, the dividend growth rate g can be written as the product of 
the return on equity (ROE) and the earnings retention ratio (b), therefore, (4.2) can be 
rewritten as: 
0
0
(1 * )
*
D ROE bP
k ROE b
+
=
−
                                                                                                (4.3) 
It can be seen clearly from equation (4.3), as ROE increases, the stock price would 
increase as well.  
Earnings per share is defined as the total net income of the company divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding. It has been widely demonstrated in the accounting 
and finance literature that earnings have valuation and market information content, 
and have been implicitly recognized as a fundamental variable in stock price 
determination (see, e.g., Kleido n, 1986; Kor mendi and Lipe, 1987; Campbell and 
Shiller, 1988). It is positively correlated with the term future cash flow in Gordon’s 
model given a constant dividend payout ratio, and thus it shall also be positively 
correlated with the stock price. Empirical studies provide supportive evidence. For 
example, Kim (2007) found EPS and ROE were critical factors in determining the 
market price of stocks traded on the Korean Stock Exchanges. Sing et al. (2002) 
found EPS is a significant fundamental variable in explaining short-run dynamics of 
price changes of property stocks in Singapore and suggested institutional investors 
should pay more attention to EPS in their stock selection process. I assume the 
Chinese domestic investors pay less attention to firm’s performance and, in contrast, 
foreign investors will to pay relatively more for firms which can generate more profit. 
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Therefore, a negative relationship is expected to be seen between the price premium 
and firm’s profitability. 
H. III. Companies with better future prospects have less price differences between 
their foreign and domestic classes. 
Stock valuation relies heavily on the expected growth of a company. At the beginning 
of this chapter, I introduced the aspect that Chinese investors are said to desire quick 
gains from holding stocks and often he ld shares for less than one month. Following 
the new hypothesis, I argue these short-oriented and speculative traders care less or do 
not care at all about company’s future prospects; contrarily, sophisticated foreign 
institutional investors pay a great attention on the persistence of company’s earnings. 
Two measurements are used here to proxy the firm’s future prospect: the forecast 
earnings growth which is defined as the difference of current earnings per share and 
the forecast earnings per share in one year relative to the current earnings per share, 
and the forecast sales growth which is defined as the difference of current sales and 
the forecast one year forward sales relative to current sales.  
It is understood both theoretically and empirically that earnings forecasts can possess 
information content. Miller and Modigliani (1958) stated the necessity of considering 
the value of the “stream of profits over time”. Chan and Chen (1991 ) propos e that the 
earnings prospects of firms are associated with a risk factor in returns. Firms judged to 
have strong prospects have lower expected s tock returns since they are rewarded with 
lower costs of capital, than firms with poorer prospects. I assume since Chinese 
investors will not hold the shares long enough, they do not give much weight to a 
firm’s forecast earnings growth. Hence, they might still pay a relatively high price for 
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shares of firms which do not have prospects of high earnings growth, and the expected 
earnings growth rate is thus expected to be negatively associated with the A-shares 
premium. As sales are the major source of earnings, a firm’s sales prospects is also 
expected to be related with the price premium negatively. 
H. IV. The price premium for firms which pay more dividends to their investors is 
smaller compared with those pay less.   
The effect of dividends on the valuation of secur ities has been a controversial subject 
in financial research over the history. Ever since Miller and Modigliani (1958) pointed 
out, in a perfect world where there was no transaction costs, no taxes, and information 
is costless, that a firm’s value, on which the value of the equities backed, is irrelevant 
with its dividend po licy, researchers and practitioners have attempted to explain, in a 
more realistic world, how market price reacts to firms’ dividend decisions. While 
there are many aspects of dividends unknown to researchers, we are confident that the 
stock price of a firm will generally rise when the firm announces an increase in the 
dividend and will generally fall when a dividend reduction is announced. Blume and 
Friend (1978) mentioned that in a survey of 1,041 American individual investors, a 
strong preference for dividend payout is revealed, even if retained earnings were 
reduced. If the proportion of corporate earnings paid out as dividends were to increase 
substantially, 41.8% of the respondents would plan to increase their stock holdings, 
while only 10.5% would plan a reduction. Moreover, it is commonly believed that 
dividend policy contains information content: only companies whose management 
think things look good tend to return cash flows to outside shareholders, and the 
announcement of a dividend is taken as a signal that higher future earnings are likely 
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to rise. If Chinese investors are indeed liquidity-driven, they would not take the firm’s 
payout ratio into their account when making buying or selling decisions. In contrast, 
foreign investors would value the signal and desire the dividend income. As a 
consequence, the premia of firms paying more dividends are hypothesized to be less 
compared with those paying less. I thus expect high dividend payout ratio is 
negatively related to the A-shares price premium.   
H. V. Firms with a smaller proportion of untradeable shares tend to have less price 
differences between their domestic class shares and foreign class shares. 
It is believed that good corporate governance does increase the firm’s market 
valuation (Bai et al., 2004). From the standpo int of practitioners, a series of surveys 
with institutional investors and private equity investors focusing on emerging markets 
conducted by McKinsey shows that 80% of these investors are willing to pay a 
premium to well-governed firms 4. Daoming Pu, deputy manager of JP Morgan Hong 
Kong office also pointed out that “if the proportion of shares in circulation is too low, 
we are not interested in”5
                                                 
4 McKinsey & Company, 1999–2002, The McKinsey Quarterly. 
. From a more academic point of view, Wang and Xu (2004) 
propose due to effective corporate governance, such firms tend to have higher returns 
over the long run. Based on China’s unique government-owned untradable shares 
structure, discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the percentage of tradable A-shares relative 
to all outstanding A-shares is adopted here as a measure of the corporate governance, 
following Wang and Wu (2004). They argue that the floating ratio may reflect the 
expected corporate governance in China, thus would be helpful in predicting a firm’s 
future cash flow. In addition, I argue that firms with higher floating ratios have fewer 
5 International Finance News, 2 December 2002.  
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non-tradable shares and thus face less political pressure from government policies and 
also suffer less manipulation from potential concentrated investors. As a consequence, 
firms with higher floating ratios tend to be more transparent and have better corporate 
governance. Since better corporate governance is an attractive feature when 
considering portfolio choice, it is hypothesized that foreign investors would pay 
relative ly more for such feature, and thus a negative relationship be tween firms’ 
corporate governance and their A-shares price premia should be observed.  
H. VI. Firm’s size is negatively related to the A-shares price premium. 
The interpretation of how firm’s size is related with its stock price or returns is two-
fold. Firstly, it is widely documented in the finance literature that stock expected 
returns are negatively related to firm’s size (see, e.g., Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981; 
Kato and Schallheim, 1985; Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Daniel and Titman, 1997), 
given which, foreign investors would price their shares higher for firms of a larger 
size. Assuming the pricing of domestic and foreign shares is driven by different forces, 
foreign investors would pay relatively more for firms with larger size and thus the A-
shares premium would be negatively correlated with firm size. Secondly, the premium 
is expected to be negatively related to the firm size according to the information 
asymmetry hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3. Firm size can be viewed as a proxy for 
the difficulty of access to the relevant information of the firm; say, the bigger the firm, 
the more frequently it tends to be covered by the media and so it would generate less 
asymmetric information among investor groups. On both accounts, a negative 
relationship be tween firm’s size and its A- and B-shares price premium is expected to 
be observed. Firm size is proxied by two measurements: market capitalization 
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calculated using tradable A-shares, and market capitalization based on total 
outstanding A-shares.  
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To avoid the infancy period of the Chinese stock markets and RMB’s foreign 
exchange rate regime adjustment periods in 1994 and 2005 6
                                                 
6 From January 1994, China started a market-based, managed floating exchange rate system pegging to U. S. 
dollars; from 21 July 2005, China switched its exchange rate regime to a managed float linked to a basket of 
currencies after a 2.1 percent appreciation against the dollar. 
, the sample period starts 
from 1994 and ends in 2004. The 11 years sample period covers the period before 
Chinese domestic individuals were allowed to invest in once foreigner-only shares, 
the period after QFIIs were allowed to participate with once domestic-only shares, and 
the period between these institutional changes. All 86 firms, 42 from SHSE and 44 
from SZSE, which issue dual-class shares by the end of the sample period, are 
examined. Full lists of companies included are available in the Appendices D and E. 
Most of our datasets are obtained from the Datastream of Thomson Financial, 
including trading data and companies’ financial data; earnings and sales forecasts data 
are from I/B/E/S; ownership structure data is from the Beijing Tianxiang Investment 
Consultant. Datastream does not have separate information on tradable shares and 
nontradable shares; the da ta type “the number of shares in issue” covers both state 
shares, legal person shares and employee shares, which are classified as nontradable 
shares and ordinary tradable shares. Although the Datastream does contain data of 
“percentage of free float number of shares” and “total strategic holdings”, the data 
provided is not consistent with ones I computed based on individual firms’ financial 
statements. I thus use ownership structure data provided by the Beijing Tianxiang 
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Investment Consultant. Because the firms do not release their financial repor ts on a 
finer frequency, analyses will be conducted on annual basis. The definition of 
explanatory variables is provided in the following Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4. 1: Description of Explanatory Variables 
Factors Variables Abbr. Definitions 
Expected 
Signs 
Financial Leverage 
Debt-to-equity ratio DTE Annual ratio of total debt to common 
equity 
+ 
Profitability Earnings per share EPS Earnings per share for the fiscal year - 
Return on equity ROE Net income divided by average total 
equity 
- 
Future Prospects Forecast earnings 
growth 
FEG Difference between current and forecast 
one year forward EPS relative to the 
current EPS 
- 
Forecast sales growth FSG Difference between current and forecast 
one year forward sales relative to the 
current sales 
- 
Dividend Policy Dividend payout ratio DIV Dividends per share relative to earnings 
per share 
- 
Corporate  
Governance 
Floating ratio FR Number of free-floating A-shares relative 
to the number of all outstanding A-shares 
- 
Firm Size Market capitalization LMCAP1 Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
calculated based on free float A-shares 
- 
LMCAP2 Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
calculated based on total outstanding A-
shares 
- 
Liquidity  Relative liquidity LIQ Relative turnover rate, which is calculated 
as the ratio of trading volume to the 
number of shares traded on the market, 
of the A-shares to B-shares 
+ 
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The following Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables: 
 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 PRE DTE EPS ROE FEG FSG DIV  FR LMCAP1 LMCAP2 LIQ 
 Panel A: SHSE 
 Mean 2.928 85.41 0.063 2.531 0.136 0.121 20.66 0.176 6.344 7.678 2.204 
 Median 1.624 60.09 0.094 4.850 0.010 0.030 0.000 0.118 6.454 7.761 1.326 
 Maximum 19.58 571.2 1.600 76.33 17.33 2.246 100.0 0.682 8.884 10.25 30.15 
 Minimum -0.513 -212.8 -1.490 -88.51 -17.36 -0.750 0.000 0.033 3.022 4.344 0.059 
 Std. Dev. 2.970 87.47 0.256 16.97 3.057 0.475 28.57 0.123 1.077 0.998 3.371 
 Skew ness 1.766 2.341 -1.410 -2.543 -0.417 1.696 0.995 1.235 -0.347 -0.471 4.645 
 Kurtosis 7.060 11.54 15.29 13.82 17.50 7.605 2.576 4.062 2.792 3.549 29.36 
 Jarque-Bera 509.1 1629 2789 2252 2241 216.7 71.61 129.5 9.230 20.86 13995 
 Probability  0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0099*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 Panel B: SZSE 
 Mean 1.845 60.34 0.120 5.434 0.310 0.028 25.85 0.279 6.538 7.598 6.337 
 Median 1.240 42.91 0.130 8.060 0.051 0.059 13.77 0.234 6.626 7.702 2.724 
 Maximum 8.775 513.9 1.192 131.2 9.333 1.323 100.0 0.826 8.975 10.13 90.35 
 Minimum -0.493 -249.3 -1.593 -147.2 -5.857 -1.000 0.000 0.056 2.537 3.566 0.027 
 Std. Dev. 1.672 74.14 0.302 21.15 1.908 0.460 29.08 0.152 0.934 0.915 10.34 
 Skew ness 1.492 1.841 -1.418 -1.570 2.220 -0.393 0.657 1.377 -0.655 -0.781 4.001 
 Kurtosis 5.075 11.50 10.34 18.14 11.34 3.723 2.086 4.421 4.115 5.281 23.67 
 Jarque-Bera 207.6 1287 978.5 3197 870.1 7.510 38.64 156.5 46.46 120.0 8004 
 Probability  0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0233** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 Panel C: SHSE vs. SZSE t test 
 t-stat 7.488 5.818 -4.584 -3.326 -0.908 2.478 -3.695 -17.38 -3.702 1.653 -25.42 
 p-value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0010*** 0.3647 0.0143** 0.0002*** 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 0.0990* 0.0000*** 
Notes: ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A and Panel B list the summary statistics for firms listed on the SHSE and 
SZSE respectively. Panel C lists t-statistics and corresponding p-values for hypot hesis 
that there is no difference in the mean of various variables between firms listed on the 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Except for variables FEG and LMCAP2, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level, and LMCAP2 is also 
significant at the 10% level. Thus, separate examinations will be conducted for the 
firms listed on the two exchanges.  
The average price premium in the Shenzhen market appears more modest: investors 
of the Shanghai A-shares pay almost four times the price that B-shares investors pay, 
for stocks with identical fundamental backups; while for the Shenzhen- listed shares, 
the A-shares are in general nearly three times more expensive. The Shanghai- listed 
firms are suggested to be significantly more financial risky than the Shenzhen- listed 
firms. Since the founding of new China, Shanghai has been the most economically 
developed city in China, and many of the largest stated-owned companies, e.g., the 
Shanghai Baoshan Iron and Steel Company, the Shanghai Petrochemical Company, 
were set up there. These large-scale state-owned enterprises became partially 
privatized and publicly listed after the SHSE established following the economics 
reform and Opening Up. The historical background for firms listed in the SZSE is 
very different. When the SZSE established in 1991, Shenzhen had only been 
designated as a special economic zone (SEZ) for about ten years. There were no large-
scale state-owned enterprises, and foreign-funded enterprises were small in size. Even 
today, firms listed on the SHSE tend to be larger than those choos ing the SZSE, 
which is evidenced by LMCAP2, the market capitalization calculated based on 
number of total outstanding shares. Since bank loans are the main source of capital for  
Chinese firms, and large state-owned companies normally face lower barriers and 
conditions and have bountiful mortgages to get bank loans, and it is no wonder that 
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the Shanghai- listed firms have significant higher financial leverage than the 
Shenzhen- listed firms. The Shenzhen- listed firms have significantly better 
profitability, measured by either EPS or ROE, than firms listed in Shangha i: the mean 
values of which of the Shenzhen- listed firms are about twice of which of the 
Shanghai- listed firms. While the Shenzhen- listed firms have higher forecast earnings 
growth in the near future, the Shanghai- listed firms, though not significant, are 
expected grow faster in annual sales. Comparing the Shanghai- listed firms, the 
Shenzhen- listed firms on average pay more proportion of their earnings back to 
investors; and a zero median value of the variable DIV indicates more than half of the 
Shanghai- listed firms do not provide dividends to investors. Since the Shanghai- listed 
firms are mainly previous state-owned enterprises, they in general have higher 
por tions of outstanding shares kept by the government and other institutions, and so 
they tend to have lower FR ratios. Affected by the lower FR ratio, firm size, measured 
by the number of tradable shares, of the Shanghai- listed firms is significantly lower 
than that of the Shenzhen firms, although when measuring by the number of all 
outstanding s hares, the Shanghai- listed firms are larger.  
4.4 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
4.4.1 Model Specification 
Since the concerned factors vary bot h over time and across firms, I will consider a 
panel data model. To assess the relevance of the various possible firm funda mentals 
leading to the price premium, an error components model is implemented in the 
estimation: 
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, , , 1 ,i t i i t i i t i tPRE X PREα β γ ε−′= + + +                                                                           (4.4) 
where, ,i tPRE represents the price premium for firm i in year t ; Xi,t is a vector of 
explanatory variables used to measure firm fundamentals; following Domowitz et al. 
(1997), the lagged price premium is included to reflect the trend of the price premium 
and filter out the autocorrelation; the firm-specific fixed effect is represented by the 
time- invariant coefficient iα ; ,i tε  represents the error term and is assumed to be zero 
mean and be uncorrelated with either the lagged term PREi,t-1 or the proxy variables, 
that is , ,( ' ) 0i t i tE X ε =  and , ,( ) 0i t i tE PRE ε = . Although a number of firm-specific 
variables are included in the model, there is no doubt some others are left out. The 
most important benefit of using a panel data method is its ability it gives us to control 
for unobservable firm-specific effects, which may correlated with other observables 
included in the model. Besides, panel data models facilitate a reduction in collinearity 
among the explanatory variables and improves efficiency in estimating model 
dynamics in short time-series. 
4.4.2 Panel Unit Root Test 
Previous studies utilizing the model specification (4.4), e.g., Domowitz et al. (1997), 
Sun and Tong (2000), Chen et al. (2001), Chan and Kwok (2005) and Fong and Wong 
(2007), failed to verify necessary stationarity conditions of the premium series or 
undertake tests for stationarity. As Bond (2002) explained, whilst the time series 
properties of the series are not crucial for the asymptotic distribution theory in this 
setting, they can nevertheless be crucial for the identification of parameters of interest 
and for the finite sample properties of particular GMM estimators. In order to avoid 
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any such potential problem, I will undertake a panel unit root test on the premium 
series as the first step before carrying on further analyses.  
In the panel unit root test framework, tests can be roughly categorized as two main 
types: the first type of tests, i.e., LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002), IPS (Im, Pesaran 
and Shin, 1997, 2003), and Fisher-type (Maddala and Wu, 1999 and Choi, 2001),  is 
constructed under the assumption that the individual time series in the panel are cross-
sectionally independently distributed; the second type of tests releases this assumption 
and can be further distinguished into the covariance restrictions approach, adopted 
notably by Chang (2002, 2004), and the factor structure approach, including 
contributions by Bai and Ng (2004), Phillips and Sul (2003), Moon and Perron (2004), 
Choi (2002) and Pesaran (2007). Among all these methods, LLC, IPS and Fisher-type  
tests are most commonly used in practice 7
Both the IPS and Fisher-type tests combine information based on individual unit root 
tests and relax the restrictive assumption of the LLC test that all time series share a 
common unit root. Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) suggest using a 
nonparametric Fisher-type test (Fisher, 1932) which is based on a combination of the 
p-values of the test statistics for a unit root in each cross-sectional unit (the ADF test 
or other non stationary tests). The Fisher-type test overcomes the shortcomings of 
both the LLC and IPS frameworks: it does not require a balanced panel as is the case 
of the IPS test, while the LLC and IPS tests are constructed under the assumption that 
T is the same for all cross section units; it can be carried out for any unit root test 
.  
                                                 
7 A simple but detailed comparison of them is available with Laura Barbieri, Panel Unit Root Tests: A Review, 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Sociali – Piacenza, 
(www3.unicatt.it/unicattolica/dipartimenti/DISES/allegati/LBarbieri43.pdf). 
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derived, and it is possible to use different lag lengths in the individual ADF regression 
while other tests require the same lag length in all models. Given the above 
advantages, the Fisher-type unit root test is adopted here.  
The proposed Fisher-type test is: 
1
2 ln
N
i
i
P p
=
= − ∑                                                                                                            (4.5)  
which combines the p-values from unit root tests for each cross-section i to test for 
unit roots in panel data. Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, 2 ln ip−  has a 
2χ distribution with two degrees of freedom. This means that P is distributed as 
2χ with 2N degrees of freedom, as iT →∞ , for finite N. 
When N is large, Choi (2001) proposed a modified P test, Z test: 
1
1 ( 2 ln 2)
2
N
i
i
Z p
N =
= − −∑                                                                                          (4.6) 
This statistic corresponds to the standardized cross-sectional average of individual p-
values and converges to a standard normal distribution. 
Table 4.3 presents the panel unit root test result utilizing both P test and Choi Z test. 
For both Shanghai shares and Shenzhen shares, the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
 
Table 4.3: Fisher-Type Panel Unit Root Test  
 Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP 
 P test Z test P test Z test 
 SHSE 
Individual Intercepts 119.396 -3.211 115.972 -2.952 
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    (0.0146)**      (0.0007)***   (0.0245)**      (0.0016)*** 
Individual Intercepts & 
Individual Trends 
97.145 -2.114 117.702 -2.529 
  (0.0932)*     (0.0173)**    (0.0039)***      (0.0057)*** 
 SZSE 
Individual Intercepts 106.776 -2.142 106.899 -2.168 
    (0.0475)**    (0.0161)**   (0.0467)**     (0.0151)** 
Individual Intercepts & 
Individual Trends 
95.702 -1.728 160.630 -3.837 
  (0.0629)*     (0.0420)**     (0.0000)***      (0.0001)*** 
Notes: Number of lags included in the Fisher-ADF test is suggested by AIC. Values in the parentheses are p- 
values.  ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates significant at the 5% level; and  ‘***’ indicates 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
4.4.3 Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
The unobserved idiosyncratic firm features captured by iα can be wiped out with 
panel data by running the first difference equation: 
' '
, , 1 , 1 , 2 , , 1 , , 1( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tPRE PRE PRE PRE X Xγ β ε ε− − − − −− = − + − + −                       (4.7) 
In equation (4.7) , the difference of the lagged term , 1 , 2i t i tPRE PRE− −−  is correlated 
with the difference of the disturbance , , 1i t i tε ε −− , i.e., , 1( ) 0i t itE dPRE dε− ≠ . The 
conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is no longer appropriate as 
biased and inconsistent estimator will result.  
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggested using the level PREi,t-2, or the lagged difference 
dPREi,t-2, as instruments for the differenced lagged endogenous regressor dPREi,t-1. 
Assuming there is no serial correlation, these instruments can be expected to be 
uncorrelated with the differenced error term: 
, 2( ) 0i t itE PRE dε− =  and , 2( ) 0i t itE dPRE dε− =                                                           (4.8)  
Following the initial work of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), a more efficient generalized 
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method-of-moments (GMM) procedure is proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and 
then further generalized and extended by Ahn and Schmidt (1995), Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) just to mention a few. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) argue that additional instruments can be obtained in a dynamic panel model if 
one utilizes the orthogonality cond itions that exist between lagged values of 
dependent variable and the disturbances. Following this, values of PRE lagged one 
period or more qualify as instruments in the first-differenced system, implying the 
following moment conditions: 
, ,( ) 0i t s i tE PRE dε− = ,  t=3,…,T;  s>=2                                                                        (4.9) 
GMM estimation based on (4.9) alone could be highly inefficient. In most cases, it is 
necessary to make use of the explanatory variables as additional instruments. Under 
the assumption that X’i,t are exogenous variables, , ,( ' ) 0i t i sE X ε = for all t, s=1,2,…,T, 
the explanatory variables can also be considered as valid instruments: 
, ,( ' ) 0i t s i tE X dε− = , t=3,…,T;  s>= 1                                                                        (4.10) 
However when the va lue of γ  increases towards unity, and as the relative variance of 
the fixed effects iα  increases, the instruments used in the standard first-differenced 
GMM estimator become less informative. Blundell and Bond (1998) derived a 
consistent estimator for this problem by allowing use of an extended system GMM 
estimator. In addition to lagged levels of dependent variable as instruments for 
equations in first differences, they use lagged differences of dependent variable as 
instruments for equation (4.4) in levels.  
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, 1 ,( ) 0i t i tE dPRE ε− = , for t=3,…,T                                                                             (4.11)  
When X’ are exogenous, the following level moment conditions can also be used as 
additional instruments: 
, ,( ' ) 0i t s i tE dX ε− = , t=3,…,T;  s>=1                                                                          (4.12)                                                                             
This technique is especially designed for situations with “small T, large N” panels, 
meaning few time periods and many individuals.  
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on the validity of two assumptions: 
firstly, the error terms are assumed not exhibit serial correlation, and secondly, the 
instruments are not correlated with error terms. To address these issues, two 
specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blunde ll and Bond (1998)  are used here. The overall validity of the moment 
conditions is checked by the Sargan test 8
                                                 
8 For more details, p lease see Baltagi, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd Edition, p.141. 
. The null hypothesis of the instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated to some set of residuals is rejected if the Sargan test statistic 
registers a large value compared with a chi-squared distribution with the degree of 
freedom equals to the difference between the number of moment conditions and 
number of parameters. To check the serial correlation property of the level residuals, 
the Arellano-Bond m1 and m2 statistics are calculated. If the level residuals were 
indeed serially uncorrelated,  then, by construction, the first-differenced residuals in 
(4.7) would follow a MA(1) process which implies that autocorrelations of the first 
order are non-zero but the second or higher order ones are zero. Based on the 
differenced residuals, the Arellano-Bond m1 and m2 statistics, bo th distributed as N (0, 
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1) in large samples, test the null hypotheses of zero first order and second order 
autocorrelation, respectively. A significant m1 and insignificant m2 would suggest 
valid moment conditions.  
The dynamic panel regression results, utilizing both the GMM-difference estimator 
and GMM-system estimator, of the Shangha i- and Shenzhen- listed firms are reported 
in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. Models A and B are based on the GMM-difference 
estimators and models C and D are based on the GMM-system estimators. In model A, 
the instrument set is equation (4.9), that is values of PRE lagged one period or more 
are used as instruments in the first-differenced system; in model B, instrumental set 
(4.10) is further added to the instrumental set (4.9); in model C, (4.11) is augmented 
with (4.9)-(4.10), that is lagged differences of PRE are used as additional instruments 
for equations in levels in addition to the instruments for equations in first differences; 
in model D, extra instrumental variables, (4.12), lagged differences of explanatory 
variables are added to the instrumental set of model C.  Since I only have a short T,  
i.e., T=11, which is not sufficient to conduct the analysis in sub-periods to take into 
account  of the po licy changes, I will run the dynamic panel regressions over the ent ire 
sample period to get a evidence of how the firm fundamentals attribute to the A-
shares premium on the SHSE and SZSE respectively. The tests results are reported in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
 
Table 4.4: Dynamic Panel Regressions of Shanghai-Listed Firms  
 GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS 
  A B C D 
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l.PREM 0.2086 0.2811 0.1755 0.2215 0.4067 0.3256 0.3411 0.2491 
 (0.287) (0.148) (0.212) (0.111) (0.000)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)*** 
DTE 0.0158 0.0388  0.0089 0.0191 0.0173 0.0102 0.0040 0.0028 
 (0.646) (0.257) (0.533) (0.180) (0.169) (0.413) (0.304) (0.452) 
EPS 11.6732 9.2807 10.8950 4.5374 8.4752 6.5915 3.8519 2.4612 
 (0.375) (0.498) (0.091)* (0.490) (0.195) (0.302) (0.391) (0.568) 
ROE  -0.2528  -0.0702  -0.2181  -0.0544 -0.1364 -0.1300 -0.0897  -0.0852  
 (0.240) (0.761) (0.046)** (0.625) (0.175) (0.183) (0.204) (0.208) 
FEG 0.6033 0.6358 0.2130 0.2458 0.2512 0.2272 0.1666 0.1493 
 (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.062)* (0.030)** (0.036)** (0.051)* (0.068)* (0.088)* 
FSG 1.8894  3.3845 0.6987 1.6272 1.2797 1.0902 1.4346 1.1022 
 (0.294) (0.053)* (0.323) (0.018)** (0.065)* (0.108) (0.006)*** (0.029)** 
DIV -0.0396 -0.0395 -0.0303 -0.0247 -0.0208 -0.0236  -0.0207 -0.0243 
 (0.185) (0.198) (0.012)** (0.042)** (0.103) (0.056)* (0.029)** (0.008)*** 
FR  0.3834 -17.9195 3.2923 -13.6204 -2.1802 -5.7103 -3.4687 -5.0374 
 (0.981) (0.196) (0.714) (0.095)* (0.723) (0.311) (0.291) (0.088)* 
LMCAP1 -2.3771  -2.3402  0.0165  0.2609   
 (0.140)  (0.005)***  (0.943)  (0.073)*  
LMCAP2  1.5518  2.0521  0.2415  0.3776 
  (0.406)  (0.024)**  (0.195)  (0.001)*** 
LIQ 0.1948 0.2918 0.0476 0.1667 0.1839 0.1630  0.2622 0.2116 
 (0.262) (0.090)* (0.553) (0.034)** (0.006)*** (0.014)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Sargan testa 15.7227 16.2872 81.9780 85.0576 81.6467 85.2312 145.7353 152.8732 
 (0.7850) (0.7533) (0.1974) (0.1393) (0.4590) (0.3523) (0.4439) (0.2906) 
m1b -2.3084 -2.1357  -3.4044 -3.6209     
 (0.0210)** (0.0327)** (0.0007)*** (0.0003)***     
m2c 0.0276  0.4124 0.3907  0.9827     
 (0.9780) (0.6801) (0.6960) (0.3258)     
Wald testd 40.82 37.36 38.58 36.32 113.25 122.5 254.85 281.13 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 
Notes: a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation. 
c The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
d Wald test for all explanatory variables are jointly significant. 
Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 
5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant at the 1% level. 
 
In all models, validity of the instrument variables is confirmed by both the Sargan test 
and the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test.  Highly statistically significant Wald 
statistics also confirmed all variables included in the regressions are jointly significant 
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in explaining the premium. Significant coefficients of LPREM in models C and D 
suggest first-order autocorrelation exists in the premium. Though not statistically 
significant at any conventional level, DTE shows positive sign, as the H. I expected, 
in all models. As measurements of firm profitability, EPS and ROE are found not to 
be contributing to the premium at any conventional significance level with only one 
exception in model B and when LMCAP1 is included, and so I would draw the 
conclusion that firm profitability is not an important factor causing the A-shares price 
premium, and local Chinese and foreign investors do not have much difference in 
valuing firm profitability. At the 10% significance level, all models confirm FEG 
drives the premium, however the sign of which is not what is expected. I find FEG is 
positively, rather than negatively, associated with PREM, suggesting it is actually A-
shares investors who care more about firms’ long term performance. This surprising 
result is also found with FSG, firm’s prospect measured by the forecast sales growth, 
as supported by most of the models. DIV is found to be significantly negatively 
related to the premium as the H. IV expected. FR is found to be insignificant at the 5% 
level in all models. Because of the existence of the unique untradeable shares, firm 
size is measured by two approaches, one includes the untradeable shares into 
calculation of the market capitalization, and one does not. Most of the models show a 
positive relationship between the premium and firm size, although some of which are 
not statistically significant. This finding is contradictory with both previous evidence 
and the theoretical prediction discussed in the H. VI. In interpreting this, I would 
rather believe that the result suggests both local and foreign investors prefer to invest 
in larger firms, though the local Chinese pay relatively more attention to the firm size 
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factor. Relative liquidity enters the premium positively as expected, and confirms 
previous evidence that the A-shares investors prefer liquid shares.  
 
Table 4.5: Dynamic Panel Regressions of Shenzhen-Listed Firms 
 GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS 
 A B C D 
l.PREM 0.2793 0.2927 0.2167 0.1963 0.3058 0.2571 0.3477 0.3213 
 (0.086)* (0.082)* (0.053)* (0.082)* (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
DTE 0.0074  0.0054 0.0034 0.0032 -0.0001 -0.0024 0.0001 -0.0008   
 (0.401) (0.558) (0.528) (0.547) (0.968) (0.573) (0.972) (0.690) 
EPS 1.1347 1.2570 1.7633 1.2487 1.7120 1.6437 1.0516  0.9754 
 (0.628) (0.605) (0.053) (0.184) (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.096)* (0.115) 
ROE  -0.0132  -0.0186  -0.0317  -0.0279 -0.0362 -0.0377 -0.0280  -0.0282 
 (0.650) (0.535) (0.018)** (0.040)** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
FEG -0.1497 -0.1334 0.0222 0.0431 0.0388 0.0359 0.0628  0.0618 
 (0.373) (0.448) (0.773) (0.579) (0.631) (0.645) (0.307) (0.306) 
FSG  -1.1085 -1.1464 -0.5028  -0.3667 0.2056 0.2472 -0.1004 -0.1330 
 (0.376) (0.379) (0.422) (0.563) (0.742) (0.682) (0.784) (0.714) 
DIV 0.0083 0.0042 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0013 
 (0.571) (0.782) (0.899) (0.949) (0.926) (0.932) (0.989) (0.801) 
FR 3.9933 -0.2083 -2.5703 -6.1592   -4.6904 -6.0629 -0.5609  -0.7515  
 (0.554) (0.974) (0.531) (0.105) (0.076)* (0.010)*** (0.521) (0.339) 
LMCAP1 -1.0120  -0.4590  0.2769  0.1195  
 (0.112)  (0.173)  (0.057)*  (0.091)*  
LMCAP2  -0.4194  0.1277  0.3489  0.1426 
  (0.563)  (0.723)  (0.003)***  (0.016)** 
LIQ 0.2882 0.2988 0.0908 0.0922 0.1268 0.1153 0.0742 0.0683 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.011)** (0.010)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Sargan testa 20.9027  21.5443 64.1060 65.1666 79.2188 80.3416 128.0907 130.3495 
 (0.8909) (0.8701) (0.6442) (0.6085) (0.4402) (0.4056) (0.9439) (0.9256) 
m1b -2.7689  -3.0023 -4.2018  -4.1825      
 (0.0056)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***     
m2c 0.8931   0.9898  2.3784 2.3559      
 (0.3718) (0.3223) (0.0174)** (0.0185)**     
Wald testd 32.64 28.44 28.79 26.78 133.63 148.24 215.95 227.22 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0013)** (0.0028)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.000)*** 
 
Notes: a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation. 
c The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
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d Wald test for all explanatory variables are jointly significant. 
Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 
5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant at the 1% level. 
 
In the Shenzhen market, insignificant Sargan test statistics again confirm the overall 
validity of instruments used in all models. However, Arellano-Bond’s second-order 
serial correlation test fails to reject at the 5% significance level in model B. Again, 
highly statistically significant Wald statistics confirmed all variables included in the 
regressions are jointly significant in explaining the premium. Highly significant and 
positive coefficients of LPREM in all models indicate strong mean reversion property 
of the premium. Same as what is found in the Shanghai market, the financial leverage 
is insignificant, at any conventional level, in explaining the premium in the Shenzhen 
market. EPS is found significant at the 5% level in Model C but not in other models, 
and I would consider it as not statistically important in explaining the premium. 
Hence, the result indicates there is not much difference in valuing EPS between 
investors of the A- and B-shares. However, the other profitability measurement, ROE, 
is found to be highly significant and negatively related to the premium in almost all 
the models, suggesting compared with the A-shares investors, the B-shares investors, 
as the H. II expected, give relatively more weight to ROE when valuing shares. Both 
the two measurements of firm prospects, FEG and FSG, are found no longer 
statistically significant at any conventional level. DIV is found no longer significant in 
affecting the premium in any of the models either. As the H. V expected, significant 
and negative coefficient of FR in model C, though not in other models, supports the 
B-shares investors value firms have less portions hold by the government. In models 
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C and D, the positive sign o f firm size is again observed: the LMCAP1 and LMCAP2 
are found statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. The highly 
significant and positive liquidity factor again confirms the liquidity preference of the 
A-shares investors. 
4.5 Cross-Sectional Evidence 
The above panel analysis takes account of the entire sample period over 11 years but 
fails to take into account the declines in the price premium caused by the policy 
changes. 
The following Table 4.6 compares the average premium before and after the 2001 
open B-shares market reform and the QFII programme. Significant declines in the 
premium around the 2001 event are found on both exchanges. Significant decline in 
the premium around the QFII programme is found in the Shenzhen market only. 
 
Table 4. 6: t-Test of the A-Shares Premium Before and After Regulation Relaxations 
 SHSE SZSE 
Averaged Premium (1994-2000) 4.1312 2.7944 
Averaged Premium (2001-2002) 1.1446 1.18447 
Averaged Premium (2003-2004) 1.0578 0.8662 
pre-2001 vs. post-2001 -39.6835 -31.1437 
    (0.0000)***   (0.0000)*** 
pre-QFII vs. post-QFII -0.9950 -6.0514 
 (0.3256)    (0.0000)*** 
      Note: Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% level. 
 
In order to consider the influence of the policy changes, in this section, I split the 
sample into three sub-periods: the period when the A- and B-shares market are strictly 
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segmented runs from 1994 to 2000; the period when Chinese individuals can trade in 
the B-shares market but foreign investors are still kept away from the A-shares market, 
which includes 2001 and 2002; and the period when QFIIs are involved in the A-
shares trading, which includes 2003 and 2004. Since each of the last two sub-periods 
only covers a very short time, i.e., two years, the dynamic panel data estimation will 
not be suitable any longer. Cross-sectional regressions based on OLS are employed. 
The specification is as follows: 
i i iPRE C Xβ ε′= + +                                                                                                 (4.13)  
where C is a constant; Xi,t is the same set of explanatory variables used in the panel 
analysis; error terms iε  are i.i.d. and normally distributed. Values of the variables are 
taken from the averaged observations in the period. Such smoothing diminishes the 
influence of a few extreme outliers, i.e., large standard deviation and kurtosis in DTE, 
EPS, ROE, FEG and FSG suggested in Table 4.2. 
After the relaxation in regulation in 2001, Chinese individuals rushed into the former 
prohibited market, and one may argue it is hard to distinguish which investor group is 
the main force driving the market price. However capital control in China still existed 
after the reform. Chinese investors have limited access to foreign currency which is 
required by the B-shares trading. The jump of the B-shares price only lasted for four 
months, but since the B-shares market fully opened in June, the trading activity went 
back to the pre-event level. Hence, I would consider it still the foreign investors who 
dominate the pricing in the B-shares market even after the deregulation. The influence 
of firm fundamentals in the price premium is expected still exist but the power may 
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become lower.  
The participa tion of the foreign investors in the A-shares trading does not affect the 
A-shares premium directly. As introduced earlier, QFIIs who can be successfully 
granted licenses are in general those have the characteristic of long-term investment. 
For those firms issuing both the A- and B-shares, QFIIs should choose to stay in the 
B-shares market since the B-shares can return them the same dividends as the A-
shares, but are associated with a lower price-to-earnings ratio. However another 
important motivation of introducing the programme is that the po licy makers hope the 
QFIIs could bring their advanced investment perceptions and help in improving the 
highly speculative atmosphere in the A-shares market. If the programme functioned as 
anticipated, the influence of firm fundamentals to the premium should further 
decrease.  
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the results of cross-sectional regressions for the three sub-
periods in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets respectively. Panels A, B and C refer 
to the three sub-periods respectively.  
 
Table 4. 7: Cross-Sectional Regression of Shanghai-Listed Firms 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
C 6.8753 6.5921 1.6693 1.2881 1.4757 0.6135 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0115)** (0.0215)** (0.5514) 
DTE 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0007 
 (0.8583） (0.8104) (0.6065) (0.7045) (0.2050) (0.2395) 
EPS -3.7328 -4.3103 0.2829 0.1866 0.0575 -0.0180 
 (0.1419) (0.0671)* (0.5535) (0.6889) (0.8010) (0.9425) 
ROE -0.0038 0.0015 -0.0008 3.67E-05 -0.0031 -0.0037 
 (0.9310) (0.9719) (0.7740) (0.9893) (0.2877) (0.2103) 
FEG 0.2143 0.2181 -0.0588 -0.0531 0.1534 0.2527 
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 (0.0857)* (0.0813)* (0.3770) (0.4199) (0.8096) (0.1327) 
FSG 0.2720 0.1273 -0.3929 -0.4114 0.4217 0.8381 
 (0.7187) (0.8549) (0.2566) (0.2272) (0.4003) (0.0782)* 
DIV -0.0135 -0.0137 -0.0033 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0028 
 (0.0402)** (0.0442)** (0.2815) (0.3326) (0.5259) (0.4903) 
FR -6.5867 -7.6353 -2.2712 -2.2642 -2.1747 -2.0597 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)** (0.0028)*** (0.0008)*** 
LMCAP1 -0.3179  -0.0132  0.0119  
 (0.1053)  (0.8032)  (0.9091)  
LMCAP2  -0.1885  0.0312  0.1183 
  (0.2561)  (0.6179)  (0.4522) 
LIQ 0.0869 0.0857 -0.0486 -0.0442 0.0324 0.0277 
 (0.2266) (0.2229) (0.1658) (0.1771) (0.3986) (0.4894) 
Adj. R2 0.6751 0.6564 0.4401 0.4420 0.2284 0.2470 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity is corrected following White (1980). Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘*’ indicates 
significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
For firms listed on the SHSE, among all the explanatory variables, DIV and FR are 
found to be significant at the 5% level before Chinese individual investors entered the 
B-shares market. As expected, the higher proportion of earnings returned to investors, 
the more free floating shares the company have, the narrower the gap in the A- and B-
shares’ prices. In the following two sub-periods, FR is found consistently statistically 
significant in affecting the price premium. Supporting my conjecture, the absolute 
value of coefficients of FR decreases through time, indicating as former prohibited 
investors get involved in the markets, their investment theories infiltrated and 
influenced their counterparts. At the 5% significant level, no other fundamental 
variables are found statistically significant related to the premium, suggesting the 
difference in valuation preferences between investors of the A- and B-shares 
disappeared as the two markets become more integrated.  
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Table 4. 8: Cross-Sectional Regression of Shenzhen-Listed Firms 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
C 3.1908 2.3765 0.3286 0.4333 0.2352 0.3273 
 (0.0056)* (0.0003)*** (0.8430) (0.7915) (0.6838) (0.5459) 
DTE -0.0032 -0.0025 0.0033 0.0033 0.0029 0.0029 
 (0.2883) (0.2945) (0.3389) (0.3388) (0.0636)* (0.0614)* 
EPS 0.7026 0.3009 0.5657 0.6554 -0.6433 -0.6292 
 (0.4934) (0.7574) (0.7091) (0.6458) (0.2858) (0.2971) 
ROE -0.0326 -0.0352 -0.0263 -0.0284 0.0246 0.0253 
 (0.0133)** (0.0094)*** (0.3868) (0.3193) (0.1755) (0.1737) 
FEG 0.1424 0.1493 -0.1263 -0.1224 0.3658 0.3880 
 (0.0742)* (0.0409)** (0.1796) (0.1879) (0.1205) (0.0941)* 
FSG 0.4575 0.6537 0.2006 0.1902 0.5436 0.5514 
 (0.1980) (0.0310)** (0.5883) (0.6235) (0.0975)* (0.0955)* 
DIV -0.0053 -0.0040 0.0047 0.0047 -0.0010 -0.0011 
 (0.5195) (0.6235) (0.3501) (0.3593) (0.7621) (0.7654) 
FR -1.9665 -1.8038 -0.9821 -0.8809 -1.0218 -0.9754 
 (0.0052)*** (0.0135)** (0.0095)*** (0.0468)** (0.0324)** (0.0471)** 
LMCAP1 0.0411  0.1037  0.0500  
 (0.8239)  (0.6655)  (0.4894)  
LMCAP2  0.1480  0.0767  0.0297 
  (0.0094)***  (0.7084)  (0.6139) 
LIQ -0.0164 -0.0232 -0.0018 -0.0048 0.0627 0.0646 
 (0.1958) (0.0339)** (0.9294) (0.7704) (0.0770)* (0.0732)* 
Adj. R2 0.2810 0.3784 0.0908 0.1058 0.1681 0.1780 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity is corrected following White (1980). Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘*’ indicates 
significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
For firms listed on the SZSE, significant FR is also found throughout all the sub-
periods. Same as what is found on the SHSE, the influence of FR to the premium 
decreased in the second sub-period, however it rebounded in the third sub-period, 
suggesting the QFII programme is not as successful, in term of influencing local 
investors’ investing preference, as it is on the SHSE. Besides FR, selected variables 
also show significant roles in explaining the price premium among firms. Measured 
by ROE, firm’s profitability is statistically significantly associated with the price 
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premium before individual Chinese entered the B-shares market, and the finding is 
robust to the finding from the panel data estimation. Foreign investors would like to 
pay a relatively higher price for firms which have higher return on equity. Firm’s 
future prospects is also found affect the price premium at the 5% significant level in 
the first sub-period, but contradicting my prediction, the A-shares investors are found 
to care more about firm’s growth prospects. Market capitalization measurement 
LMCAP2 is found to enter the premium with a surprising positive sign at the 1% 
significance level, indicating local investors care more about firm size. Liquidity 
factor is found to be significant at the 5% significance level, however, the negative 
sign, suggesting foreign investors pay more attention to liquidity, is also contradicted 
by my hypothesis and previous evidence. All the above findings with firm’s future 
prospects, size and relative liquidity of the A- and B-shares are robust to the find ings 
from the previous pane l da ta estimation. In Panel B, the low adjusted R-square 
suggests the firm fundamentals do not well explain the premium, and no other factors, 
besides FR, are found to be significantly different in valuation preferences between 
investors of the A- and B-shares. In Panel C, at the 10% significance level, the 
financial leverage is found to play a statistically significant positive role, which is 
consistent with the expectation of H. I, in affecting the price premium. FEG and FSG 
are found to positively contribute to the premium at the 10% significance level. 
Liquidity factor is also found to be significant at the 10% level. 
4.6 Event Study Analysis 
What explains the decline of the A-shares premium? In this section, consequences of 
the policy changes and their relationships to the funda mental attributes will be 
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examined by investigating the cross-sectional variation in the changes in the pr ice 
premium before and after the policy changes. Two models are employed as follows: 
'
, , 1 ,i t i t i tdPRE C Xβ ε−= + +                                                                                        (4.14) 
and , ' , 1 ,
, 1
i t
i t i t
i t
dPRE
C X
PRE
β ε−
−
= + +                                                                                (4.15) 
Model (4.14) measures the simple change in the price premium and model (4.15) 
measures the relative change. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the regression results for 
firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets respectively.  
 
Table 4. 9: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Change in the Shanghai A-Shares Premium  
 2001 event QFII event 
 model 1: dpre model 2: relative dpre model 1: dpre model 2: relative dpre 
C -1.3892 -1.3386 -0.6612 -0.5861 0.3605 -0.1584 2.0039 1.4932 
 (0.0161)
** (0.0775)* (0.1560) (0.3252) (0.5189) (0.8082) (0.1385) (0.3259) 
DTE -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0024 
 (0.0815)
* (0.0790)* (0.0262)** (0.0361)** (0.0036)*** (0.0123)** (0.0515)* (0.0671)* 
EPS -0.6543 -0.5152 -0.6114 -0.4665 -0.0641 -0.2946 0.0386 -0.2782 
 (0.1498) (0.3134) (0.4428) (0.4919) (0.8898) (0.5234) (0.9691) (0.7820) 
ROE 0.0101 0.0086 0.0039 0.0021 -0.0010 0.0009 -0.0019 0.0009 
 (0.2206) (0.3761) (0.8061) (0.8846) (0.8129) (0.8305) (0.8485) (0.9297) 
FEG 0.0253 0.0248 -0.0064 -0.0076 0.0607 0.1176 0.0799 0.2840 
 (0.1439) (0.2538) (0.7322) (0.7728) (0.3614) (0.1426) (0.6933) (0.3057) 
FSG -0.0362 0.0043 -0.1160 -0.0734 0.2041 0.2169 0.3663 0.4182 
 (0.7860) (0.9728) (0.4760) (0.6699) (0.0038)
*** (0.0012)*** (0.0679)* (0.0611)* 
DIV -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0032 -0.0022 
 (0.6647) (0.7187) (0.7149) (0.7261) (0.9719) (0.8033) (0.5975) (0.7275) 
FR -0.1702 0.1296 -0.3763 -0.1001 -0.2647 -0.1965 -0.6691 -0.8961 
 (0.6359) (0.6497) (0.3047) (0.6833) (0.5848) (0.6867) (0.4579) (0.4108) 
LMCAP1 0.0969  0.0887  -0.0106  -0.1537  
 (0.1471)  (0.2072)  (0.8776)  (0.3333)  
LMCAP2  0.0666  0.0576  0.0482  -0.0720 
  (0.3501)  (0.4158)  (0.5116)  (0.6409) 
LIQ 0.0034 0.0044 0.0011 0.0021 -0.0420 -0.0387 -0.1382 -0.1328 
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 (0.8626) (0.8042) (0.9666) (0.9400) (0.0333)** (0.0550)* (0.0156)** (0.0268)** 
Adj. R2 0.2864 0.1499 0.2838 0.2174 0.1592 0.1661 0.1289 0.1200 
Note: Heteroscedasticity is corrected following White (1980). Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘*’ indicates 
significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
When the B-shares market opened up to local Chinese individuals, the B-shares price 
increased dramatically leading to a decline in the A-shares price premium. If what is 
suggested by the cross-sectional regressions in the Table 4.7 is true, that is local 
investors in the Shanghai market do not value firm fundamentals, I should then expect 
the change (relative change) in the A-shares price premium is not related to firm 
fundamentals. The above regression confirms that both absolute and relative declines 
in the price premium are statistically significantly dependent on firms’ financial 
leverage, which would indicate Chinese investors do care about firm’s financial risk, 
though I did not find the leverage ratio significantly attributes to the level of price 
premium in either the pre-2001 event or the post-2001 event sub-sample. This might 
mean local investors’ fundamental preference is not stable, and in the year 2000 local 
investors show significant preference in firm’s financial risk. The negative coefficient 
indicates Chinese individual investors would like to pay more for firms with lower 
financial risk indicating by lower financial leverage. The liquidity factor is not found 
statistically significant as the expectation that Chinese investors prefer stocks which 
are more liquid.  
The launc h of the QFII programme introduced foreign institutional investors into the 
A-shares market, and the introduction of QFIIs is expected to br ing rational and 
advanced investment perception to the speculative individuals in the A-shares market. 
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The above result suggests a large part of the decline in the premium around the QFII 
launch concentrates in firms with lower financial risk and higher forecast sales growth, 
however I would expect that influenced by foreign institutional investors’ investing 
preference, and the decline in the A-shares price thus premium concentrates in shares 
with less favourable fundamental background. The result, in stead, suggests the more 
favourable firm fundamentals in common view, the greater their A-shares price drop. 
Larger decline  in the premium is also found in firms with lower relative liquidity of 
the ir A- and B-shares. 
 
Table 4.10: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Change in the Shenzhen A-Shares Premium  
 2001 event QFII event 
 model 1: dpre model 2: relative dpre model 1: dpre model 2: relative dpre 
C -0.8149 -0.8035 0.1178 0.1143 -1.8064 -1.9971 -2.1708 -2.4332 
 (0.0012)
*** (0.0023)*** (0.3759) (0.4517) (0.3247) (0.2899) (0.4024) (0.3596) 
DTE 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0024 
 (0.6139) (0.6016) (0.0290)** (0.0291)** (0.4942) (0.4001) (0.3766) (0.3196) 
EPS 0.0218 0.0247 -0.1439 -0.1449 -1.1408 -1.1350 -1.2757 -1.2735 
 (0.9158) (0.9095) (0.2374) (0.2548) (0.2020) (0.2012) (0.2779) (0.2782) 
ROE 0.0018 0.0018 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0283 0.0280 0.0314 0.0312 
 (0.2396) (0.2101) (0.0225)
** (0.0214)** (0.2461) (0.2381) (0.3285) (0.3213) 
FEG 0.0011 0.0013 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0190 -0.0191 -0.0348 -0.0354 
 (0.9549) (0.9423) (0.5896) (0.5926) (0.8114) (0.7871) (0.7533) (0.7209) 
FSG 0.1223 0.1208 -0.0060 -0.0058 -0.1280 -0.1349 -0.1894 -0.1982 
 (0.1557) (01630) (0.9151) (0.9200) (0.8063) (0.7848) (0.7968) (0.7776) 
DIV 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0002 9.80E-05 -0.0013 -0.0014 
 (0.7380) (0.7156) (0.1031) (0.1072) (0.9669) (0.9801) (0.8318) (0.7964) 
FR -0.0412 -0.0363 -0.3437 -0.3417 0.0839 0.3230 0.1645 0.4635 
 (0.7958) (0.8057) (0.0258)
** (0.0189)** (0.8867) (0.6496) (0.8481) (0.6561) 
LMCAP1 0.0037  0.0006  0.1762  0.2128  
 (0.9033)  (0.9773)  (0.3286)  (0.4010)  
LMCAP2  0.0011  0.0010  0.1701  0.2083 
  (0.9700)  (0.9617)  (0.2955)  (0.3587) 
LIQ -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0008 0.1899 0.2079 0.2592 0.2827 
 (0.6993) (0.6693) (0.8238) (0.8313) (0.5354) (0.4829) (0.5514) (0.5039) 
Adj. R2 0.1771 0.1753 0.4360 0.4361 0.2103 0.2860 0.1129 0.1860 
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Note: Heteroscedasticity is corrected following White (1980). Values in the parentheses are p-values. ‘*’ indicates 
significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
For firms listed on the SZSE, no firm fundamentals are found to be statistically 
significantly associated with the absolute decline in the premium. However, the larger 
relative decline of the premium is found to be statistically significantly concentrated 
in firms with lower DTE, ROE and FR. The observation indicates that Chinese 
investors in the Shenzhen market also prefer lower financial risk firms, though it is 
hard to explain they also prefer firms with lower return on equity and less shares 
available to the public. No examined fundamentals seem statistically significant in 
affecting the premium change after the QFII programme launched, which indicates 
the investors in the Shenzhen market do not become ‘wiser’ as hoped.  
4.7 Summary and Discussion 
In this chapter, I proposed a complementary explanation of the Chinese A-shares 
premium. Under this proposal, the premium reflects different valuation preferences of 
the investors of the A- and B-shares: the B-shares investors place more value upon 
information on fundamentals concerning a firm and, in contrast, the A-shares 
investors value shares liquidity more highly. Foreign investors would like to pay 
relatively more for firms backed by better fundamentals, and so these firms tend to 
have lower prema. This is the first study in the literature tries to explain the premium 
via the perspective of firm-specific characteristics. By adopting a dynamic panel data 
analysis, cross-sectional regressions and event studies, the relationship between the 
Chinese A-shares price premium and firm fundamentals, i.e., financial leverage, 
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profitability, future prospectus, dividend payout, corporate governance and size, has 
been examined between the years 1994 and 2004. I found evidence that foreign and 
domestic investors have different preferences on firm fundamentals.  
The dynamic panel data regression is conducted upon a widely used panel error  
component model in previous studies (see, e.g., Domowitz et al., 1997; Sun and Tong, 
2000; Li, 2004; Chan and Kwok, 2005), and this specification (equation 4.4) carries 
some robustness. Over the entire sample period, the premia in the Shanghai market 
are suggested to be positively associated with firms’ future prospects and negatively 
associated with the proportions in the annual earnings paid as dividends; while for 
firms listed in the Shenzhen market, those with lower returns on equity and higher 
market capitalizations tend to have higher A-shares premia. For firms listed on both 
exchanges, stocks with higher liquidity have higher A-shares premia, and this 
provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the local Chinese investors place 
more value upon shares liquidity. Among the above significant factors, the influence 
of two of them, future prospects and market capitalization, is contradictory with my 
hypothesis. The evidence suggests that the local Chinese investors do care about 
compa nies’ performance in the future, and not just trade their shares every a few 
months. The positive sign of market capitalization suggests that the local investors do 
value the size factor when making valuation decisions, and actually, that they would 
like to pay relatively more for firms with larger size than their foreign counterparts.  
The cross-sectional regressions, which are conducted over three different sub-periods, 
suggest that firms with higher floating ratios tend to have lower premia throughout all 
the sub-periods. Besides the floating ratio, the Shanghai- listed firms with higher 
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dividend payout ratios also tend to have lower premia before the B-shares market 
opened to Chinese individual investors. In addition, for firms listed in the Shenzhen 
market, I found those having higher returns on equity and lower future prospects tend 
to have lower premia before the B-shares market opened. The effects of dividend 
payout ratio and return on equity in the Shangha i and Shenzhen markets are also 
confirmed in the panel data estimation. For firms listed in the both markets, no 
relationship is found, at the 5% significance level, between the firm fundamentals 
(apart from the floating ratio) and the premium, since the B-shares market opened to 
Chinese individual investors. The observation suggests as the Chinese stock markets 
become more integrated, the investing preferences of the different investor groups 
also become more integrated.  
The event studies provide further evidence of what kind of firms tend to have the 
greatest decline in the premium around the time of regulation relaxations. The 
evidence from the Shanghai market shows that the decline in the premium around the 
2001 event concentrates in firms with lower financial risk; and the evidence from the 
Shenzhen market shows that, besides the financial risk, the relative decline also 
concentrates in firms with lower return on equity and floating ratio. With respect to 
the QFII programme, a larger decline is found to be concentrated in the Shanghai-
listed firms with lower financial risk and higher forecast sales growth. However, in 
the Shenzhen market, foreign investors’ va luation perception seems not to affect local 
investors’ perception. 
My new hypo thesis shed light on the interpretation of the Chinese A-shares premium 
in two respects: Firstly, it provides evidence of whether the Chinese A-shares market, 
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which is dominated by individual investors, is liquidity-dr iven in nature. It helps to 
provide an answer to the question: do local Chinese individuals indeed value more 
about stock liquidity but care less about company fundamentals? Secondly, it helps us 
to identify whether firms with certain types of fundamentals tend to have higher or 
lower pr emia, and if this is so, in what way. As I have discussed, as a result of the 
introduction of the QFII/ QDII programmes, the Chinese stock market has been 
speeding up its process of opening up to the outside world. The QFII is found, on the 
basis of empirical evidence, not to be effective in improving the Chinese investors’ 
investment perception. This research also provides a reference for policy makers in 
understanding the different behaviour patterns of different investor groups and 
anticipating possible outcomes of further reforms. However, as the change of Chinese 
exchange rate regime in 2005, only two years after the QFII are included in the study, 
and the result might be speculative due to lack of enough observations. Further work 
could involve revisiting the top ic when the influence of the change in the exchange 
rate regime is taken into account and the possibility of the investors having time-
varying preference is incorporated explicitly.  
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CHAPTER 5 
PRICE DISCOVERY IN CHINESE 
STOCK MARKETS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will conduct an empirical investigation into the existence and degree 
of the market segmentation by examining the manner of the relationships between 
locally-owned and foreign-owned Chinese listed shares. According to price discovery 
theory, a share’s market price is an equilibrium outcome of different markets or 
market participants’ responses to newly arrived information. However, since different 
markets or markets participants have various capabilities in obtaining and processing 
the information, they understand the information in different ways and the speed of 
their reactions to the information may also vary. Information asymmetry can thus 
emerge under such circumstances. Those participants who have information 
advantages are able to benefit from their position, while those with information 
disadvantage will then follow the leading investors. Hence, a lead- lag relations hip or  
information diffusion is generated between different markets or market participants. 
Since the Chinese A- and B-shares are based on the same underlying assets and 
subject to same macroeconomic environments and microeconomic factors, their prices 
are supposed to share a common trend, however one may behave with some delay in 
incorporating information into the current market price, given the segmented market 
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structure and information asymmetry. If the A-shares market is the one which takes 
the leading role, the current B-shares price will actually be a reflection of the lagged 
price information in the A-shares market, and information of lagged A-shares returns 
will be helpful in forecasting current B-shares returns, and vice versa. 
It is typically documented in the finance literature that domestic investors, compared 
with foreign investors, are better informed about the value of local assets (Brennan 
and Cao, 1997; Kang and Stulz, 1997; Choe, et al., 2000; Hau, 2001; Dvorak, 2005), 
however, there is also evidence found supporting different opinion, namely foreign 
investors are better informed and outperformed than local investors (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2000; Seaholes, 2000; Froot and Ramadorai, 2007). Among all the 
literature examining the information asymmetry between local investors groups and 
foreign investors groups, effort has also been made to verify the information 
adjustment process in the Chinese stock markets, and the findings are controversial.  
The first set of literature supports the view that domestic investors are better informed 
about the value of local assets. Employing a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), 
Sjoo and Zhang (2000) found supportive evidence in the Shenzhen market that there 
exists important long-run information diffusion from the A-shares to the B-shares 
between July 1993 and June 1997. Using direct graph theory and multivariate 
GARCH model estimation, Lin and Wu (2003) found that for the four Chinese 
domestic markets, spillover in mean returns went uni-directionally from the A-shares 
market to the B-shares market in the period of 5 January 2000 to 30 May 2003. In 
add ition, Wu and Zhu (2002) examined daily return data of 75 firms one year before 
and after the 2001 event to identify how the information diffusion between the A- and 
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B-shares markets affected by the opening of the B-shares market, and they found the 
two markets were strictly segmented before the B-shares market opened to Chinese 
local individuals, while after the event, the two markets tended to be semi-segmented 
with information flows from Chinese investors to foreign investors. While considering 
da ily return data may not be the best basis on which to uncover a rapid dynamic 
relationship, Chan et al. (2007) conducted a comprehensive analysis using high-
frequency transactions data, which gives direct evidence of which market is faster in 
processing and discovering information and o f the nature of the informational linkage 
between the A- and B-shares markets. Their results suggest that the local investors 
dominate the price discovery process both pre- and post- the 2001 open market reform. 
Wang (2006) applied a GARCH model to examine the cross-autocorrelation pattern 
between daily portfolios returns before and after China opened its once foreign-
exclus ive B-shares market, and a leading role of A-shares portfolio is identified. By 
implementing a nonlinear Granger causality test, Qiao et al. (2008) provided evidence 
of A-shares markets tend to lead their B-shares counterparts in the same stock 
exchange after the 2001 policy allowing domestic citizens to invest in the B-shares 
markets. 
The second set of literature provides contrary evidence. Chui and Kwok (1998) argue 
foreign institutional investors, who are the major participants of the B-shares market, 
have noticeable professiona l experience and advanced knowledge in processing and 
analyzing information, and they also have better channels in exploring new 
information, while the A-shares marke t is mainly composed of individual investors 
who lack access to information and receive information slower than the foreign 
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participants. Those individuals are hence more likely to condition their trading 
decisions on the previous movements of the B-shares. Using weekly data between 
July 1993 and June 1997, Sjoo and Zhang (2000) found supportive evidence of 
foreign investors being better informed in the Shanghai market, which compared with 
the Shenzhen market, is more sizeable and liquid. Kim and Shin (2000) found 
although the A-shares tended to lead the B-shares before 1996, when the Asian 
Financial Crisis took place, the B-shares became more influential. Yang (2003) 
examined Shanghai A-shares, Shanghai B-shares, Shenzhen A-shares, Shenzhen B-
shares, Hong Kong H-shares and red chip stock market price indexes, and concluded 
that foreign investors in the Shanghai B-shares market are better informed than 
Chinese domestic investors in the two A-shares markets and foreign investors in the 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong marke ts over time.  
The third set of literature argues the information flow between domestic and foreign 
investors is bi-directional. Wo (1997) conducted a bivariate Granger causality test of 
A- and B-shares returns and found evidence of two-way information flows between 
January 1993 and October 1995. Chakravarty et al. (1998) also found there is a bi-
directional information flow between the Chinese A- and B-shares markets, even if it 
is mor e likely the return of A-shares takes the leading role.  
There is another set of literature which takes the view that there does not exist any 
information asymmetry between the different groups of investors. Chen et al. (2001) 
found there is no information feedback in Chinese stock markets and the A- and B-
shares markets are perfectly segmented. The analyses of variance decompos itions 
conducted by Darrat et al. (2006) suggested that there is no information asymmetry 
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between the A- and B-shares markets in both before and after February 2001 open 
market reform periods, though the prices of the two markets are closely linked over 
the long-run.  
 
It can be seen from the above review of relevant studies that the issue of whether 
foreign investors are less well informed than Chinese domestic investors is 
controversial. This may simply reflect the fact that different data samples and 
different time periods are used in the various studies, as well as different 
methodologies having been employed in the research. I will, in this chapter, provide 
further evidence of the lead- lag effects between the Chinese A- and B-shares with a 
more complete dataset, which includes the time period after QFIIs entered the 
domestic market. This is the first contribution of this chapter. 
Most previous studies used the official price indexes released by stock exchanges as 
the research object, however, firms which issue the A- and B-shares at the same time 
only comprise less than 10% of the listed firms included in calculating the official 
indexes. The inclus ion of the other 90% firms is very likely to lead to biased results, 
and in order to avoid the sample selection bias I will conduct the investigation only 
based on stocks issued by dual- listed firms. This is the second contribution of this 
chapter: a new aggregated price, based on which following analyses conducted, will 
be constructed. 
New econometric methodologies are employed. In addition to the traditional and most 
used Granger causality test, I also utilize the more recently developed Toda-
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Yamamoto (1995) causality test to provide a more robust result. Besides the 
investigation based on the self-calculated aggregate price, I further examine the 
contribution of individual firms by employing a panel data analysis. Up to my best 
knowledge, this is the first time panel data techniques are used to examine the issue of 
information flows in the Chinese A- and B-shares markets. Panel data analysis 
enables us more power to identify data properties by providing a fuller insight into 
both the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions.  
The fourth contribution of this chapter arises from looking further into sub-periods 
divided according to the policy changes when I examine more closely the 
effectiveness of the 2001 open market reform and QFII programme. The effect of 
opening the B-shares market to local Chinese investors has been examined 
extensively (as outlined previously), however the effectiveness of the QFII 
programme still lacks sufficient attention after its launch five years ago. The 
comparison of the interaction of different stock classes in different time horizons will 
provide some new empirical evidence of the effectiveness, in term of the market 
integration, of the QFII programme.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 will investigate the 
segmentation/ integration status of the Chinese stock markets, lead- lag relations hips  
between the Chinese A- and B-shares, and shor t-run interactions between them, by 
using the self-calculated aggregate price. Employing recently developed panel data 
techniques, the issue will be re-examined in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 will provide a 
summary. 
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5.2 Investigation on An Aggregate Level  
Lead- lag relationships between the Chinese A- and B-shares are firstly examined on 
an aggregate level. The use of aggregate pr ice is consistent with mos t of previous 
studies regarding the information diffusion in the Chinese stock markets, however, my 
study will provide results from a more appropriate dataset and a more complete time 
span. Both a Granger-type causality test (1969) in a VAR framework, which is the 
most popular methodology that has been used in the field, and the most recently 
developed Toda-Yamamoto (1995) approach, are employed to detect lead-lag 
relationships in the Chinese markets. The Granger causality test requires precise 
knowledge of the integration properties of the system, thus pretests of unit roots and 
cointegrating rank will be conducted first. Section 5.2.1 describes the data and 
summary statistics. Econometric methodo logies employed are introduced in Section 
5.2.2, including Augmented Dickey Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root 
tests, Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration procedure, Granger-type and Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) causality tests and Pesaran and Shin’s generalized impulse 
response functions (1998). Empirical evidence will be provided in Section 5.2.3, and 
finally Section 5.2.4 summarizes. 
5.2.1 Data and Preliminary Description 
Daily adjusted closing prices of individual A-shares and B-shares are collected from 
the Datastream database. The prices of both the A-shares and B-shares are expressed 
in Chinese currency, yua n. The companies included in the sample are same as the 
ones used in Chapter 4, and the name lists are available in the Appe ndices D and E. 
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The aggregated price of A-shares portfolio and B-shares portfolio are computed by 
taking the weighted average price of individual shares and the number of total 
outstanding shares of each particular share class is used as the weight 1. When there is 
no trading on a particular day, the price is considered as the closing price of the last 
trading day. The entire sample starts from 3 January 1994 and ends at 31 December 
20042
Table 5.1 provides a description of the summary statistics of the daily rate of return. 
The daily rate of return is calculated based on the conventional first difference of 
logarithmic prices: 
, and is further split into three sub-periods: 3 January 1994 to 16 February 2001, 
28 February 2001 to 8 July 2003, and 9 July 2003 to 31 December 2004, to account 
for potential structural breaks as well as test the effectiveness of the structural changes 
brought by China’s opening its once foreigner-only shares to domestic individual 
investors and opening the domestic market to certain foreign institutions respectively. 
, , , 1log logi t i t i tR P P −= − , where Ri,t denotes the rate of return for the 
ith market on day t and Pi,t denotes the corresponding market pr ice. On average, the 
A-shares bring higher returns to investors in the strictly segmented period, however 
since the B-shares made available to Chinese investors in 2001, the B-shares portfolio 
started to outperform slightly. Comparing be tween the exchanges, in all sub-samples, 
the Shenzhen A-shares provide higher rate of returns to investors comparing with the 
Shanghai A-shares, and the Shenzhen B-shares also generate higher returns with only 
one exception in the first sub-period. In add ition, it is suggested that the B-shares 
                                                 
1 Because of the existence of non-tradable shares in China, the use of the number of tradable shares as the weight is 
supposed to be more appropriate, however Datastream does not provide such information and the data provided by 
the Tianxiang Investment Consultant, obtained from individual companies’ semi-annual reports, are not frequent 
enough to capture the change in the weight. In addition, the use of number of total outstanding shares as a weight 
is actually consistent with the way the official shares indexes released by  the exchanges calculated.  
2 I did not include the more recent post-2004 data due to China’s exchange rate regime reform in 2005. For more 
details, p lease refer to the Section 4.3.  
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listed on both exchanges have been exhibiting more volatile than the A-shares pos t the 
2001 event. All series can be considered as normally distributed.    
 
Table 5. 1: Summary Statistics of Chinese Shares’ Returns 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
 Mean 0.0002 -3.26E-06 0.0003 -0.0001 
 Median 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -8.96E-05 
 Maximum 0.3072 0.4012 0.2916 0.4132 
 Minimum -0.1794 -0.1292 -0.2043 -0.1860 
 Std. Dev.  0.0271 0.0240 0.0268 0.0256 
 Skewness 1.7602 2.8556 0.9907 2.4482 
 Kurtosis 24.8531 48.1984 19.8454 45.7553 
 Jarque-Bera 37951 160766 22284 143452 
 Probability 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
 Mean -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0006 
 Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 0.0908 0.0939 0.0892 0.0928 
 Minimum -0.0571 -0.1002 -0.0607 -0.0909 
 Std. Dev.  0.0155 0.0226 0.0147 0.0237 
 Skewness 0.7059 0.2971 0.6568 0.4061 
 Kurtosis 8.3092 7.8847 9.0907 6.9000 
 Jarque-Bera 772.11 619.47 993.20 406.00 
 Probability 0.0000
*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
 Mean -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0003 
 Median -5.53E-05 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0000 
 Maximum 0.0442 0.0590 0.0438 0.0751 
 Minimum -0.0565 -0.0901 -0.0463 -0.0614 
 Std. Dev.  0.0140 0.0143 0.0126 0.0152 
 Skewness -0.0517 -0.2309 0.3605 0.2031 
 Kurtosis 4.2414 9.4523 4.0200 5.9896 
 Jarque-Bera 25.023 674.77 25.162 146.78 
 Probability 0.0004*** 0.0000*** 0.0003*** 0.0000*** 
Note: ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.2 provides statistic information on the pair-wise correlation between the 
return of different portfolios. Positive correlations are found with almost all pairs. The 
correlation of Shanghai A-shares returns and Shanghai B-shares returns increased 
from 0.27 to 0.67 after the open B-shares market reform, and further increased to 0.74 
after the QFII programme operated. The same trend can be found in the Shenzhen 
market as well with the correlation increased from 0.28 to 0.68 and further to 0.77. 
The observation indicates the linkage between the Chinese A-shares and B-shares 
markets may, to some extent, have strengthened. The correlations between different 
exchanges reached the highest in the second sub-period. Overall, the linkage of the A-
shares return between the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets is suggested to be closer 
than the B-shares’.  
 
Table 5. 2: Correlations of the Chinese Segmented Markets 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
RSHH_A 1.0000 0.2663 0.7948 0.2508 
RSHH_B 0.2663 1.0000 0.2419 0.6912 
RSHZH_A 0.7948 0.2419 1.0000 0.2811 
RSHZH_B 0.2508 0.6912 0.2811 1.0000 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
RSHH_A 1.0000 0.6714 0.9124 0.6504 
RSHH_B 0.6714 1.0000 0.6557 0.8798 
RSHZH_A 0.9124 0.6557 1.0000 0.6768 
RSHZH_B 0.6504 0.8798 0.6768 1.0000 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
RSHH_A 1.0000 0.7402 0.8886 0.6799 
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RSHH_B 0.7402 1.0000 0.7569 0.7796 
RSHZH_A 0.8886 0.7569 1.0000 0.7666 
RSHZH_B 0.6799 0.7796 0.7666 1.0000 
 
The natural logarithm and first difference of the constructed prices from different 
sample periods are plotted in Figures 5.1-5.3 respectively. All series seem 
autocorrelated in levels, while appear stationary in first differences. I thus would 
expect all the series to be I (1). 
 
Figure 5.1:  Plots of Chinese Shares’ Price and Return (3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001) 
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Figure 5.2:  Plots of Chinese Shares’ Price and Return (28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003) 
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Figure 5.3: Plots of Chinese Shares’ Price and Return (9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004) 
 
 
 
5.2.2  Empirical Methods 
In this section, econometric methodologies proceed in following empirical analyses 
are outlined briefly. Firstly, I conduct the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) and 
Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root tests in levels and first differences for each series to 
see whether the series have mean reversed properties. Secondly, I app ly the Johansen 
(1991, 1995) procedure to test for possible cointegration relationships between any 
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pa irs of the markets. Thirdly, I test for Granger causality depending on whether the 
series examined share common trend in their movements: an error correction 
component justified by Engle and Granger (1987) will be employed if an assumption 
of cointegration is reasonable. In addition to the traditional Granger-type causality test, 
I also employ the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to consider the robustness of 
the results. Lastly, I further look at the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) 
suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998) to capture the transmission of time- lagged 
information among markets and reveal the shor t-term dynamics of their causal 
linkages.  
5.2.2.1 Unit Root Tests 
There are a number of ways to conduct a unit root test (e.g., Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 
Phillips and Perron, 1988; Kwiatkowski et al, 1992; Leybourne and McCabe, 1994; 
Elliott et al, 1996; Perron and Ng, 1996; Ng and Perron, 2001), however, I will only 
discuss two of the most popular used techniques which will be applied in the 
following study: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test  
The first unit root test has its roots in the paper by David Dickey and Wayne Fuller 
(1979) and is named after them. The intuition and process of it can be described as 
following: 
Consider an AR (1) model:  
1t t ty c yβ ε−= + +                                                                                                       (5.1) 
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where 2(0, )t N εε σ . ty has a unit root if β =1. If one series has a unit root then its 
autocorrelations will be near one and will not drop much as lag lengt h increases; it 
will have a long memory and exhibit trend behaviour. With the stochastic trend 
contains in yt, standard regression inference measures can be very misleading in that t-
values and R-square can both be overstated. Thus it is essential to identify the 
integration of the series when dealing with financial data.   
By subtracting 1ty −  from both sides, we can get a modified version of the AR (1) 
mod el:  
1t t ty c yφ ε−∆ = + +                                                                                                      (5.2)  
where 1φ β= − . The Dickey-Fuller test now tests the null hypothesis of a unit root 
0 : 0H φ = against the alternative 1 : 0H φ < . Since the test is done over the difference 
term, it is not possible to use standard t-distribution to as critical values. These critical 
values are derived from a limiting distribution that can be represented as a functional 
of Brownian motion and, to this day, they are derived in tables through simulation 
(see, e.g., MacKinnon, 1996) of this distribution. 
There are three main versions of the DF test when conside ring whether to include  a 
constant and/or deterministic trend: 
Test for a unit root: 1t t ty yφ ε−∆ = +                                                                            (5.3) 
Test for a unit root with drift: 1t t ty c yφ ε−∆ = + +                                                      (5.4)  
Test for a unit root with drift and de terministic time trend:  
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1t t ty c t yγ φ ε−∆ = + + +                                                                                               (5.5)  
Each version of the test has its own distribution and critical values which depend on 
the size of the sample. A sample value less negative than the critical values suggests 
that we cannot reject the null that yt  has a unit root.  
While the DF test only applies to AR (1) model, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is 
an extension version of the DF test for a larger and more complicated set of time 
series mode ls. The testing procedure for the ADF test is the same as for the DF test 
but it is applied to AR (p) model: 
1 1 1 ...t t t p t p ty c t y y yγ φ δ δ ε− − −∆ = + + + ∆ + + ∆ +                                                           (5.6) 
where p is the lag order of the autoregressive process. 
Choosing the order p of an autoregression is a very important issue as it requires 
balancing the benefit of including more lags against the cost of additional estimation 
uncertainty. On the one hand, if the order of an estimated autoregression is too low, 
potentially valuable information contained in the more distant lagged values will be 
omitted. On the other hand, if it is too high, more coefficients than necessary will be 
estimated, which in turn introduces additional estimation error. A widely used 
approach in practice, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is applied in the study to 
choose the optimal p. The calculation of AIC is as following:  
( ) 2( ) ln( ) ( 1)SSR pAIC p p
T T
= + +
                                                                             (5.7)  
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where, SSR (p) is the sum of squared residuals of the estimated AR (p). The AIC 
estimator of p, pˆ , is the value that minimizes AIC (p) among the possible choices p = 
0,1,…, pmax , where pmax  is the largest value of  p considered. The AIC trades off the 
two forces in the above equation: SSR (p) necessarily decreases when an additional 
lag added, while in contrast, the second term in (5.7) increases, so that the number of 
lags that minimizes the AIC is a consistent estimator of the true lag length. 
Again, the ADF statistic does not have a normal distribution, and the critical values 
can be found in ADF simulation tables (see, e.g., MacKinnon, 1996).  
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test 
An alternative way to test for the stationarity of series is the Phillips-Perron test, 
which is also widely used in econometric software packages. Phillips and Perron 
(1988) developed a more comprehensive theory of unit root nonstationarity. Basically 
the test is similar to the standard DF or ADF test, but it is more powerful in term of it 
incorporates an automatic correction to the DF or ADF procedure to allow for 
autocorrelated residuals.  
Consider the AR (1) model (5.1), the PP method modifies the t-ratio of the φ  
coefficient so that serial correlation does not affect the asymptotic distribution of the 
test statistic. The statistic PP test based on is:  
 
1/ 20 0 0
1/ 2
0 0
ˆ( )( ( ))( )
2
T f set t
f f sφ φ
γ γ φ−
= −
                                                                              (5.8) 
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where φˆ  is the estimate, and tφ is the t-ratio of φ , ˆ( )se φ is coefficient standard error, 
and s is the standard error of the test regression. In add ition, 0γ is a consistent estimate 
of the error variance in (5.3) calculated as 2( ) /T k s T− , where k is the number of 
regressors. The remaining term, 0f , is an estimator of the residual spectrum at 
frequency zero, and is based on kernel-based sum-of-covariances in our tests.  
Besides the advantage that the PP test corrects for any serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity in the error term, it also has the advantage over the ADF test that 
the user does not have to specify a lag length for the test regression. Its disadvantage 
is that it is an asymptotic procedure and may not be fully appropriate with finite 
sample. In order to seek a more robust result, I will apply bot h the ADF and PP tests 
with the sample.  
5.2.2.2 Cointegration and Error Correction Mechanism 
The concept of cointegration is recognized as a milestone to examine the equilibrium 
relationships of two or more time series, which individually appear to be wondering 
erratically, in the long-run. The series are called cointegrated if there exists a causal 
relationship among them that a movement in one leads to a movement in the others at 
least given time for adjustment to short-run changes; in simpler words, in the long-run, 
they move together. When the series are cointegrated,  the spurious regression will not  
be a problem. There are two approaches, the two-step Engle-Granger (1987) test and 
Johansen’s (1991, 1995) test, popularly used in practice to examine the existence of 
such equilibrium relationships.  
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The insight on Engle-Granger’s test is based on the DF test outlined above. Assume 
two time series y1 and y2 are both integrated to the same order I (1), if y1 and y2 are 
cointegrated, then there must exist a coefficient θ , makes 2, 1,t ty yθ− stationary. 
Otherwise, 2, 1,t ty yθ−  is nonstationary, i.e., I (1), and series y1 and y2 are not sharing 
same trend. Thus, the two-step E-G test can be conducted as the following: firstly, run 
a nor mal OLS 2, 1,t t ty c yθ ε= + + , and save the residual tε , which can be viewed as 
the term 2, 1,t ty yθ− ; secondly, carry out a DF test on the residual series, without 
including a deterministic trend. If the unit root hypothesis is rejected then we 
conclude that y1  and  y2 are cointegrated; however, if the unit root is accepted then 
conclude cointegrating relationship does not exist. One thing we need to ment ion is 
that the standard DF test critical values are not appropriate in the context of this 
residual based test. A set of critical values can be obtained from Engle and Granger 
(1987). 
An alternative method of detecting any cointegrating relationship is Johansen’s (1991, 
1995) approach. It is becoming more and more popular in applied economics recently. 
The Johansen’s approach is based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) system. The 
VAR system is described as a symmetric dynamic system where all variables are 
treated as endogenous. In particular, each variable in the system is explained as a 
linear function of its own lagged values and the lags of all the other variables in the 
mod el.  
Consider a VAR which includes number p of lags,  
1 1 2 2...t t t p t p ty A y A y A y ε− − −= + + +                                                                               (5.9) 
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where yt is a k-vector  of non-stationary I (1) variables, tε  is a vector of uncorrelated 
error terms.  
The equation (5.9 ) can be rewritten as: 
1
1
1
p
t t i t i t
i
y y y ε
−
− −
=
∆ = Π + Γ ∆ +∑                                                                                      (5.10) 
where 
1
p
i
i
A I
=
Π = −∑ , 
1
p
i j
j i
A
= +
Γ = −∑                                                                          (5.11)  
of which, I is an identity matrix, Πcan be interpreted as a long-run coefficient matrix 
which contains the information on the pos sible cointegration relationships.  
Granger’s representation theorem asserts that if the coefficient matrix Π  has reduced 
rank r<k, then there exist k r× matrices α  and β  each with rank r such that 
'αβΠ = and ' tyβ  is I (0). r is the number of cointegrating relations (the cointegrating 
rank) and each column of β  is the cointegrating vector. Johensen’s method is to 
estimate the Π  matrix from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether one can reject 
the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of Π . If the variables are not cointegrated, 
then rank of Π  will not be significantly different from zero. There are two test 
statistics for cointegration under the Johansen’s approach, which are formulated as: 
1
ˆ( ) ln(1 )
g
trace i
i t
r Tλ λ
= +
= − −∑                                                                                         (5.12) 
and max 1ˆ( , 1) ln(1 )rr r Tλ λ ++ = − −                                                                             (5.13) 
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where T is the number of usable observations; iˆλ  denotes the estimated value of the 
characteristic root (eigenvalue) obtained from the estimated Πmatrix; r is the number 
of cointegrating vector.  
The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of at most r cointegration relationships 
against an unspecified or general alternative in a likelihood ratio framework, while the 
maximum eigenvalue statistic conducts separate tests on each eigenvalue and tests the 
null hypothesis of r cointegration relationships against the defined alternative of r+1 
cointegration relations hips. 
If the series being examined are cointegrated, then the relationship between them can 
be expressed as an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM), or VECM in a VAR 
framework. The VECM has cointegration relations built into the specification so that 
it restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their 
cointegrating relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment from a 
disequilibria state to an equilibrium state.  
Take a simplest possible version, consider a bivariate VAR system with one 
cointegrating equation and no lagged difference terms, the cointegrating equation is:  
2, 1,t ty yβ=                                                                                                                 (5.14) 
The corresponding VECM is:  
 
1, 1 2, 1 1, 1 1,
2, 2 2, 1 1, 1 2,
( )
( )
t t t t
t t t t
y y y
y y y
α β ε
α β ε
− −
− −
∆ = − +
∆ = − +                                                                                 (5.15) 
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In this simple model, 2, 1 1, 1t ty yβ− −−  is the so called error correction term, ,i tε (i=1,2) is 
the error in the VEC mode l. The error correction term can be considered as an 
equilibrium error. In long run equilibrium, it is zero, however, if y1 and y2 deviate 
from the long run equilibrium, the error correction term will be nonzero and each 
variable adjusts to partially restore the equilibrium relation. The coefficient iα  
measures the speed of adjustment of the i-th endogenous variable towards the 
equilibrium. Assume the error correction term is positive, which implies that , 1i ty − is 
too high to be in equilibrium. A negative iα  will then generate a negative ,i ty∆  and 
brings ,i ty back to the equilibrium. In the case , 1i ty − is be low the equilibrium level, the 
oppos ite will hold: it will start increasing in the next period and the equilibrium error 
will be corrected in the model.  
5.2.2.3 Causality Tests 
Granger-Type Causality Test  
The Granger-type causality test is one of the possible statistical tests that can be used 
to investigate the causality relationship between different markets. To detect the lead-
lag relationship of A-shares and B-shares markets, in other words, the direction of the 
causality between A-shares and B-shares’ returns, I will, in this section, introduce this 
most popular and representative methodology of practice.  
Again, I use a simple bivariate VAR system as an example. The form of the causality 
test depends on whether the series being examined are cointegrated.  
The following model is adopted if there is no cointegrating relationship between them: 
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1 1 11 1, 12 2, 1
1 1
m m
i i
t t i t i t
i i
y c y yθ θ ε− −
= =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑  
2 2 21 1, 22 2, 2
1 1
m m
i i
t t i t i t
i i
y c y yθ θ ε− −
= =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑                                                                (5.16) 
where 1ty∆ and 2ty∆ denote the return series for any two portfolios being examined, 
tε =( 1tε , 2tε )’ is the vector of the corresponding error terms and m is the optimal lag 
length obtained by using AIC.  
If two series being examined are cointegrated,  I then follow many studies in the field, 
for example, Kim and Shin (2000), to impose the error correction term on (5.16): 
1 1 1 1 11 1, 12 2, 1
1 1
m m
i i
t t t i t i t
i i
y c ECM y yα θ θ ε− − −
= =
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑  
2 2 2 1 21 1, 22 2, 2
1 1
m m
i i
t t t i t i t
i i
y c ECM y yα θ θ ε− − −
= =
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑                                            (5.17) 
The error correction term makes the VAR system does not throw away long run 
information caused by differencing. The Granger causality test examines the null 
hypothesis that 12
iθ =0 or 21
iθ =0, for all i (i=1,2,…,m), in the usual manner. If the null 
hypothesis that 12
iθ =0 for all i (i=1,2,…,m) cannot be rejected I then conclude past 
values of 2y∆ are helpful in explaining 1y∆ , thus 2y∆  Granger causes 1y∆ ; similarly, 
if the null hypothesis that 21
iθ =0 for all i (i=1,2,…,m) cannot be rejected I then 
conclude past values of 1y∆  provide additional information in explaining 2y∆ , thus 
1y∆ is said Granger causes 2y∆ . If both hypotheses cannot be rejected, then I conclude  
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the causality is bi-directional, i.e., past values of both variables provide additional 
information in forecasting the current value of the other variable. 
Tests of the hypotheses require the Wald statistics which follow a chi-squared 
distribution, and it is essential to make sure all the variables included are stationary. 
Toda-Yamamoto (1995) Causality Test 
An alternative to the conventional Granger-type causality test is the so called Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) causality test. This procedure was suggested with the objective to 
overcome the problem of inva lid asymptotic critical values when causality tests are 
performed in the presence of non-stationary series. It has the advantage of avoiding 
pretesting the variables for the integration and cointegration properties, provided the 
maximal order of integration of the process does not exceed the true lag length of the 
VAR model. 
The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure is basically based upon the test equations 
of Granger, but augmented with extra lags (dmax) depending on the potential order of 
integration of the series of interest. If the series are assumed to be I(1), one extra lag is 
added to each variable in the test equation. If both variables are assumed to be I(0), no 
extra lag is added in the equation, and the Toda-Yamamoto test is equivalent to the 
Granger causality test. Modified Wald tests are then carried out on the matrix of the 
first k (number of lags suggested by the AIC) coefficients rather than all lagged 
coefficients to de termine the direction of causality on a usual manner. 
5.2.2.4 Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) 
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The examina tion of causality in a VAR suggests which of the variables in the model 
statistically significantly impact on the future values of each of the variables in the 
system, but it cannot reveal whether changes in the value of a given variable have a 
positive or negative effect on the other variable in the system, or how long it would 
take for the effect of that variable to work through the system. Such information will, 
however, be  given by an examina tion of the VAR’s impulse responses. 
The traditional impulse response function (TIRF) is defined as: 
1 1 1 1 1( , , ) , 0,..., 0, 0, 0,..., 0,t t n t t t n t t n t t t n tTIRF n E y E yδ ϖ ε δ ε ε ϖ ε ε ε ϖ− + + + − + + + −= =  = = =  −  = = =    
(5.18) 
where yt is a random vector, t iε + is a random shock, 1tϖ −  is a specific realisation of the 
information set 1t−Ω  and n is the forecast horizon. Thus we have a realisation of yt+n 
generated by the system when it is hit by a shock of size δ for i = 0 while all shocks 
are equal to zero for i = 1,2,…,n, and a realisation of yt+n when t iε +  = 0 for all i = 
0,…,n (the benchmark representation). It measures the effect of a shock of size δ 
hitting the system at time t on the state of the system at time t+n, given that no other 
shocks hit the system.  
However, TIRF suffers from a critical problem: it is not realistic to require the error 
terms of all other equations in the VAR system are held constant, since the error terms 
are likely to be correlated across equations to some extent. Different results may be 
obtained by assuming different ordering of variables entering the system.3
To address the problem of the ordering dependence of the TIRF, Pesaran and Shin 
  
                                                 
3 For more discussion, see Enders, 2004, pp. 274-276. 
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(1998) proposed the Generalized Impulse Response Function (GIRF) methodology. 
Instead of controlling the impact of correlation among residuals, the GIRF follows the 
idea of a nonlinear impulse response function and computes the mean impulse 
response function. It computes the mean by integrating out all other shocks. When one 
variable is subjected to a shock, other variables also vary as is implied by the 
covariance. 4
In an augmented vector autoregressive model described by Pesaran and Shin (1998):  
  
1
p
t i t i t t
i
x x w ε−
=
= Φ +Ψ +∑ ,    t=1,2,…,T                                                                     (5.19) 
where xt=(x1t,x2t,…,xmt)’is an m×1 vector of jointly determined dependent variables, wt 
is an q×1 vector of deterministic and/ or exogenous variables, and {Φi, i=1, 2,…,p} 
and Ψ are m×m and m×q coefficient matrices. Under certain assumptions 5
1
2( )gj jj n jn A eψ σ
−
= ∑
, a 
generalized impulse response function can be expressed by: 
,       n=0,1,2,…                                                                       (5.20) 
which measures the effect of one standard error shock, i.e. 1/ 2( )jjσ , to the jth equation 
at time t on expected values of x at time t+n, and where An is a coefficient matrix and 
1 1 2 2 ...i i i p i pA A A A− − −= Φ +Φ + +Φ , and ej is an m×1 selection vector with unity as its 
jth element and zeros elsewhere. 
As for a VECM: 
                                                 
4 For more details, see Pesaran and Shin, 1998, Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multivariate 
models, Economics Letters, 58(1): 17-29. 
5See Lütkepohl, 1991 (Chapter 2), and Pesaran, M. H. and Pesaran, B., 1997 (Section 19.3). 
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∆ = −Π + Γ ∆ +ΠΛ +∑ ,       t=1,2,…,T                                             (5.21) 
where 
1
p
m ii
I
=
Π = − Φ∑ , 1
p
i jj i= +
Γ = − Φ∑  for i=1,2,…,p-1, and Λ is an m g×  matrix 
of unknown coefficients. The generalized impulse response function for xt with 
respect to a shock in the jth equation is given by: 
, 1/ 2( ) ( )
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z j n
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e
n Bψ β
σ
′= ∑ ,          n=0,1,2,……                                                         (5.22) 
where β ′  is a cointegrating vector and Bn is a cumulative effect matrix. 
5.2.3 Empirical Findings 
In this section, the empirical evidence, by applying the outlined econometric 
techniques discussed above, is presented.  
5.2.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
Both the ADF and PP procedures are applied to verify the order of integration of the 
price series. Table 5.3 presents the results of tests on the levels of natural logarithm of 
the pr ice series. Generally, the ADF and PP tests provide similar results. In Panel A, 
the null hypothesis of there is a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% significance 
level for almost all the series, with one exception of the Shanghai A-shares when a 
time trend is included in the testing specification. In Panel B, both methods suggest 
the Shanghai B-shares prohibit a stationary property when considering a time trend in 
the model. The Shenzhen B-shares is suggested to be stationary by the PP test, 
whether or not a time trend is inc luded, however there is not enough evidence of 
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rejecting the null hypot hesis when the ADF is employed. In Panel C, all series are 
suggested to be nonstationary.  
 
Table 5.3: Unit Root Tests on Levels 
 ADF PP 
 Intercept Intercept&Trend Intercept Intercept&Trend 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
Shanghai A-shares -2.5615 -4.2048 -2.5534 -3.8869 
 (0.1013) (0.0044)*** (0.1031) (0.0127)** 
Shanghai B-shares -1.4003 -1.5098 -1.5801 -1.1061 
 (0.5836) (0.8263) (0.4926) (0.9265) 
Shenzhen A-shares -1.0187 -2.6085 -0.9252 -2.4250 
 (0.7486) (0.2765) (0.7806) (0.3663) 
Shenzhen B-shares -1.6445 -1.8472 -1.9024 -1.8263 
 (0.4595) (0.6812) (0.3314) (0.6917) 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
Shanghai A-shares -1.3401 -2.5285 -1.1767 -2.7019 
 (0.6122) (0.3142) (0.6861) (0.2362) 
Shanghai B-shares -1.3231 -4.2917 -2.4617 -6.3963 
 (0.6203) (0.0034)*** (0.1255) (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen A-shares -1.4094 -2.0795 -1.4094 -2.0182 
 (0.5786) (0.5557) (0.5786) (0.5897) 
Shenzhen B-shares -1.8607 -2.0757 -2.8012 -5.7566 
 (0.3511) (0.5578) (0.0586)* (0.0000)*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
Shanghai A-shares -0.8152 -1.9987 -0.6974 -1.7432 
 (0.8133) (0.5997) (0.8447) (0.7301) 
Shanghai B-shares -0.3058 -1.5547 -0.2422 -1.5492 
 (0.9211) (0.8088) (0.9301) (0.8109) 
Shenzhen A-shares -0.3984 -1.4262 -0.3304 -1.2790 
 (0.9064) (0.8520) (0.9174) (0.8913) 
Shenzhen B-shares -0.8235 -1.6019 -0.8188 -1.6454 
 (0.8109) (0.7908) (0.8123) (0.7723) 
Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates 
significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.4 lists the results on first differences, all series are shown to be stationary. I 
thus conclude all the series can be seen as I (1), as price data is normally considered. 
The following analyses will be conducted under this condition.  
 
Table 5. 4: Unit Root Tests on First Differences 
                    ADF                       PP 
 Intercept Intercept&Trend Intercept Intercept&Trend 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
Shanghai A-shares -9.0066 -9.0142 -43.1730 -43.1650 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shanghai B-shares -8.2987 -8.4278 -37.1084 -37.1120 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen A-shares -8.5971 -8.6391 -43.3935 -43.3981 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen B-shares -8.7027 -8.7691 -38.9491 -38.9417 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
Shanghai A-shares -5.7083 -5.6994 -23.2990 -23.2858 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shanghai B-shares -5.9108 -5.9123 -23.0123 -23.1293 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen A-shares -5.8454 -5.8596 -23.2879 -23.2687 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen B-shares -7.8670 -7.8498 -23.0174 -23.0662 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
Shanghai A-shares -4.2214 -4.2397 -18.8075 -18.7861 
 (0.0007)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shanghai B-shares -4.2600 -4.3257 -18.3068 -18.3142 
 (0.0006)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen A-shares -3.9686 -4.0677 -18.6440 -18.6505 
 (0.0018)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Shenzhen B-shares -3.9193 -4.1356 -18.5659 -18.6728 
 (0.0021)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates 
significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant at the 1% level. 
 
5.2.3.2 Cointegration Test 
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Following the evidence that all the series are I(1), I applied the Johansen (1991, 1995) 
cointegration test to detect whether there exists any long-run relationship in the 
Chinese stock markets.  
Table 5.5 summarizes results of the Johensan (1991, 1995) cointegration test, 
allowing for a linear deterministic trend in the data and an intercept in the 
cointegration equation and VAR, over the three sub-periods respectively. Number of 
lagged variables included in the test is selected according to the AIC. I also run 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-type autocorrelation tests on residuals to make sure the 
numbers of lags suggested produce White noises.  
In the first sub-period, the null hypothesis of there exists zero cointegrating 
relationship between any markets cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level by 
either the trace statistic or the max-eigenvalue statistic. In the second sub-period, two 
cointegrating relationships are suggested at the 5% significance level: the Shanghai A-
shares and B-shares, and the Shenzhen A-shares and B-shares are found move 
towards same trends over a long-term. However, what is surprising is that the test 
statistics suggest that the Chinese stock markets are segmented over the long-run in 
the third sub-period as no cointegrating relations hip is found at any conventional 
significance level.  
 
Table 5. 5: Bivariate Johensan Cointegration Test 
 lag  Trace Max-eigenvalue 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
SHH_A & SHSH_B 7 r=0 10.8978 6.6323 
   (0.2178) (0.5335) 
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  r<=1 4.2655 4.2655 
   (0.0389)** (0.0389)** 
SHZH_A & SHZH_B 7 r=0 7.9396 6.1554 
   (0.4719) (0.5933) 
  r<=1 1.7841 1.7841 
   (0.1816) (0.1816) 
SHH_A & SHZH_A 7 r=0 13.1579 12.0510 
   (0.1091) (0.1087) 
  r<=1 1.1069 1.1069 
   (0.2928) (0.2928) 
SHH_B & SHZH_B 5 r=0 9.7585 5.8369 
   (0.2998) (0.6342) 
  r<=1 3.921643 3.9216 
   (0.0477)** (0.0477)** 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
SHH_A & SHSH_B 2 r=0 38.1825 36.6949 
   (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
  r<=1 1.4876 1.4876 
   (0.2226) (0.2226) 
SHZH_A & SHZH_B 5 r=0 17.5722 15.3844 
   (0.0240)** (0.0331)** 
  r<=1 2.1878 2.1878 
   (0.1391) (0.1391) 
SHH_A & SHZH_A 1 r=0 8.4284 5.1944 
   (0.4208) (0.7171) 
  r<=1 3.2341 3.2341 
   (0.0721)* (0.0721)* 
SHH_B & SHZH_B 6 r=0 21.9371 14.2020 
   (0.0047)*** (0.0511)* 
  r<=1 7.7351 7.7351 
   (0.0054)*** (0.0054)*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
SHH_A & SHSH_B 5 r=0 9.2531 9.1628 
   (0.3425) (0.2729) 
  r<=1 0.0903 0.0903 
   (0.7638) (0.7638) 
SHZH_A & SHZH_B 1 r=0 8.7270 8.6045 
   (0.3912) (0.3205) 
  r<=1 0.1225 0.1225 
   (0.7264) (0.7264) 
SHH_A & SHZH_A 1 r=0 6.1142 5.8665 
   (0.6820) (0.6304) 
  r<=1 0.2477 0.2477 
   (0.6187) (0.6187) 
SHH_B & SHZH_B 1 r=0 8.3278 8.3224 
   (0.4310) (0.3469) 
  r<=1 0.0055 0.0055 
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   (0.9403) (0.9403) 
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) probability values. ‘*’ indicates 
significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 5% level; and  ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
The finding is consistent with that of Yang (2003) who reports no cointegrating 
relationship between the A- and B-shares markets based on market indexes from 2 
January 1995 to 29 December 2000, the period before the B-shares market opened to 
local Chinese, and is also consistent with Yao (2003) who find daily closing prices of 
A- and B-shares indexes are cointegrated in the post-2001 event period. However, the 
finding does not conform to my expectation. The Chinese segmented markets have 
not become more linked after certain foreign investors can participate in the formerly 
restricted A-shares market.  
5.2.3.3 Granger Causality Test 
As introduced earlier, model (5.17) is employed in detecting causality with the post-
2001 sub-sample, and in the absence of long-term equilibrium (cointegration) 
relations, studies following model (5.16) are conducted with the pre-2001 and post-
QFII sub-samples. Numbers of lagged variables included in the tests are selected 
following the AIC and residuals autocorrelation tests. The chi-square statistics along 
with the corresponding probability values are presented in Table 5.6.  Panel A refers 
to the sub-period before the 2001 open market reform; Panel B refers to the sub-
period after the 2001 event and before the QFII programme; and Panel C refers to the 
post-QFII sub-period. 
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Table 5. 6: Lead-Lag Relationships in the Chinese Stock Markets (Granger Causality Test) 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHH_B 3.4112 1.3034 3.9226 
 (0.7557) (0.2536) (0.4166) 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHH_A 6.5071 4.3618 9.4607 
 (0.3688) (0.0368)** (0.0506)* 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_B 4.9873 12.4980 0.0397 
 (0.5454) (0.0140)** (0.8420) 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_A 8.1236 7.9181 1.13E-05 
 (0.2292) (0.0946)* (0.9973) 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_A 4.7540 0.0292 1.8271 
 (0.5757) (0.8644) (0.1765) 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHH_A 8.0718 0.0891 4.8114 
 (0.2329) (0.7653) (0.0283) 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_B 7.6323 24.2749 0.6318 
 (0.1060) (0.0002)*** (0.4267) 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHH_B 23.3231 8.5154 0.4195 
 (0.0001)*** (0.1300) (0.5172) 
Notes: Values reported in the parentheses are probability values. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
I find in the time when the Chinese stock markets are strictly segmented, foreign 
investors in the Shenzhen market seem to have an information advantage over foreign 
investors in the Shanghai market. One possible explanation of this observation is that 
as surveys reveal mos t of participants in the Shenzhen B-shares market are investors 
from Hong Kong, and compared with foreign investors in the Shanghai market, they 
have a natural linkage with mainland listed firms and are more familiar with the 
investment environment in the mainland of China.  
In the second sub-period, more information flows are detected as the markets became 
more linked. A statistically significant test statistic is found rejecting the null 
hypothesis of Shanghai B-shares returns do not Granger cause A-shares returns, 
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suggesting investors in the Shanghai B-shares market take a leading role. A bi-
directional feedback between the A- and B-shares is found in the Shenzhen market. In 
addition, it is suggested the Shanghai B-shares investors are better informed over 
investors in the Shenzhen market, which is opposite with what was observed in the 
first sub-period. 
In the third sub-period, information is found flow from the Shanghai B-shares market 
to the A-shares market.  
To summarize, at the 10% significance level, we can conclude the information flows 
in the Chinese stock markets as the following figure shows: 
 
Figure 5.4: Lead-Lag Relationships in the Chinese Stock Markets (Granger Causality Test) 
 
Period A: 3 January 1994 - 16 February 2001 
 
 
Period B: 28 February 2001 – 8 July 2003 
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
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Period C: 9 July 2003 - 31 December 2004 
 
 
In order to provide a more robust insight, I further conduct Toda -Yamamoto (1995) 
causality tests on level VARs. The test statistics are reported in Table 5.7, and the 
summarized information flows in the markets are presented in Figure 5.5.  
 
Table 5.7: Lead-Lag Relationships in the Chinese Stock Markets  
(Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test) 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 lag chi-sq lag chi-sq lag chi-sq 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHH_B 7+1 3.2585 2+1 1.7149 5+1 7.0780 
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
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  (0.8601)  (0.4242)  (0.2149) 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHH_A  8.1876  5.6519  11.2726 
  (0.3163)  (0.0593)*  (0.0462)** 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_B 7+1 4.8410 5+1 11.0776 1+1 0.0118 
  (0.6794)  (0.0499)**  (0.9137) 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_A  8.1342  8.2327  2.64E-02 
  (0.3209)  (0.1439)  (0.8709) 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_A 7+1 4.9807 1+1 0.0195 1+1 1.6385 
  (0.6623)  (0.8890)  (0.2005) 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHH_A  9.3664  0.0895  5.0446 
  (0.2274)  (0.7648)  (0.0247)** 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_B 5+1 7.5494 6+1 23.4296 1+1 0.3852 
  90.1829)  (0.0007)***  (0.5348) 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHH_B  28.4249  9.1190  0.4597 
  (0.0000)***  (0.1670)  (0.4978) 
Notes: Values reported in the parentheses are significance levels associated with asymptotic Wald statistic for 
testing exclusion restrictions. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Very similar results are found with only two exceptions: instead of a bi-directional 
causality between the Shenzhen A- and B-shares markets, a uni-directional causality 
from the Shenzhen A-shares market to B-shares market is found using Toda and 
Yamamoto’s (1995) methodology; and an additional uni-directional causality from the 
Shenzhen A-shares to Shanghai A-shares is detected. 
 
Figure 5.5: Lead-Lag Relationships in the Chinese Stock Markets  
(Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test) 
 
Period A: 3 January 1994 - 16 February 2001 
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Period B: 28 February 2001 - 8 July 2003 
 
 
Period C: 9 July 2003 - 31 December 2004 
 
 
5.2.3.4 Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs)  
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
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By conducting GIRF analyses suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998), the shor t-term 
interactions between the Chinese A- and B-shares are revealed in this section. GIRFs 
are used to trace the response of the endogenous variables to an unanticipated shock 
in another variable. Figures 5.6 to 5.8 present the dynamic responses of one market to 
a generalized one-standard-deviation shock on the disturbance term from the other 
market in different sample periods respectively. The responses standard errors are 
generated following the Monte Carlo methodology in the Eviews and repeated 100 
times. The Shanghai A- and B-shares and the Shenzhen A- and B-shares are 
considered in VECM frameworks, while others are conducted in VAR frameworks. I 
conducted estimation of the GIRFs 10 periods ahead. Numbers of lags included in the 
VARs (VECMs) are selected following the AIC.  
 
Figure 5.6: Dynamic Interactions in the Chinese Stock Markets (3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001) 
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 -139- 
Figure 5.7: Dynamic Interactions in the Chinese Stock Markets (28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003) 
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Figure 5.8: Dynamic Interactions in the Chinese Stock Markets (9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004) 
 
 -141- 
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Following observations are made: 
(i) In the strict segmentation period,  
When the system produces impact of one unit innovation on the Shanghai B-shares, 
the initial response of the Shanghai A-shares is positive and the scale is 0.0075. It 
descends to 0.001 after one trading day and gradually heads to zero and becomes 
stable on the seventh trading day. On the other hand,  when the system generates 
impact of one unit innovation on the Shanghai A-shares, the initial response of the 
Shanghai B-shares is positive as well while the scale is 0.006, which is slightly 
smaller. It descends to negative at the third time unit and gradually adjusts back to 
positive direction with a maximum level of 0.0006. Again, on the seventh trading day, 
the impact diminishes to zero. Comparing investors of the Shanghai A- and B-shares, 
the foreign investors appear more easily overreact. 
When an unexpected shock hits the Shenzhen B-shares, the initial response of the 
Shenzhen A-shares is positive. The scale is about 0.008. It drops immediately to 
0.0005 on the second trading day and keeps the level until the third trading day when 
it converts to an uptrend. The trend lasts two time units, after then, the consistent 
influence gradually diminishes. Turning to the other side, when the initial shock 
happe ns with the Shenzhen A-shares, the initial response of the Shenzhen B-shares is 
slightly smaller as 0.007. It drops to 0.001 after one trading day and keeps dropping 
until the third trading day. It also converts to an uptrend from the third trading day but 
the trend only lasts one day. From day 4, it starts decreases and reaches negative level 
after two trading days. Then it rebounds again and gradually becomes stable after day 
9. The Shenzhen B-shares market appears slightly more efficient than the Shenzhen 
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A-shares market as it takes less time for the B-shares to digest the innovation.  
When an unexpected shock hits the Shenzhen A-shares, the initial response of the 
Shanghai A-shares is positive and the scale is about 0.022. It drops immediately to 
close to zero after one trading day and remains at this level for two days. Then it 
gradually increases to 0.002 and suddenly heads to a negative direction from day 6, 
and reaches the minimum level of -0.002 on day 7. After then, it heads back to zero 
and vanishes after day 8.  When the hit happe ns with the Shanghai A-shares, the 
response of the Shenzhen A-shares is very similar but appears slightly negative on day 
2.   
The interactions between the Shanghai and Shenzhen B-shares are also very similar. 
The digests of the shocks are bo th centered in the first two trading days and descended 
gradua lly to zero in the next two days. More shock is digested within the first trading 
day in the Shenzhen market, however, it takes slightly longer time to completely 
digest the innovation from the Shanghai B-shares than the other way around.  
(ii) After Chinese individual investors entered the B-shares market, 
When the system produces one unit innovation on the Shanghai B-shares, in contrast 
to the downward bended response functions observed earlier in VAR models, the 
response function maintains its long run equilibrium in the VECM. This is as 
expected as the VECM (or the restricted VAR) has built in the cointegration 
relationship and the long-run behaviour of the endogenous variables has been 
restricted to converge to their equilibrium. The Shanghai A-shares initially exhibits a 
positive response of about 0.01085 and drops to below 0.0105 after two trading days, 
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and then it heads gradually to 0.0106. While when the system firstly produces an 
innovation on the Shanghai A-shares, the Shanghai B-shares react uni-directionally 
upward from the level of around 0.0153.  
The effect of a shock to the Shenzhen B-shares on the Shenzhen A-shares was 
positive throughout the next 10 days time horizon. This positive impact is relatively 
stable in the first two trading days and reaches its minimum on the third day, then it 
jumps significantly and becomes stable again after four trading days. The impact the 
other way around is more volatile: the reaction of the Shenzhen B-shares to the 
Shenzhen A-shares’ innovation descends continually in the first three trading da ys and 
reaches its minimum on day 4, and then becomes up and down in the next two days, 
before it becomes stable upwards from day 6.  
When the system produces one unit innovation on the Shenzhen and Shanghai A-
shares respectively, the other market responses initially around the level of 0.014. 
Since zero lags are suggested by AIC in the bivariate VARs, no responses are 
observed afterwards. 
When an unexpected shock hits the Shenzhen B-shares, most of the impact on the 
Shanghai B-shares is absorbed within the first trading day. The impact is weakened 
after then and wonders around zero slightly until it vanishes on day 7. When an 
innovation starts from the Shanghai B-shares market, trend of the response observed 
in the Shenzhen B-shares market is largely similar and the response magnitudes are 
slightly larger.  
(iii) After QFIIs entered the Chinese A-shares market, 
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When one unit of unexpected shock hits the Shanghai B-shares, the Shanghai A-
shares give it an immediate response of 0.01. The response lasts one trading day. 
When an inno vation starts from the Shanghai A-shares, the same observation is found 
with the Shanghai B-shares.  
When one unit of unexpected shock hits the Shenzhen B-shares, the Shenzhen A-
shares give it an immediate response of nearly 0.01. The response lasts one trading 
day. When an innovation starts from the Shenzhen A-shares, a same trend could be 
observed with the Shenzhen B-shares, however, the initial response is around 0.012. 
When the system produces one unit innovation on the Shenzhen A-shares, the 
Shanghai A-shares response initially at the level of 0.012, and most of the influence is 
absorbed within the first trading day. On day 2, the influence drops to around 0.002, 
and lasts one trading day before the influence is absorbed completely. On the other 
hand, when the initial shock happens to the Shanghai A-shares, all influences are 
absorbed within the first trading day. 
When one unit inno vation hits the Shenzhen B-shares, the Shanghai B-shares 
response immediately at a level of 0.011, and the influence is absorbed within the first 
trading day. When the shock initially hits the Shanghai B-shares, a similar response is 
found with the Shenzhen B-shares.  
5.3 Investigation on A Panel Level 
Recent developments in the literature suggest that panel-data-based procedures have 
higher power than procedures based on individual time series. For example, Maddala 
and Wu (1999) argues, “the commonly used unit root tests like the Dickey-Fuller 
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(DF), augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests lack power in 
distinguishing the unit root null from stationary alternatives, and that using panel data 
unit root tests is one way of increasing the power of unit root tests based on a single 
time series”. The introduction of a panel data dimension allows us to use both cross-
sectional and time-series information to test the causality relationships between the 
different classes of shares. In particular, it offers us a larger number of observations, 
increasing the degree of freedom and reducing the collinearity among explanatory 
variables. Thus, I will employ a panel causality technique in this section in the hope  
that it will noticeably improve the efficiency of time series causality tests. 
Despite the great deal of effort devoted empirically towards revealing the causal 
relationships between different investors groups in the Chinese stock markets by using 
time series techniques, no sufficient effort has been made to develop parallel panel 
data techniques. To my best knowledge, there is only one study so far in the Chinese 
stock markets segmentation literature that employs panel data cointegration 
techniques to investigate the nature of their relationships. Ahlgren et al. (2003) used 
panel data unit root and cointegration analyses to examine whether a long-run 
relationship between Chinese A- and B-shares prices exists for 88 firms, 44 from each 
exchange, over the period January 1993 to July 2002. However, they did not take 
account of the issue of which market is more likely to lead the other market. In 
add ition, their work is limited by using only monthly data and did not cover the period 
after the QFII programme. I will, therefore, further extend the examina tion to a panel 
context in this section.  
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The remainder of the section is organized as follows: Section 5.3.1 introduces data 
and summary statistics; the econometric methodo logies are introduced in Section 
5.3.2; and Section 5.3.3 discusses empirical results.  
5.3.1 Data and Preliminary Description 
The data source and sample selection criterion is the same as what was used to 
compute the time-series aggregate price (see Section 5.2.1). A summary of the 
statistics of the returns is provided in Table 5.8. In all the three sub-periods, the 
returns can be considered as normal distributed.  
 
Table 5. 8: Summary Statistics of Chinese Shares’ Returns (Panel Data) 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
 Mean 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 
 Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 0.4515 0.5680 0.4343 0.8079 
 Minimum -0.2755 -0.4055 -0.2474 -0.7101 
 Std. Dev. 0.0350 0.0466 0.0342 0.0405 
 Skewness 1.1723 0.1221 0.9484 0.3855 
 Kurtosis 14.6553 7.3437 13.0241 17.9279 
 Jarque-Bera 353411.3 41986.16 237160.9 413173.9 
 Probability 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
 Mean -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0009 
 Median -0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 0.0983 0.1671 0.0973 0.1040 
 Minimum -0.1066 -0.1563 -0.1082 -0.1642 
 Std. Dev. 0.0224 0.0272 0.0229 0.0297 
 Skewness 0.3828 0.2210 0.2618 0.1820 
 Kurtosis 6.5198 6.4905 6.1726 5.4028 
 Jarque-Bera 12599.1 12048.26 9689.189 5530.746 
 Probability 0.0000*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
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 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
 Mean -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0007 
 Median -0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 0.0966 0.1178 0.0976 0.0973 
 Minimum -0.1088 -0.1466 -0.1069 -0.1067 
 Std. Dev. 0.0226 0.0229 0.0233 0.0220 
 Skewness 0.0105 -0.0619 -0.0060 0.1101 
 Kurtosis 5.0358 5.6960 4.7070 5.0830 
 Jarque-Bera 2602.694 4570.503 1794.891 2701.245 
 Probability 0.0000*** 0.0000
*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Note: ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5.9 provides the pair-wise correlations of the different shares’ returns. It is not 
surprising that in general the linka ge, which is measured in a panel data framework, is 
weaker, than when it is measured with aggregate price, since the use of average prices 
eases variations across firms. All the markets are positively correlated, and the same 
trend can be found with what was observed from the correlations of aggregate prices, 
except that the linkage between the Shanghai A- and B-shares after the QFII 
programme does not seem to be enhanced, but in fact is slightly reduced.   
 
Table 5. 9: Correlations of the Chinese Segmented Markets (Panel Data) 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
RSHH_A 1.0000 0.1971 0.4213 0.1987 
RSHH_B 0.1971 1.0000 0.1402 0.2827 
RSHZH_A 0.4213 0.1402 1.0000 0.2980 
RSHZH_B 0.1987 0.2827 0.2980 1.0000 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
RSHH_A 1.0000 0.5319 0.5209 0.4274 
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RSHH_B 0.5319 1.0000 0.4301 0.6641 
RSHZH_A 0.5209 0.4301 1.0000 0.5761 
RSHZH_B 0.4274 0.6641 0.5761 1.0000 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
 RSHH_A RSHH_B RSHZH_A RSHZH_B 
RSHH_A 1.0000 0.4761 0.4006 0.3585 
RSHH_B 0.4761 1.0000 0.3055 0.3732 
RSHZH_A 0.4006 0.3055 1.0000 0.6653 
RSHZH_B 0.3585 0.3732 0.6653 1.0000 
 
5.3.2  Empirical Methods 
Following the empirical methods applied to the aggregate price, in this section, I will 
focus on conducting panel unit root and cointegration tests to identify the 
segmentation/ integration of the Chinese stock markets, and a panel causality test to 
trace the lead- lag roles between the markets. Three steps are involved. As a first step,  
stationarity of the series is examined by using Fisher-type ADF and PP panel unit root 
tests. The testing procedure has been explained in Section 4.4.2. Following is the 
residual-based and combined-Johansen panel cointegration tests, to identify long-run 
equilibria between the markets. For causality test, I consider a typical example of 
traditional panel data causality tests following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988).  
5.3.2.1 Panel Cointegration Test 
For testing the cointegration in the Chinese stock markets, I consider three methods: 
residual-based Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao (1999) tests, and a Fisher-type test using 
an underlying Johansen methodology (Maddala and Wu, 1999). Ahlgren et al. (2003) 
also e mployed t he combined-Johansen procedure in their study.  
Pedroni (1999, 2004) Panel Cointegration Test 
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Based on the following equation (5.23): 
1
m
it i ji jit it
j
y xα β ε
=
= + +∑                                                                                             (5.23) 
Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) method tests the null hypot hesis that the residual term 
1it i it ituε ρ ε −= +  is I (1) through two different sets of statistics. One group of the tests 
is termed as ‘within dimension’ (panel tests) which pools the data across the ‘within’ 
dimension and takes into account common time factors and allows for heterogeneity 
across members. This group of test statistics includes a variance ratio statistic, a non-
parametric Phillips and Perron type ρ-statistic, a non-parametric Phillips and Perron 
type t-statistic and a Dickey–Fuller type t-statistic 6
1iρ =
. The null hypothesis for this group 
of tests is , and the alternative hypot hesis is 1iρ ρ= < . The other group of the 
tests is termed as ‘between dimension’ (group tests) which allows for heterogeneity of 
parameters across members. This group of test statistics includes a Phillips and Perron 
type ρ-statistic, a Phillips and Perron type t-statistic and an Augmented Dickey–Fuller 
type t-statistic 7 1iρ =. The null hypothesis for this group of tests is , and the 
alternative hypothesis is 1iρ < , for all i. All the seven statistics are normally 
distributed.  
Kao (1999) Panel Cointegration Test 
Same as the Pedroni’s approach, Kao (1999)’s test also follows the basic idea of 
Engle-Granger (1987) and is residual-based.  
Consider the following panel regression model: 
                                                 
6 For more details and mathematical representations of the tests, refer to Pedroni (2004). 
7 For more details and mathematical representations of the tests, refer to Pedroni (2004). 
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it i it ity x eα β= + +                                                                                                     (5.24) 
where bo th yit and xit are I (1) and noncointegrated.  
For Kao’s DF and ADF test, the following regression can be run on the estimated 
residual term: 
1it it ite e vρ −= +                                                                                                           (5.25) 
or     1
1
p
it it j it j it
j
e e e vρ ϕ− −
=
= + ∆ +∑                                                                              (5.26)  
In order to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration ( 1ρ = ), Kao constructed four 
DF test statistics and one ADF test statistic 8
By Monte Carlo comparison, Gutierrez (2003) claims when the time-dimension of the 
panel is large, Pedroni’s tests have higher power than Kao’s.  
. If the null hypothesis can be rejected, 
then yit and xit are considered to be cointegrated.  
Combined Johansen Panel Cointegration Test 
Fisher (1932) derives a combined test that uses the results of the individual 
independent tests. Maddala and Wu (1999) use Fisher's result to propose an 
alternative approach to testing for cointegration in panel data by combining tests from 
individual cross-sections to obtain a test statistic for the full panel. If iπ is the p-value 
from an individual cointegration test for cross-section i, then under the null hypothesis 
for the panel,  
                                                 
8 For more details, please see Kao (1999). 
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p-values from individual independent tests are obtained by employing Johansen (1991, 
1995) procedure introduced in Section 5.2.2.2. 
5.3.2.2 Panel Causality Test 
To identify directions of the information flows in the Chinese stock markets, I 
estimate a Granger-type causality model based on Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988, 1989), 
assuming the causalities among cross sections are homogeneous.  The Holtz-Eakin et 
al. (1988, 1989) model is as follows: 
, 0 , , ,
1 1
m m
i t j i t j j i t j i i t
j j
y y x f uα α δ− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
                                                              (5.28)
 
where yi,t is the dependent variable at time t for stock i; xi,t is the causal variable at 
time t for stock i; α′ s and β ′ are the coefficients on the dependent and causal 
variables respectively; fi is a fixed effect; m is the number of lags included; and ui,t is a 
white noise error term.  In order to eliminate the fixed effects fi,, equation (5.28) needs 
to be first differenced: 
, , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
m m
i t i t j i t j i t j j i t j i t j i t i t
j j
y y y y x x u uα δ− − − − − − − −
= =
− = − + − + −∑ ∑                      (5.29) 
As introduced in Section 4.4.3, this specification introduces a problem of simultaneity 
because the error term is correlated with the regressor, , , 1i t i ty y −− . To deal with the 
problem, an instrumental variable procedure is traditionally used in estimating the 
model, which produces consistent estimates of the parameters. A wide ly used 
 -153- 
estimator is the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 9
1 2 ... 0mδ δ δ= = = =
. This 
method has been shown to produce more efficient and consistent estimators compared 
with other procedures. Then the Wald test is conducted in a usual manner, that is, 
whether or not x Granger causes y can be tested through a joint hypothesis 
of . If the null hypothesis can be rejected, then xi,t is considered 
Granger cause yi,t ; otherwise, xi,t is considered not Granger cause yi,t..  
By interchanging yi,t and xi,t as dependent and independent variables in (5.28), which 
variable is taking the leading role can be assessed.  
5.3.3 Empirical Findings 
5.3.3.1 Unit Root Test 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 present results for the Fisher-type ADF and PP panel unit root 
tests on level and first difference of the variables respectively.  
 
Table 5.10 Panel Unit Root Test on Levels  
 Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP 
 
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Individual Intercept 
Individual Intercept 
and Trend 
 P test Z test P test Z test P test Z test P test Z test 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
LSHH_A 91.1007 -0.9278 159.303 -4.9562 100.668 -1.9376 210.97 -7.3718 
 (0.2304) (0.1768) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0791)* (0.0263)** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHH_B 96.0991 -1.3097 39.2821 5.2327 96.0300 -1.8124 39.7175 4.78848 
 (0.2602) (0.0952)* (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.2618) (0.0350)** (1.0000) (1.0000) 
LSHZH_A 75.8343 0.8695 91.5537 -0.8775 73.6115 0.9199 102.119 -2.3213 
 (0.6706) (0.8077) (0.2205) (0.1901) (0.7344) (0.8212) (0.0656)* (0.0101)** 
LSHZH_B 94.1441 -1.0280 61.9366 2.8301 99.5714 -2.6691 59.0672 1.10789 
 (0.2107) (0.1520) (0.9661) (0.9977) (0.1180) (0.0038)*** (0.9823) (0.8660) 
                                                 
9 For more details, see Section 4.3.3. 
 -154- 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
LSHH_A 75.5303 0.9031 155.346 -5.0978 74.2651 0.5821 160.204 -5.4973 
 (0.8258) (0.8168) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.8517) (0.7197) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHH_B 219.778 -6.2113 848.705 -23.8783 277.036 -9.4250 1063.09 -28.4603 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHZH_A 68.7181 1.0171 130.374 -3.0311 69.0788 0.6129 120.698 -3.0262 
 (0.8863) (0.8454) (0.0009)*** (0.0012)*** (0.8800) (0.7300) (0.0054)*** (0.0012)*** 
LSHZH_B 131.276 -3.4869 594.71 -17.5535 246.317 -8.4549 965.734 -26.2341 
 (0.0007)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
LSHH_A 61.9038 2.3720 62.1447 1.5499 61.1656 2.6706 63.4183 1.3597 
 (0.9843) (0.9912) (0.9834) (0.9394) (0.9869) (0.9962) (0.9777) (0.9130) 
LSHH_B 33.3711 5.6191 54.1547 2.7579 36.6867 5.3372 65.0601 1.3553 
 (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9983) (0.9971) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9683) (0.9123) 
LSHZH_A 41.8377 3.9077 40.7865 3.5976 42.0353 3.6803 45.4997 2.8920 
 (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9998) (1.0000) (0.9999) (0.9998) (0.9981) 
LSHZH_B 29.6247 5.5699 34.8007 3.7618 32.4934 5.4985 42.5558 3.1067 
 (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9999) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9991) 
Notes: Numbers of lags included in the tests are selected by AIC. Values in the parentheses are probability values. 
‘*’ indicates significant at the 10%  level; ‘**’ ind icates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates significant 
at the 1% level. P test statistic follows asymptotic chi-square distribution and Z test statistic follows asymptotic 
normal distribution.  
 
Similar results are provided by using the Fisher chi-square statistic and the Choi Z-
statistic. In the first sample period, the null hypothesis of all time series being unit 
root nonstationary cannot be rejected for almost all the four classes of shares with 
except for the Shanghai A-shares 10
                                                 
10 I also run the IPS and LLC tests to identify the property of the Shanghai A-shares: at the 5% significant level, 
the null of unit root exists cannot be rejected by both of them when individual intercepts are included in the test 
specifications; when both individual intercepts and trends are included, the LLC test still supports the existence of 
unit root, however, the IPS test does not.  
. The result suggests that at least one of the 
Shanghai A-shares can be considered as stationary. In the second sample period, all 
test statistics are shown to be highly significant for the B-shares listed on both 
exchanges. When individual intercepts are included in the test specifications, both the 
Shanghai A-shares and Shenzhen A-shares are suggested to be nonstationary, 
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however when individual trends are augmented, it is suggested that at least some of 
the Shanghai A-shares and S henzhen A-shares can be considered as stationary. Thus I 
would consider all the four types of shares are I(0) in the second sub-period. In the 
third sample period, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all the shares, which 
implies that prices of all the shares in the Chinese stock markets contain unit roots.  
Table 5.11 presents results of the panel data unit root tests on first difference for those 
variables contain unit roots at levels. In all the sample periods, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected at the 1% significance level.  
 
Table 5.11 Panel Unit Root Test on First Differences  
 Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP 
 
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Individual Intercept 
Individual Intercept 
and Trend 
 P test Z test P test Z test P test Z test P test Z test 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
LSHH_B 5162.79 -66.5045 9142.81 -91.6061 3011.46 -48.500 11303 -104.672 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHZH_A 4648.8 -62.019 8745.1 -88.4303 3081.14 -50.3965 10289 -98.534 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHZH_B 5278.01 -68.6074 6997.68 -77.7254 6334.02 -77.4742 11055 -103.656 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
LSHH_A 4797.64 -65.2725 5136.94 -66.997 6219.33 -76.658 7020.47 -81.5771 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHH_B 5945.51 -74.5771 6800.4 -79.7245 6257.32 -76.7482 7332.73 -83.5726 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHZH_A 4871.75 -65.9472 5276.13 -68.199 6021.68 -75.7316 6743.72 -80.3036 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LSHZH_B 4858.1 -66.3975 5264.09 -68.7849 6075.13 -76.0848 6864.33 -81.0508 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘***’ indicates significant at the 1% level. 
 
 -156- 
Thus, I would consider prices of the Shanghai A-shares before the 2001 open market 
reform and prices of all the classes of shares after the 2001 reform and before QFIIs 
entered the A-shares market as I(0), and prices of all other shares as I(1). 
5.3.3.2 Cointegration Test 
The next step is to test for the existence of long run relationships between the I (1) 
variables. Tables 5.12 and 5.13 provide the empirical results employing the residual-
based Pedroni’s and Kao’s approaches, and the combined-Johansen approach, 
respectively.   
 
Table 5.12 Residual-Based Panel Cointegration Tests  
 SHH_A & SHH_B SHZH_A & SHZH_B SHH_A & SHZH_A SHH_B & SHZH_B 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
 Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic      -    - -0.2990 0.3815       -    - -0.0353 0.3987  
Panel rho-Statistic      -    - 6.8876 0.0000***      -    - 6.9698 0.0000*** 
Panel PP-Statistic      -    - 0.5683 0.3395       -    - 0.7094 0.3102  
Panel ADF-Statistic      -    - 2.0896 0.0450**      -    - 1.6966 0.0946* 
Group rho-Statistic      -    - 9.6358 0.0000***      -    - 9.7695 0.0000*** 
Group PP-Statistic      -    - -0.3600 0.3739       -    - 1.8927 0.0665* 
Group ADF-Statistic      -    - 2.7582 0.0089***      -    - -0.2721 0.3844  
Kao t-Statistic      -    - -0.2540 0.3997      -    - 9.2938 0.0000*** 
 Panel B: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
 Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic 9.3904 0.0000*** 3.9350 0.0002*** -0.1776 0.3927  -0.1437 0.3948  
Panel rho-Statistic 2.9839 0.0047*** 6.9475 0.0000*** 6.9549 0.0000*** 6.9527 0.0000*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.1641 0.0000*** -3.3846 0.0013*** -0.4445 0.3614  -1.5092 0.1277  
Panel ADF-Statistic -0.5188 0.3487  5.2313 0.0000*** 5.7369 0.0000*** 3.7923 0.0000*** 
Group rho-Statistic 5.1603 0.0000*** 9.7453 0.0000*** 9.7418 0.0000*** 9.7471 0.0000*** 
Group PP-Statistic -4.9387 0.0000*** -2.8696 0.0065*** -1.5930 0.1122  -1.2437 0.1841  
Group ADF-Statistic 0.6613 0.3206  10.602 0.0000*** 8.3636 0.0000*** -0.1366 0.3952  
Kao t-Statistic -3.4317 0.0003*** -3.7462 0.0001*** 0.6412 0.2607 0.9143 0.1803 
Notes: The first seven statistics in each panel are from Pedroni’s approach, and the last statistic is from Kao’s ADF 
approach. Individual intercepts are included in both test specifications. Lag length is selected according to AIC. 
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‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant 
at the 1% level. 
  
In the first sample period when the Chinese stock markets were strictly segmented,  
the null hypothesis of there is no long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
Shenzhen A-shares and B-shares can be rejected by two of the four Pedroni’s panel 
test statistics, and by two of the three Pedroni’s group test statistics. The less 
performed Kao’s ADF test statistic is not significant at any conventional level, 
suggesting the Shenzhen A-shares and B-shares are not cointegrated. This empirical 
evidence is inconsistent with Ahlgren et al. (2003)’s finding.  
As for the B-shares markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen, one (two) of the four 
Pedroni’s panel test statistics and one (two) of the three Pedroni’s group test statistics 
can be rejected at the 1% (10%) significance level. The Kao’s ADF statistic can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level, suggesting the existence of a long-run 
relationship.  
After QFIIs entered the former restricted A-shares market, the linkage between the 
Chinese A-shares and B-shares are suggested to be strengthened in both exchanges. 
Both the Pedroni’s statistics and the Kao’s statistic indicate there exist long-run 
equilibrium relationships between the A- and B-shares. This evidence is inconsistent 
with the previous find ing when pure time series were examined.  
Two of the four Pedroni’s panel test statistics and two of the three Pedroni’s group 
test statistics suggest the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares are cointegrated at the 1% 
significance level. However, the Kao’s ADF test does not provide supportive evidence 
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of the existence of the cointegrating relationship at any conventional significance 
level.   
As for the Shanghai and Shenzhen B-shares, two of the four Pedroni’s panel test 
statistics and one of the three Pedroni’s group test statistics suggest the existence of a 
long-run equilibrium relationship at the 1% significance level. However, the Kao’s 
ADF test does not support this evidence at any conventional significance level. 
 
Table 5.13 Fisher-Johansen’s Panel Cointegration Test  
            lag=1         lag=2         lag=3           lag=4 
  Trace  Max-eigen   Trace  Max-eigen  Trace  Max-eigen  Trace  Max-eigen  
  Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
SHZH_A & SHZH_B r=0  166.2  139.8  136.9  125.9  114.1  109.9  120.2  118.1 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0110)** (0.0217)** (0.0038)*** (0.0055)*** 
 r<=1 141.8 141.8 114.0 114.0 94.58 94.58 82.65 82.65 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0112)** (0.0112)** (0.1617) (0.1617) (0.4592) (0.4592) 
SHH_B & SHZH_B r=0  139.9  115.8  96.32  78.13 73.86 61.65 109.4 97.06 
  (0.0001)*** (0.0122)** (0.1689) (0.6600) (0.7777) (0.9682) (0.0330)** (0.1561) 
 r<=1 151.3 151.3 128.5 128.5  99.91  99.91 103.4 103.4 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0013)*** (0.1134) (0.1134) (0.0741)* (0.0741)* 
  Panel C: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
SHH_A & SHH_B r=0  127.3  120.5  98.80  95.75  91.24  88.69  92.97  88.14 
  (0.0039)*** (0.0123)** (0.2026) (0.2683) (0.3853) (0.4594) (0.3381) (0.4757) 
 r<=1 101.3 101.3 89.37 89.37 90.30 90.30 96.35 96.35 
  (0.1569) (0.1569) (0.4393) (0.4393) (0.4121) (0.4121) (0.2545) (0.2545) 
SHZH_A & SHZH_B r=0  91.33  82.65 86.33 78.87  70.06  65.27 61.34 57.11 
  (0.2740) (0.5212) (0.4091) (0.6377) (0.8621) (0.9353) (0.9702) (0.9892) 
 r<=1 98.97 98.97  94.93  94.93 87.00 87.00  85.58  85.58 
  (0.1265) (0.1265) (0.1948) (0.1948) (0.3898) (0.3898) (0.4315) (0.4315) 
SHH_A & SHZH_A r=0  138.7  122.9 121.5 104.7 112.2 94.59  105.1  92.04 
  (0.0002)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0631)* (0.0218)** (0.2015) (0.0596)* (0.2569) 
 r<=1 120.0 120.0  119.2  119.2 117.4 117.4 108.7 108.7 
  (0.0061)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0361)** (0.0361)** 
SHH_B & SHZH_B r=0 94.95 101.2 76.29 80.54 69.92 71.67 51.32 51.54 
  (0.1945) (0.0974)* (0.7129) (0.5867) (0.8646) (0.8289) (0.9981) (0.9980) 
 r<=1 56.32 56.32 57.85 57.85 60.07 60.07 61.04 61.04 
  (0.9913) (0.9913) (0.9869) (0.9869) (0.9775) (0.9775) (0.9720) (0.9720) 
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Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates 
significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant at the 1% level. 
 
According to the Fisher-Johansen’s panel cointegration test, at the 5% significance 
level, cointegrating relationships are only suggested between the Shenzhen A- and B-
shares in the first sub-period when more than two lags are included. After QFIIs 
involved in A-shares trading, the A- and B-shares in the Shanghai marke t are 
suggested share a common trend in the long-run when one lag is included. However, 
such a relationship is not found elsewhere at the 5% significance level. Generally, 
these results are consistent with what was observed on an aggregate level.  
5.3.3.3 Panel Granger Causality Test 
Table 5.14 presents the result of panel causality test following Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988, 1989), and the directions of information flows, in the Chinese stock markets 
are summarized in Figure 5.9.  
 
Table 5. 14 Lead-Lag Relationships in the Chinese Stock Markets (Panel Causality Test)  
 lag=1 lag=2 lag=3 lag=4 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-16 Feb 2001 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHH_B 16.2077 26.4511 27.3540 41.1295 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHH_A 0.0113 3.8384 0.9577 8.7562 
 (0.9154) (0.1467) (0.8115) (0.0675)* 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_B 4.7250 13.7588 17.1843 12.6885 
 (0.0297)** (0.0010)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0129)** 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_A 0.0077 2.6839 2.8720 25.9239 
 (0.9299) (0.2613) (0.4118) (0.0000)*** 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_A 0.0574 14.5461 6.8414 15.0043 
 (0.8106) (0.0007)*** (0.0771)* (0.0047)*** 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHH_A 0.7074 9.6036 5.4125 35.9260 
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 (0.4003) (0.0082)*** (0.1440) (0.0000)*** 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_B 0.7908 12.5473 27.5391 51.8462 
 (0.3739) (0.0019)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHH_B 13.1514 11.3863 14.7197 6.9108 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0021)*** (0.1407) 
 Panel B: 28 Feb 2001-8 Jul 2003 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHH_B 23.3546 11.4703 39.7086 8.7455 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0678)* 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHH_A 11.1533 17.6330 6.9066 10.2561 
 (0.0008)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0749)* (0.0363)** 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_B 77.9265 42.0739 40.6801 13.0615 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0110)** 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_A 17.3286 18.1838 10.3156 34.4365 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0161)** (0.0000)*** 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_A 15.0374 9.1151 0.0166 10.9524 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0105)** (0.9994) (0.0271)** 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHH_A 7.4968 2.0176 5.0572 8.6987 
 (0.0062)*** (0.3647) (0.1677) (0.0691)* 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_B 67.7736 47.3258 13.5146 75.6120 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0000)*** 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHH_B 16.9028 15.2377 10.4776 51.6682 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0149)** (0.0000)*** 
 Panel C: 9 Jul 2003-31 Dec 2004 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHH_B 5.9396 18.0758 16.6064 20.3977 
 (0.0148)** (0.0001)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0004)*** 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHH_A 15.1087 16.1130 27.7101 15.5640 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0037)*** 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_B 0.5937 7.5315 12.1069 12.4294 
 (0.4410) (0.0231)** (0.0070)*** (0.0144)** 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_A 4.5336 9.0043 8.8459 5.3925 
 (0.0332)** (0.0111)** (0.0314)** (0.2493) 
SHH_A does not Granger cause SHZH_A 0.2307 9.5888 15.6790 17.1371 
 (0.6310) (0.0083)*** (0.0013)** (0.0018)*** 
SHZH_A does not Granger cause SHH_A 7.7907 20.9120 19.4874 17.9932 
 (0.0053)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0012)*** 
SHH_B does not Granger cause SHZH_B 0.3106 10.7496 19.5028 17.7990 
 (0.5773) (0.0046)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0014)*** 
SHZH_B does not Granger cause SHH_B 7.9590 25.2559 24.3478 29.4417 
 (0.0048)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates significant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates 
significant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ ind icates significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 5.9: Lead-Lag Relationships in the Chinese Stock Markets (Panel Causality Test) 
 
Period A: 3 January 1994 - 16 February 2001 
 
 
Period B: 28 February 2001 - 8 July 2003 
 
 
Period C: 9 July 2003 - 31 December 2004 
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5.4 Summary and Discussion 
The information hypot hesis discussed in Chapter 3 attributes the Chinese A-shares 
premium to the asymmetric information local and foreign investors hold. It argues that 
the foreign investors in the Chinese stock market find it more difficult to assess 
information regarding the local economy and firms. However, the argument that 
foreign investors are less informed about local assets than Chinese investors itself is 
not definite and needs fur ther verification. Literature explaining the premium with the 
information asymmetry hypothesis commonly uses firm size as a proxy of the 
asymmetric information, however, if the assumption that local investors have an 
information advantage over foreign investors does not hold, it will not be appropriate 
to treat firm size as asymmetric information, but may be more appropriate to consider 
it as a firm fundamental proposed in Chapter 4. An extens ive literature, discussed in 
Chapter 3, tested the argument that local investors are better informed, employing 
different samples and methodologies, but results are controversial. In this chapter, I 
contribute to the literature of whether Chinese investors indeed have an information 
advantage over foreign investors in the Chinese stock markets, with more up-to-date 
SHH_A 
SHZH_B 
SHH_B 
SHZH_A 
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data, a more appropriately constructed index, and more advanced econometric 
techniques.  
Considering that the official A-shares index, although widely used in existing 
literature, is not representative, I constructed an aggregate price of Chinese shares 
using the price of individual dual- listed shares weighted by the number of tradable 
shares. Based on the newly created aggregate prices, I then conducted time series unit 
root and cointegration tests followed by a Granger causality test on stationary VARs 
(VECMs) and the Toda-Yamamoto causality test on level VARs to identify direction 
of information flows between the Chinese A- and B-shares markets. The results 
suggest the Chinese A- and B-shares were perfectly segmented before the B-shares 
market opened up, and after which, long-run equilibrium relationships between them 
can be observed in bo th Shanghai and Shenzhen. This finding is consistent with 
previous literature (see, e.g., Yang, 2003; Yao, 2003; Darrat et al., 2006). There had 
not  been a study examining the lead- lag relationship of the Chinese A- and B-shares 
investors after QFIIs entered the A-shares market. My study covered this period, 
however, I did not see any cointegrating relationship after the QFII programme 
launched as expected, and this finding is quite surprising. The Granger causality test 
and the Toda-Yamamoto causality test provide similar results, that there was no 
information transmission between the A- and B-shares markets before the B-shares 
market opened and more information flows were identified after the 2001 and QFII 
deregulations. The evidence supports the second set of literature in that it seems the 
B-shares investors are better informed in the Shanghai market. As for the Shenzhen 
market, the information flow, after the 2001 open market reform, between the A- and 
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B-shares is suggested to be bi-directional by the VECM Granger causality test, and 
uni-directional from the A-shares to the B-shares by the Toda-Yamamoto causality 
test. However, it is surprising to see no information transmission is suggested by 
either of the causality test after QFIIs entered the Shenzhen A-shares market.  In 
add ition, the manner of information transmission between the A- and B-shares 
markets in short-run was looked into through generalized impulse response functions, 
and double-way feedbacks are suggested.  
Trying to provide more robust and insightful evidence, I conducted a causality test 
using a panel data set, for the first time in the area of Chinese segmented stock 
markets. The panel data technique incorporates both time-series and cross-sectional 
information and is consequently considered to be more powerful than time-series 
techniques alone. Residual-based panel cointegration tests confirm the segmentation 
status of the Chinese A- and B-shares markets before the 2001 deregulation, which is 
consistent with previous time-series’ findings but contrast with the finding of Ahlgren 
et al. (2003), which is so far the only study done with panel data themselves. This 
technique also provides supportive evidence that the markets are more linked after 
QFIIs entered the A-shares market. However, the combined Fisher-Johansen 
cointegration method provides opposite findings. Using traditional Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988, 1989) panel causality procedure, I find before the 2001 event, the Chinese 
local investors are indeed better informed than foreign investors, as the information 
hypothesis about the premium puzzle argues. After the deregulation, the Chinese 
stock markets are more linked, and bi-directional feedbacks between the markets are 
identified.  
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Although different results are suggesting by the pure time-series and panel-data 
methods, both of them suggest there is not always a flow of information from the A-
shares investors to the B-shares investors, but after 2001, the B-shares investors tend 
to have information advantage over the A-shares investors. This finding indicates the 
information hypo thesis alone cannot well explain the Chinese A-shares premium.  
Especially after 2001, it should be that other factors are responsible for the existence 
of the premium. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WHY IS CHINA UNIQUE? A CROSS-
COUNTRY COMPARISON 
6.1 Introduction 
The phe nomenon of marke t segmentation is not unique to China, and is observed in a 
large number of countries, especially emerging markets. For instance, Finnish law 
allows foreign investors to own up to 20% of the shares of any Finnish company; and 
at the same time, Finnish investors were prohibited from investing in foreign 
securities, at least until 1986 (Hietala, 1989). The Thai stock market maintains two 
separate listings, the Main Board and the Alien Board: the Alien Board is designed for  
common stocks which have reached foreign ownership limits, and foreign investors 
are only allowed to hold shares listed on the Alien Board (Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994). 
The Singapore and Malaysian markets parallelled those in Thailand in creating a 
distinct market for foreign investors when the foreign ownership limit for a particular 
stock is reached (Bailey and Jagtinai, 1994). The Philippine market lists Class B 
shares available to both locals and foreigners, and Class A shares for locals only 
(Bailey and Jagtinai, 1994). Mexican equity is also characterized by the existence of 
multiple classes of shares that differentiate between national and foreign investors 
(Domowitz et al., 1997). In Switzerland, local firms issue bearer shares and registered 
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shares to maintain domestic control (Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995). In all the above 
mentioned countries, otherwise identical equities are priced differently by foreign and 
local investors. It is typically recorded in the literature that foreign investors who face 
the restrictions in investing in local assets need to pay a premium to enjoy the 
diversification benefit, e.g.,  Bailey et al. (1999) suggest, in such markets, foreigners 
have often paid premia of 20, 50 or even 100% above the price of an otherwise 
identical security available only to locals. However, there exists an interesting puzzle 
marked China unique, among the markets which have similar market segmentation 
feature: in all these segmented markets, China is the only country where foreign 
investors enjoy a lower price, rather than a higher premium, for identical assets.  
The question of why China is different from other countries, which have similar 
institutional settings with aspect of foreign ownership restrictions, has long been 
raised, and is mentioned in a large number of Chinese stock market segmentation 
studies (as was discussed in Chapter 3). Bailey et al. (1999) mentioned “it is difficult 
to explain why Chinese investors pay large premia for restricted shares relative to 
what foreigners typically offer for matching unrestricted shares”. Until today, the 
puzzle is still not solved satisfactorily, and we still do not know what makes the 
Chinese segmented markets so different. All the Chinese A-shares premium related 
studies (as discussed in Chapter 3) ended up examining what factors cause the price 
premium in China. Those same examined factor s, very often ind ividua lly, have 
corroborated the foreign class shares price discount in other segmented markets. This 
leads to a natural empirical question: can the same set of factors corroborate both the 
local class shares pr ice premium in China, and the foreign class shares price premium 
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in the other countries? Interestingly, this research question appears has not  to have 
been considered since the question was raised ten years ago. After Bailey et al. (1999), 
no s tudies comparing the segmented markets in different countries have been made, to 
the best of my knowledge. In pursuit of financial market liberalization, most of the 
governments removed the market segmentation restrictions to allow investors invest 
freely, while a few of them, e.g., China, Thailand, The Philippines, still remain. In this 
chapter, I will try to shed light on the puzzle by providing some cross-country 
comparison evidence. A few countries, i.e., China, Singapore and Thailand, which 
have similar dual- listing market frameworks will be compared and contrasted to see 
whether the premia in these countries can be explained using same factor(s), and 
whether there exists any particular reason makes China unique. Restricted to limited 
data and literature, this evidence can only be viewed as preliminary. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3,  four principal factors, namely differential risks, differential demands, 
differential liquidities, and asymmetric information, are popular in explaining the 
price premium/ discount in China and other segmented markets. I will base my 
examination, therefore, on these four factors. This cross-country comparison is the 
first time this approach has been taken to try to understand the Chinese premium 
puzzle. Additionally, the literature in the dual- listed stocks pricing in Thailand and 
Singapore is very limited, and a secondary contribution of this work is to enrich the 
results in this literature.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 introduces the 
background of the Singapore and Thai stock markets, which also impose limited 
ownership restrictions on foreign investors and adopt dual- listing institutional systems, 
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and compares their institutional settings with the Chinese stock market. The data used 
in the cross-country comparison is described in Section 6.3. A preliminary description 
of the premia in the sample countries is provided in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 compares 
the explanatory power of the popularly used four premium contributors to the premia 
in the sample countries. Section 6.6 proposes and examines potential reasons for why 
China is unique. And finally Section 6.7 provides summary and discussions.   
6.2 Institutional Settings 
Although the three sample countries, China, Singapore and Thailand, are similar in 
that they all adopt  the dual- listing market system, they have their own features. In 
order to better understand the issue, background information on the foreign ownership 
restrictions and common shares classifications in Singapo re and Thailand, and an 
institutional comparison of the sample countries will be provided in this section. A 
brief review of the relevant literature of the two respective sample markets will also 
be provided.  
6.2.1 Singapore 
Different from the Chinese stock market be fore 2001, the Singapore market is a 
classic example of a mildly legally segmented market because the capital restriction 
flow is unidirectional. Singapore regulations permit companies to impose restrictions 
on foreign holdings of equity ownership of local firms in some industries, and the 
maximum holdings can vary across industries and across companies. In most 
instances, foreign investors 1
                                                 
1 A foreigner is more strictly defined as an individual who is not a citizen or permanent resident of Singapore; or a 
 are restricted to common shares of a firm with a 
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maximum limit that varies between 20% and 30%. However, under certain conditions, 
the percentage could be slightly different in certain industries and firms across 
industries. For example, if the shareholders and the stock exchange agree on certain 
amendments, foreign investors can hold shares of banks up to 40%; in other sectors, 
the maximum foreign ownership holding is even higher, 45% to 55%; while in 
national defence-related industries, foreign investors can hold at most 25% common 
shares of the firm; and certain firms and industries are allowed to choose their own 
foreign equity ownership restrictions. As in China and other segmented markets, the 
intent of the Singapore foreign ownership restrictions is to ensure local control of 
domestic firms, especially those firms and industries considered strategically 
important to national interests. Under the restrictions, foreign investors who bought 
shares that were legally registered in the name of local investors had to wait for 
registration of their shares when the foreign ownership limit was reached and became 
binding. Only when some other foreign investors had sold their shares to local 
investors and these shares were registered in local investors’ names, could foreign 
investors on the waiting list register the shares in their own names. When waiting for 
the registration, the foreign investors may lose their benefits, e.g., dividend incomes, 
rights, and bonus issues. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, foreign investors’ interests in the Singapore market 
increased. As more and more shares were bought by foreigners, it became difficult to 
find a willing seller at the single quoted price, which was too low, given the rising 
                                                                                                                                            
corporation, wherever incorporated, in which citizens or permanent residents of Singapore of any corporate body 
constituted by any stature of Singapore do not have an interest, in the aggregate, in at least 50% of the issued share 
capital of such corporation; or any legal entity (other than an individual or a corporation) which is not owned or 
controlled by the Government of Singapore or any authority thereof, and is considered by the directors to be a 
foreign person. (Lam, 1997). 
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demand for the stocks. An unlisted market then emerged,  where stocks were traded at 
a much higher price than the officially quoted price. Foreign investors would like to 
pay a premium to buy the shares from another foreign investor, rather than buy the 
shares from Singapore local investors and wait a long time to register them in their 
own names. Facing this situation, the Singapore stock exchange began to quote 
companies’ local and foreign stocks separately. The separate listings of local and 
foreign shares first started with the Singapore Airlines (SIA) and Singapore Press 
Holdings (SPH) on May 3, 1988. Under the separate listing system, a stock is traded 
on the local counter before the foreign holdings reach the regulatory limit, and the 
same stock begins to be traded on the foreign counter once the foreign ownership 
reaches the limit. Same as the Chinese A- and B-shares, the local and foreign shares 
of Singapore domestic equity are identical in terms of dividends, voting rights, and 
other characteristics. In October 1990, the Singapore government allowed local 
investors to buy and trade foreign class shares. These foreign class shares would still 
be registered as foreign class. This mildly segmented market setting paralleled the 
Chinese market after 2001, when Chinese investors entered the B-shares market, that 
domestic class shares are restricted to local investors, while all investors can trade 
foreign class shares. Different from the Chinese market setting, the Singapore 
government does not impose any restrictions on the residents of Singapo re with 
regard to their holdings of foreign securities and investments, and the Singapore 
residents are free to invest abroad. By June 30, 1995, there were a total of 35 
companies that carried restrictions on foreign ownership, of which, 17 companies 
have separate listed stock series.  
 -172- 
The Singapore foreign counter prices are typically higher than the prices on the local 
counter since the separate listing system was enforced. From 1988 to 1996, the 
average foreign shares premium was about 32% according to Bailey et al. (1999). The 
high price premium and highly active trading of the foreign counter shares brought a 
series of problems of the development of the local counter, especially the capital 
market’s main function, resources reallocation, was deteriorated by the separate 
listing. Under the situation, the Singapore government decided to let the listed 
companies themselves solve the problem by possibly merging the separate listings. 
Followed by 11 other companies, the Singapore Technologies Industrial Corp. (STIC) 
started the abortion of the separate listing system in August 1997.  
6.2.2 Thailand 
The framework of the Thai foreign ownership restrictions and the creation of the Thai 
dual- listing system are very similar to Singapore’s. In Thailand, foreigners are 
generally limited to a maximum of 50% ownership of Thai firms. For example, a limit 
of 25% is imposed on firms in the sector of banking and finance. Same as in 
Singapore, the percentage limits on the amount of equity that can be registered by 
foreigners can vary across industries and across firms within an industry under certain 
conditions. As more and more foreign investors became interested in the Thai market, 
foreign capital started rush into Thailand from the mid-1980s. The foreign ownership 
limits of many Thai companies became binding consequently. In order to register the 
shares in their own names, foreign buyers had to wait until other foreign investors 
sold their shares and the ownership limit therefore loo sened. The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) thus inaugurated the Foreign Board/ Alien Board in September 1987 
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to facilitate trading for foreign investors. As a result, the Thai market has kept two 
separate listings for common stocks which have reached foreign ownership limits: one 
for local investors and the other for foreign investors. For companies which have 
reached their foreign ownership limit, local Thai investors continue to trade shares on 
the Main Board, while foreign investors trade among themselves on the Alien Board. 
Shares with separate trading are typically those cons isting of large and well-
established companies and hence preferred by foreign investors, while the rest of the 
markets gets less interest from them.  
The Main Board and Foreign Board shares are also identical in all respects, e.g.,  
dividends, voting rights, and procedures for settlement and registration. However, 
share prices on the Foreign Board are typically higher than those on the Main Board 
(Bailey and Jagtiani 1994). In the period of 1988 to 1992, the average price premium 
of the Alien Board to the Main Board varied between 5% and 20% (Bailey et al., 
1999).  
Although trading is formally segmented into distinct boards for local investors and 
foreign investors, investors can cross to the other board, but at a cost. Foreign 
investors can also invest in the Main Board by registering under nominee names 
(usually their brokers). However, they will lose out all the benefits offered by the 
company, e.g., rights offerings, dividends, but the nominee will receive them. 
Furthermore, foreign investors can only sell Main Board holdings back into the Main 
Board market. On the other hand, Thai local investors can buy Alien Board shares 
freely, but must pay a price premium and only register them as Main Board shares. 
Since registration on the Main Board would forfeit the value of the Alien Board 
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premium, local investors may choose hold the Alien Board shares unregistered, 
however, this would result in losing cash and stock dividends, warrants, other 
distributions, and voting rights. To avoid losing the premium and other benefits, local 
investors may only sell an Alien Board share back into the Alien Board market.  
In bo th Singapo re and Thailand, the inter-market investment barriers and excess 
foreign demand provides an economic justification for the creation of separate 
markets for the local and foreign shares of domestic equity. In China, as introduced in 
Section 2.2, the motivation of the creation of the B-shares market was to solve the 
demand of foreign exchange for the development of domestic enterprises, and this 
does not ensure there would be enough demand of the Chinese B-shares from the 
foreign investors. Suggested in Section 2.3, the Chinese B-shares market has suffered 
from thin transaction and sever liquidity problems. From this point of view, the excess 
demand of foreign class shares in Singapore and Thailand, while less demand in 
China, could be a reason for the opposite premium in China.  
6.3 Data  
Daily data are collected from Datastream. Prices of restricted shares and unrestricted 
shares of the sample countries are all expressed in each country’s local currency. As 
in the previous chapters, the test period lies between 1994 and 2005, when the foreign 
exchange rate regime was stable in China.  
I identified securities in each country with substantial trading activities in bo th the 
restricted and unrestricted shares markets. For Singapore, since the dual- listing system 
was abolished in August 1997, I included all 13 companies that had separate listings 
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by the end of the period and had data available in the Datastream. Appendix F lists 
these 13 companies along with the dates of the separate listings and the respective 
foreign ownership limits, which ranged from 15% to 49%. Sample selection for 
Thailand is more difficult since the trading is not as active as the Singapore shares. 
Foreign trading switches to the Alien Board whenever a particular company reaches 
its foreign ownership limit, and returns to the Main Board if foreign ownership drops 
below the limit. Furthermore, a company may hit the limit and nominally appear on 
the Alien Board while experiencing little or no actual volume there. Therefore, I 
selected 64 companies based on their use in previous studies, i.e., Bailey and Jagtiani 
(1994) and Bailey et al. (2007). A full list of the Thai sample companies is available 
in Appendix G.  
Because of the limited time span the three markets overlapped, the first test period 
covers three and a half years from 3 Jan 1994 to 30 June 1997, which is after the 
Chinese exchange rate reform in 1994 and before the separate listing system in 
Singapore abolished in August 1997. 71 out of 86 Chinese companies which have 
data as of the end of the sample period are included 2. To avoid the Asian Financial 
Crisis from July 1997 to the end of 1998, which may have discouraged foreign 
investors from investing in the Thai stock market3
                                                 
2 Local B-shares trading codes for the companies excluded are 200429, 200488, 200530, 200581, 200725, 200726, 
200761, 200869, 900936, 900940, 900943, 900945, 900947, 900952, 900955.  
, the second test period lies between 
1 January 1999 and 30 June 2005, and only Thailand and China are included in the 
study.  
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6.4 Preliminary Description of the Premium/ Discount 
Figure 6.1 plots the average daily domestic class shares price premia in China, 
Singapore and Thailand respectively, between 3 January 1994 and 30 June 2005. The 
price premium is described as: t tt
t
PL PFPRE
PF
−
= , where tPL  and tPF  are equally 
weighted cross-sectional average prices of local class shares and foreign class shares 
respectively.  The graph shows the magnitude of the premium in China is relatively 
large. The average Chinese B-shares premium over the entire sample period is 2.15. 
The premium also exhibits much more volatility. In contrast to the persistent, higher 
local shares price in China, in Singapore, all the local shares are priced lower during 
the sample period. In addition, the Singapore discount is relatively stable through the 
time. The interesting finding lies in the Thai case: opposed with what was 
documented by Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) and Bailey et al. (1999), which are limited 
with the data pre-1994, that foreign investors offer consistent higher prices for Alien 
shares through time, I found the higher Alien shares price did not always present 
themselves- there were a few time points, mainly centered between mid-2001 and 
mid-2003, when the Alien shares are instead priced lower. This is the period that the 
Thai economy recovered from the Asian Financial Crisis 4
 
.  
                                                 
4 During the period, the SET Index increased 154%, the SET 50 Index increased 158%, the daily capital flow 
increased nearly twice, and the market capitalization increased 187% (Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand). 
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Figure 6.1: Dual-Listed Shares Price Premia in China, Singapore and Thailand 
 
Table 6.1 p resents the summary statistics of the average daily price premia in the three 
sample countries over 3 January 1994 and 30 June 1997 respectively. The Thai 
premium is further split and examined according to whether it is positive or negative, 
i.e., whether the Alien Board shares are priced lower or higher, than the Main Board 
shares.  
 
Table 6. 1: Summary Statistics of the Premia in Sample Countries (3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997) 
 China Singapore 
Thailand  
(full sample) 
Thailand  
(positive premium) 
Thailand  
(negative premium) 
 Mean 1.492 -0.516 -0.285 0.091 -0.294 
 Median 1.576 -0.514 -0.303 0.085 -0.310 
 Maximum 3.456 -0.276 0.253 0.250 0.000 
 Minimum -0.041 -0.705 -0.523 0.000 -0.520 
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 Std. Dev. 0.549 0.057 0.115 0.073 0.100 
 Obs 865  873  857  20  837 
 
In China, the foreign class shares were traded at prices lower than the prices of their 
local class counterparts through all the time in the period 5
Table 6.2 presents the summary statistics of the premium for China and Thailand over 
the latter sample period, 1 January 1999 to 30 June 2005, respectively. Similarly, I 
split the Thai sample into positive and negative premium sub-samples. 
. The average premium was 
1.492, with maximum and minimum premia equalled to 3.456 and -0.041 respectively. 
The situation in Singapor e was opposite: the foreign counter shares were priced 
higher without any exception and the average premium was -0.516. The maximum 
and minimum premia equalled to -0.276 and -0.705. Compared with the Chinese 
example, the relative price gap between the local and foreign counters was much 
smaller. The average magnitude of the relative price difference between the local and 
foreign boards was even smaller in Thailand, with the premium value of only -0.285, 
however the standard deviation of the premium was relatively large. On 20 out of the 
857 sample dates, the Thai Alien shares were priced higher than their otherwise 
identical counterparts.  
 
Table 6. 2: Summary Statistics of the Premia in Sample Countries (1 Jan 1999-30 Jun 2005) 
 
 China 
Thailand 
 (full sample) 
Thailand  
(positive premium) 
Thailand  
(negative premium) 
 Mean 2.1588 -0.1819 0.1824 -0.2782 
 Median 1.0657 -0.2400 0.1700 -0.2900 
                                                 
5 Though there were two exceptions: the average premium was -0.02 on 28 July 1994 and -0.04 on 29 July 1994.  
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 Maximum 7.8051 0.6300 0.6300 0.0000 
 Minimum 0.5145 -0.5900 0.0000 -0.5900 
 Std. Dev. 1.7944 0.2261 0.1251 0.1274 
 Obs 1549 1594 332 1262 
 
Similar observations are found with China and Thai in the second sample period. On 
one fifth of the sample dates, the price of the Thai Alien shares was inconsistent with 
Bailey and Jagtiani’s (1994) and Bailey et al.’s (1999) findings, i.e., instead of priced 
higher, they were priced lower, than shares traded on the Main Board. The premium 
in Thailand became more volatile than in China.  
6.5 Determinants of the Premium/ Discount 
Based on the widely accepted four factors to the premium/ discount discussed in 
Chapter 3, in this section, I will identify their contributions to the price premium/ 
discount in the sample countries respectively, to see whether the same set of factor(s) 
can explain both the local class shares premium in China and the foreign class shares 
premia in Singapore and Thailand. Cross-sectional regressions are used to capture 
variations in the premium across firms, due to data in time-dimension of certain 
variable, i.e., foreign ownership limits, are not available. The de finition of the 
determinants will be introduced first, and then empirical results will be presented and 
discussed.  
6.5.1 Definition of Explanatory Factors 
Differential Risks Factor 
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The risk that certain investor group is exposed to is measured by the volatility 
following a modified range-type estimator (Garman and Klass, 1980): 
, ,
,
, ,0.5( )
j i j i
j i
j i j i
H L
H L
σ
−
=
+
                                                                                                 (6.1)  
which utilizes high/ low prices and is considered to contain more information 
regarding volatility than do open/ close prices. Here, ,j iσ is the standard deviation of 
the return on the jth type of shares for compa ny i, ,( ) j tH L is the time averaged 
intraday high (low) price of the jth type of shares for company i.  
As mentioned before, the risk differential hypothesis attributes the premium to the 
different risks foreign and local investors face: the group which face a higher risk 
requires a higher expected return, and so the corresponding class of shares is priced 
lower. I define the proxy for the risk attributor as: 
, , , ,
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                                                                     (6.2)  
When the difference between the risks that different investor groups are exposed to 
increases, the gap of price between the corresponding classes should increase as well.  
Differential Demands Factor 
In China, the demand factor (D) is proxied by the relative number of the B-shares 
with respect to the total outstanding shares available on the local exchange. 
Measurement of the differential demands is different in Singapore 6
                                                 
6 Measurement of the demand factor in Thailand should be the same as in Singapore, however I could not obtain 
the updated data. 
: the maximum 
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foreign ownership limitation governments imposed on individual firms is employed as 
a measure of the demand factor. As the differential demand hypothesis states, given 
the downward sloping demand curve, the more foreign class shares available to the 
foreign investors, the lower the price of the B-shares supposed to be. So the demand 
factor is expected to be positively related to the premium, in both sample countries. 
Differential Liquidities Factor 
To proxy the differential liquidities factor, I calculated the ratio of the time averaged 
trading volume of the foreign c lass shares to the total trading volume for each stock i. 
This is defined as the volume ratio: 
,
, ,
F i
i
L i F i
V
L
V V
=
+
                                                                                                            (6.3)  
where iL  is the volume ratio of foreign shares for company i, ,F iV  is the time averaged 
trading volume of foreign shares for company i, and ,L iV  is the time averaged trading 
volume of local shares for company i. Since illiquid stocks are priced lower to 
compensate for their less liquidity, higher foreign shares liquidity should be 
negatively correlated with the premium.  
Asymmetric Information Factor 
Market capitalization (MV) is used to measure the asymmetric information factor. 
Following the information asymmetry hypothesis, larger firms tend to be covered 
more by the media, so foreign investors may find it easier to have information about 
such firms and may like to invest in the equities which they are more familiar with. 
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Hence, larger firms tend to have relatively higher foreign class shares price, and a 
negative relationship is expected be tween the market capitalization and the premium.  
6.5.2 Comparison of Chinese with Singapore and Thai (1994-1997) 
The above introduced determinants are regressed on the premia in the three sample 
countries over the period from 3 January 1994 to 30 June 1997 respectively.   
i i iPRE C Xβ ε′= + +                                                                                                  (6.4) 
where PREi is the price premium for firm i ; Xi is a vector of explanatory variables 
including RKi, Di, Li and MVi; and εi is a white disturbance. OLS estimation with 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance is 
employed. The results are presented in Tables 6.3-6.5. 
 
Table 6. 3: Determinants of the Chinese Premium (3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997) 
 C RK D L MV Adj. R2 
(1) 1.7686 -0.1718    0.0041 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0005)***     
(2) -1.2886  4.1441   0.2448 
 (0.0083)***  (0.0000)***    
(3) 1.2922   1.0866  0.0036 
 (0.0002)***   (0.1895)   
(4) 1.5919    4.18E-11 -0.0114 
 (0.0000)***    (0.6163)  
(5) -1.1206 -0.0887 4.3043 -0.6446 -4.26E-12 0.2195 
 (0.0133)** (0.0007)*** (0.0001)*** (0.4645) (0.9563)  
Notes: The calculation of the market capitalization (MV) includes the non-tradable A-shares. Values in the 
parentheses are probability values. ‘**’ indicates signif icant at the 5% level and ‘***’ indicates signif icant at the 1% 
level. 
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The result indicates the deviation in the Chinese A-shares premium across firms is 
mainly driven by the relative differential demand factor and almost one quarter of the 
deviation can be explained by it. The more the B-shares are available to the foreign 
investors, the less is the gap between the A- and B-shares’ prices. The differential 
risks  local and foreign investors are exposed to also show statistical significance, 
however the explanatory power is low.  
 
Table 6. 4: Determinants of the Singapore Premium (3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997) 
 C RK D L MV Adj. R2 
(1) 0.2156 -0.3298    0.4369 
 (0.1294) (0.0097)***     
(2) -0.0392  -0.0077   0.0799 
 (0.7920)  (0.2385)    
(3) -0.3201   0.0556  -0.0893 
 (0.3707)   (0.9028)   
(4) -0.1419    -4.64E-05 0.4092 
 (0.0190)**    (0.0026)***  
(5) -0.2691 -0.2857 -0.0003 0.7999 -3.47E-05 0.6868 
 (0.1253) (0.0168)** (0.9117) (0.0049)*** (0.0413)**  
Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘**’ indicates signif icant at the 5% level and ‘***’ indicates 
signif icant at the 1% level. 
 
The variation of the premium across firms can be better explained by the four factors 
in the Singapore market, suggested by a higher adjusted R-square value. Differential 
risks, liquidities and asymmetric information factors all together explain nearly 70% 
of the variation in the premium across firms. The risk factor  plays a statistically 
significant role and it is suggested that it alone can explain nearly half of the cross-
sectional premium variation, however the sign is unexpected. The negative sign 
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indicates either investors group in the Singapore market tend to be risk loving. The 
relative demand does not seem to influence the premium significantly as observed in 
the Chinese market. Instead, the market capitalization alone explains 40% of 
variations in the price premium across firms. As documented in the literature, the 
larger the firm, the less information asymmetry foreign investors face, and the higher 
price they would like to pay. 
 
Table 6. 5: Determinants of the Thai Premium (3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997) 
 C RK  L MV Adj. R2 
 Full Sample 
(1) -0.1208 0.0868   0.0944 
 (0.0000)
*** (0.0071)***    
(2) -0.0571  -0.0596  -0.0067 
 (0.1895)  (0.5053)   
(3) -0.0824   -1.71E-07 -0.0142 
 (0.0042)
***   (0.6295)  
(4) -0.0815 0.0927 -0.0549 -7.28E-07 0.0958 
 (0.2049) (0.0054)
*** (0.5473) (0.1377)  
 Positive Premium 
(1) 0.0868 0.0762   -0.0462 
 (0.0188)** (0.2799)    
(2) 0.1713  -0.1331  -0.0348 
 (0.0920)*  (0.4340)   
(3) 0.1546   -1.56E-06 -0.0193 
 (0.0221)**   (0.1216)  
(4) 0.3259 0.0579 -0.4088 -4.08E-06 0.1139 
 (0.0773)* (0.4972) (0.1769) (0.1081)  
 Negative Premium 
(1) -0.1804 0.0878   0.2871 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0002)***    
(2) -0.1314  -0.0175  -0.0193 
 (0.0002)***  (0.8225)   
(3) -0.1523   2.08E-07 -0.0142 
 (0.0000)***   (0.5202)  
(4) -0.1940 0.0955 0.0390 -1.73E-07 0.2747 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0008)*** (0.5398) (0.6780)  
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Notes: The demand factor is excused from the regression since the updated data is not available. Values in the 
parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates signif icant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates signif icant at the 5% level; 
and ‘***’ indicates signif icant at the 1% level. 
 
Only the differential risks factor is suggested to be important in explaining the price 
premium variation acros s firms in Thailand. The sign of the factor is positive as the 
differential risks hypothesis expected: the less different of the local and foreign 
investors’ required returns, the less the premium. In the full sample, nearly 10% of the 
variation in the premium cross firms can be explained by the factor, and the 
explanation power of the factor is even higher when exclude unusual positive premia. 
None of the examined factors is statistically significant associated with the abnormal 
positive premium sample.  
Comparing the three markets, the deviation in the premia in bot h Singapo re and 
Thailand, where foreign investors pay higher than their counterparts for the otherwise 
identical assets, is influenced by the differential risks local and foreign investors 
require, while only in China, where foreign investors instead pay less, the premium 
deviation is mainly explained by the demand factor: firms which have more B-shares 
outstanding tend to have higher premium. Besides the differential risk factor, the 
Singapore premium is also explained by the asymmetric information, which is not 
found in the other two countries. However, both the differential risks factor and the 
asymmetric information factor are suggested to contribute to the Singapore premium 
in an opposite way as the hypotheses expected.  
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6.5.3 Comparison of Chinese with Thai (1999-2005) 
Since the separate listing system in Singapore market was abolished in August 1997, I 
compare the Chinese market with only the Thai market over the period of 1 January 
1999 to 30 June 2005. The results are shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. 
 
Table 6. 6: Determinants of the Chinese Premium (1 Jan 1999-30 Jun 2005) 
 C RK D L MV Adj. R2 
(1) 1.3662 7.3467    -0.0096 
 (0.0000)*** (0.6220)     
(2) 1.5680  -0.1132   -0.0108 
 (0.0000)***  (0.7517)    
(3) 0.7268   1.6254  0.2339 
 (0.0000)***   (0.0000)***   
(4) 1.3853    2.94E-11 0.0121 
 (0.0000)***    (0.2602)  
(5) -0.0423 17.2015 0.4928 1.7963 1.86E-11 0.2488 
 (0.9172) (0.4246) (0.1587) (0.0000)*** (0.4294)  
Notes: Values in the parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates signif icant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates 
signif icant at the 5% level; and ‘***’ indicates signif icant at the 1% level. 
 
Between 1999 and 2005, more than 20% of the cross-sectional Chinese A-shares 
premium deviation is suggested to be solely driven by the relative liquidity of the 
foreign and domestic shares. It is suggested by the theory that the higher relative 
liquidity of the B-shares, the higher their price is, and thus the lower of the premium. 
However the positive sign in my result seems puzzling.   
 
Table 6.7: Determinants of the Thai Premium (1 Jan 1999-30 Jun 2005) 
 C RK  L MV Adj. R2 
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 Full Sample 
(1) 0.0745 0.0638   0.0876 
 (0.2024) (0.0000)***    
(2) 0.0218  0.4401  0.0595 
 (0.7673)  (0.0185)**   
(3) 0.18404   -1.71E-06 0.0002 
 (0.0200)**   (0.0691)*  
(4) -0.0213 0.0690 0.4353 -2.24E-06 0.2056 
 (0.7890) (0.0000)*** (0.0185)** (0.0157)**  
 Positive Premium 
(1) 0.3279 0.0522   0.0952 
 (0.0004)*** (0.0000)***    
(2) 0.4244  0.0380  -0.0393 
 (0.0041)***  (0.8726)   
(3) 0.4965   -2.77E-06 0.0047 
 (0.0001)***   (0.0113)**  
(4) 0.3476 0.0523 0.0783 -2.72E-06 0.0911 
 (0.0165)** (0.0000)*** (0.7419) (0.0126)**  
 Negative Premium 
(1) -0.1318 0.0061   -0.0426 
 (0.0475)** (0.9189)    
(2) -0.1500  0.1049  -0.0062 
 (0.0011)***  (0.3957)   
(3) -0.1543   1.52E-07 -0.0387 
 (0.0029)***   (0.7824)  
(4) -0.1541 0.0151 0.13159 -4.76E-07 -0.0718 
 (0.0532)* (0.7989) (0.3023) (0.1685)  
Notes: The demand factor is excused from the analysis since the updated data is not available. Values in the 
parentheses are probability values. ‘*’ indicates signif icant at the 10% level; ‘**’ indicates signif icant at the 5% 
level; and ‘***’ indicates signif icant at the 1% level. 
 
In the full sample, the differential risks, liquidities and asymmetric information factors 
are all found statistically significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation of the 
premium. However, same as in the Chinese market, the liquidity factor also 
contributes positively to the premium. In the positive premium sub-sample, only the 
risk factor and the information asymmetry factor appear statistically significant at the 
5% level, and the explanatory pow er is relatively low. In the negative premium sub-
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sample, it is suggested some other factor(s) should be responsible for the premium 
since none of the prevailing determinate factor is suggested to be statistically 
significant at any conventional level in explaining the premium. 
Comparing the Chinese and Thai premia, bot h of them can be explained by the 
relative liquidity of the foreign class shares to some extent, however the results 
suggest puzzling evidence that foreign investors in both markets would like to pay 
relatively more for illiquid stocks. In addition, there is no evidence to support that the 
Chinese lower foreign class shares price and the Thai lower foreign class shares price 
can be explained by same factors.  
6.6 Why is China Unique? 
6.6.1 Diversification Effect  
It is widely documented in the literature that diversification across countries has an 
incremental value for one country’s investors, because they can diversify some of 
their home country’s systematic risk and thus can earn a superior risk-adjusted 
performance (see, e.g., Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; and Lessard, 1973). 
Therefore, investors are willing to offer a premium for the constrained ownership of 
securities abroad because the exclusion of foreign securities from their portfolio will 
result in a diversification loss. I propose foreign investors in both Singapore and Thai 
markets are willing to offer a premium because the absence of such investment would 
cause them a diversification loss; while the discount foreign investors enjoy in the 
Chinese market is a reflection that the Chinese B-shares do not provide such 
diversification benefit. For international diversification to be successful, it is 
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important that the returns of individual stock market exhibit a certain degree of 
independence.  
Table 6.8 presents the correlation between the returns of the foreign class shares in the 
three sample countries and the returns of the worldwide marke ts measured by the 
MSCI World, S&P 500, FTSE 100, Hang Seng and Nikkei 500 Indexes. 
 
Table 6.8: Correlations of the Foreign Class Shares’ Returns  
and Worldwide Indexes’ Returns  
 
 MSCI S&P 500 FTSE 100 HANG SENG NIKKEI 500 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997 
China 0.0465  0.0139  -0.0053  0.0257  0.0839  
Singapore 0.0495  0.0274  0.1004  0.1192  0.0131  
Thailand 0.0394  0.0001  0.0588  0.0498  0.0050  
 Panel B: 1 Jan 1999-30 Jun 2005 
China 0.0179  0.0127  -0.0041  0.1255  0.0539  
Thailand (full sample) 0.0381  0.0284  0.0086  0.0352  0.0542  
Thailand (positive premium) -0.0694  -0.0552  -0.0052  -0.0925  -0.1260  
Thailand (negative premium) 0.0688  0.0342  0.0872  0.0447  0.0223  
 
In the first sample period, when measured by the MSCI and S&P 500 indexes, the 
Singapore foreign class shares are suggested most linked with the world market, and 
the Thai Alien Board shares are least linked. The conjecture that the Chinese A-shares 
premium is caused by the Chinese foreign class shares do not provide diversification 
benefit as the foreign class shares in other countries do, is not supported by this 
evidence. Using the FTSE 100 index as a proxy, the Chinese B-shares are seem to be 
negatively correlated with the worldwide market, and should provide more valuable 
diversification benefit than the foreign class shares in Singapore and Thailand, which 
are suggested to be positively correlated with the worldwide market. A negative return 
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from the UK’s market can be compensated for by the pos itive return from the Chinese 
market. Among the three sample countries, the Chinese market is least correlated with 
the Hang Seng index, and this observation also suggests that the Chinese B-shares 
provide more diversification value than the Singapore and Thai foreign class shares. 
When the Nikkei 500 index is used to measure the worldwide market, the hypothesis 
that the Chinese B-shares do not provide as much diversification benefit as the foreign 
class shares in the other two markets is supported, as the Chinese B-shares is least 
correlated with the Nikkei 500 index. 
In the second sub-period, except Hang Seng index, all other examined indexes have 
less correlation with the Chinese B-shares, suggesting China provides a better 
diversification option than Thailand. Suggested in Table 6.2, 20% of the Thai 
premium is positive in the second sub-period, which means same as the Chinese B-
shares, the Thai Alien Board shares are also priced lower than their counterparts. If 
the diversification effect is truly the reason why China is different, then we should 
observe some similarity between the Chinese B-shares and the Thai Alien Board 
shares. However, the finding is not supportive.  
Another measurement of the diversification value is the beta from the classic Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), which measures the 
sens itivity of the foreign shares indexes in the sample countries to the worldwide 
market.  
 ( )it ft i mt ft itr r c r rβ ε− = + − +                                                                                   (6.5) 
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where rit is the foreign class shares’ returns in the ith country on day t; rmt is the 
market returns, measured by different benchmark indexes’ returns, on day t; rft is the 
corresponding risk-free rate on day t; c is a constant; and εit is a white disturbance. 
When MSCI and S&P 500 indexes are used as worldwide market benchmarks, returns 
of 3-month U. S. treasure bills are used as the risk-free rate; when the market returns 
are proxied by the returns of FTSE 100, Nikkei 500 and Hang Seng indexes, returns 
on 3-month U. K. treasure bills, Japan’s basic discount and loan rate, and Hong Kong 
3-month interbank interest rate are used respectively to proxy the risk-free rates. 
Estimated by OLS, beta values are reported in the following Table 6.9.  
 
Table 6. 9: Beta Measures of the Foreign Class Shares with Respect to Worldwide Indexes 
 
 MSCI S&P 500 FTSE 100 Nikkei 500 Hang Seng 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997 
China 1.0006 1.0010 1.0007 0.9973 1.0001 
Singapore 1.0013 1.0015 1.0025 0.9992 1.0032 
Thailand 0.9994 0.9996 1.0006 0.9989 1.0015 
 Panel B: 1 Jan 1999-30 Jun 2005 
China 0.9992 0.9992 0.9987 0.9933 0.9993 
Thailand 1.0003 1.0003 1.0000 1.0030 1.0004 
 
Between January 1994 and June 1997, proxied by the MSCI index, worldwide stock 
market movements account for about 100.06% percent of the fluctuations in the 
Chinese B-shares returns, 100.13% percent of fluctuations in the Singapore foreign 
counter shares returns, and 99.94% percent of fluctuations in the Thai Alien Board 
shares returns. It suggests that the Thai Alien Board shares provide a relatively higher 
diversification value, and the Singapore foreign counter shares provide the least. Same 
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findings also can be observed when the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 indexes are employed 
to proxy the worldwide market. When the worldwide market is proxied by the Nikkei 
500 and Hang Seng indexes, the Chinese B-shares suggest highest diversification 
value among the foreign class shares in the three sample countries. In the second 
sample period, between the Chinese and Thai foreign class shares, the Chinese foreign 
shares always suggest higher independence to the worldwide market, and so higher 
diversification value to overseas investors, whichever benchmark is used.  
Both the correlation and beta measures approaches suggest we cannot attribute the 
opposite Chinese foreign class shares price premium to they do not provide enough 
diversification value to overseas investors.  
6.6.2 Heavy Demand of Chinese A-Shares 
The model of Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) shows that the foreign demand curve for 
local equities may not be perfectly elastic, as assumed in traditional financial theories. 
There is an increasing body of evidence to support the existence of a downward 
slopping demand curve for equity shares. Their model suggests that if the demand for 
shares from domestic investors is more price elastic than the demand from foreign 
investors, the shares available to the foreign investors will trade at a premium relative 
to the shares available to the domestic investors. Based on their argument, I 
hypothesize that the discount in the Chinese foreign class shares is caused by the 
opposite situation in China: the demand for shares from domestic investors is less 
price elastic than the demand from foreign investors. Now the question is how to 
measure the demand elasticities. Bailey (1994 ) suggests that the lack of alternatives to 
low-yielding bank accounts drives much of domestic Chinese savings into stock 
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investments and pushes prices beyond what foreigners are willing to pay. Bailey et al.  
(1999) mentioned that “Chinese demand for any available investment vehicle is even 
greater than the foreign demand to invest in China” might be the reason that Chinese 
prohibits such a unique phenomenon. However, they did not go any further because of 
the availability of suitable data. In the industrial aspect, Jing Ulrich, the managing 
director and chairman of the JPMorgan's China equities and commodities business, 
once expressed her opinion of the puzzle in an interview with Financial Times that it 
is the heavy demand and limited supp ly of the A-shares cause the unique Chinese 
premium7
 
. As I mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, bank saving is the main alternative to 
stock investment, I expect the Chinese premium is cointegrated with the inverse of the 
real savings rate, which might partially proxy for the domestic Chinese demand for 
equities. The real savings rate is measured by the difference between Chinese 6-month 
demand deposit rate and inflation rate. Lack of accurate economic relationship 
between the premium and interest rate, the cointegration test is a simple way to 
provide this insight.  
Table 6.10: Cointegration Test of Inverse of Chinese Real Savings Rate  
with A-Shares Premium 
 
 Trace Stat  Max-Eigen Stat 
r=0 9.2283 7.6738 
 (0.3447) (0.4128) 
r<=1 1.5544 1.5544 
 (0.2125) (0.2125) 
Note: Values in the parentheses are the MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) probability values. 
Quarterly observations are obtained from Datastream. The test period is from Q1 1994 to Q2 2005. 
                                                 
7 http://www.ftchinese.com/videosection.php 
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However, the hypothesized potential reason is not supported by the data. Table 6.9 
presents the cointegration test result which suggests there does not exist any long-run 
equilibrium relationship be tween the premium and Chinese real savings rate.  
6.6.3 Differential Liquidity 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggested that relatively illiquid stocks have a higher 
expected return and are thus priced lower to compensate investors for increased 
trading costs. Empirical evidence suggests that restricted assets, or assets showing 
illiquidity characteristics, are often valued at a large discount to comparable freely-
traded assets. Bailey (1994) found that foreign investors in the Thai market offer 
relatively high prices for the relatively liquid Alien Board listed shares, with the result 
that those companies exhibit a relatively higher Alien Board price premium. I will 
examine whether the oppos ite price premium in the Chinese stock market is caused by 
the relative illiquidity of the B-shares. The following Table 6.10 shows the summary 
statistics of the relative foreign shares liquidity in the sample countries. In the first 
sub-period, as the smallest value appears in the Chinese market, there is supportive 
evidence that the oppos ite premium in China is caused by the illiquidity of the foreign 
shares. In the second sub-period, the Thai Alien Board shares are relatively more 
illiquid than the Chinese B-shares, however, foreign investors in the Thai market still 
would like to pay a premium for them. Besides, the positive premium group of 
Thailand actually is related with higher average relative liquidity value.  
 
 -195- 
Table 6.11: Summary Statistics of Foreign Class Shares’ Relative Liquidity 
 Panel A: 3 Jan 1994-30 Jun 1997 
 China Singapore Thailand  
 Mean 0.3445  0.6688  0.3873   
 Median 0.3041  0.7104  0.3569   
 Maximum 0.7994  0.9079  0.9855   
 Minimum 0.0607  0.3974  0.0206   
 Std. Dev. 0.1563  0.1848  0.2624   
 Panel B: 1 Jan 1999-30 Jun 2005 
 China Thailand  (full sample) 
Thailand  
(positive premium) 
Thailand  
(negative premium) 
 Mean 0.4729  0.3317  0.4384  0.2166 
 Median 0.5038  0.2742  0.3209  0.1230 
 Maximum 0.8210  0.9688  0.9688  0.5032 
 Minimum 0.1151  0.0006  0.0087  0.0006 
 Std. Dev. 0.1798  0.2853  0.3200  0.1880 
 
6.6.4 Information Asymmetry 
Chakravarty et al. (1998) extended the asset-pricing model based on Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) to incorporate asymmetric information and market segmentation in a 
noisy rational expectations framework. Their model predicts that whether cross- listing 
leads to a premium or a discount in trading of the foreign class shares depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the information asymmetry effect and the diversification effect. 
The former effect leads to discounts for the B-shares, while the latter effect implies a 
premium for the B-shares. Their theoretical argument provides a possible explanation 
to the puzzle and to why foreign shares trade at such large discounts in China but at 
premia in other markets: when there is no asymmetric information, their model 
predicts a premium for foreign shares, as in previous mode ls of market segmentation; 
with severe asymmetric information, however, the B-shares may trade at a discount 
relative to the A-shares. Following their proposition, I will examine whether the 
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reason for China’s oppo site premium is that there is no asymmetric information in 
other countries; while in China, foreign investors are less informed.  
Although the causality tests in Chapter 5 using time-series data does not support the 
information asymmetry before 2001, the panel causality test suggests local Chinese 
investors are better informed than their foreign counterparts. Chakravarty et al. (1998) 
argue that foreign investors find it more difficult to acquire and assess information 
about local Chinese firms, relative to domestic investors. These difficulties are due to 
language barriers, different accounting standards, and lack of reliable information 
about the local economy and firms. Many listed B-shares firms do not fully and 
promptly disclose all material changes in their business conditions, and published 
statements are not always prepared according to international accounting standards. 
While these problems face all investors, they are worse for foreign investors since 
local investors may be able to have access to informal local information sources that 
are unavailable to nonresident investors.  
I tested the information asymmetry status between local and foreign investors in 
Singapore and Thailand between 3 January 1994 and 30 June 1997, using Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) causality test introduced in Chapter 5. The results are reported in 
Table 6.12. It is suggested, same as the Chinese situation, the local Singapore 
investors are also better informed about domestic equities than foreign investors. 
However, they still would like to offer a premium over the local class shares. It seems 
the information asymmetry hypothesis cannot well explain the puzzle either. 
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Table 6. 12: Information Asymmetry Between Local and Foreign Investors  in Singapore and 
Thailand (3 Jan 1994-30 June 1997) 
 Singapore Thailand 
 lag chi-sq Prob. lag chi-sq Prob. 
Foreign class shares return does not 
Granger Cause local shares return 6+1 5.8961 0.4349 8+1 17.9344 0.0217** 
Local class shares return does not Granger 
Cause foreign shares return  13.6662 0.0336**  6.9648 0.5404 
Note: ‘**’ indicates signif icant at the 5% level. 
 
6.7 Summary and Discussion 
Although the unique opposite premium of China has been mentioned a lot, no work so 
far has provided a completely satisfactory explanation. This chapter firstly compared 
and contrasted the institutional settings of China, Singapore and Thailand, which all 
have separate listing system, and secondly examined whether the cross-sectional 
deviations in the premium/ discount of the foreign class shares in the sample countries 
can be explained by same factor(s). Thirdly, four potential reasons for the opposite 
Chinese premium are proposed and examined, and preliminary evidence is provided. 
The results suggest the dual- listed shares price premia in China, Singapore and 
Thailand cannot be explained by same factors. Cross-sectional deviations in the 
Chinese A-shares premium can mainly be explained by the differential demand of the 
B-shares before June 1997 and by the differential liquidity of the B-shares after June 
1997; while in the other two countries, Singapore and Thailand, a common significant 
dr iven factor is the differential risk between local and foreign investors. The results 
from the further examina tion of the four potential reasons, i.e. the Chinese B-shares 
do not provide attractive diversification value to foreign investors; the price of the 
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Chinese A-shares is pushed up by their heavy demand from Chinese local investors; 
Chinese B-shares are relatively illiquid; foreign investors in the Chinese stock market 
face severe information asymmetry, for the opposite Chinese premium suggest none 
of them can explain the puzzle. In add ition, I found the premium in Thailand is not  
always as negative as documented with earlier data, but sometimes the local Thai 
investors also pay a higher price than their foreign counterparts for identical assets. 
This makes the Chinese lower foreign class shares price not unique anymore. 
However, I did not find the lower foreign class shares prices in China and Thailand 
are caused by same forces.  
The literature in segmented markets besides China is extremely limited, especially in 
recent years when the marke t segmentation policies were abolished in most of the 
countries as a result of market liberalization. This chapter, with more up-to-date data, 
is the first cross-country research after Bailey et al. (1999). The research of this 
chapter faced a lot of difficulties, such as there are only a few countries that continue 
to retain the dual- listing system; there is not enough essential literature on sample 
countries; data quality is poor in some countries, e.g., Mexico, due to liquidity reasons 
and the already limited sample of countries with dual- listed stocks has to be further 
reduced; updated datasets are not fully available, e.g., the differential demand factor 
in Thailand. Nevertheless, this chapter took a first step forward in trying to 
considering the Chinese puzzle. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The topic of the Chinese A-shares premium puzzle has remained unresolved for over 
a decade since it was raised by Bailey in 1994. Major research efforts across many 
disciplines, including economics, financial economics, finance, behavioural finance, 
corporate finance and management, have looked into the premium puzzle. All these 
works have mainly tried to uncover an explanation for two aspects of the puzzle: the 
factor s that caused the premium, and the segmentation/ integration of the Chinese 
stock markets. Although many efforts have been put into revealing the puzzle, there is 
so far still no leading paper or clear answer to it, but rather, all the works involved 
contribute their own parts to the prob lem. This thesis has not attempted completely to 
resolve the puzzle, but has revisited it from new perspectives, in an attempt to provide 
a more up-to-date and insightful picture.  
Compared with the A-shares market, the Chinese B-shares market has suffered from 
thin transactions and poor liquidity, which in turn seriously affects investors’ 
enthusiasm in investing in the B-shares. The B-shares market has been increasingly 
marginalized as many overseas investors have fled it, especially after domestic 
investors entered the market in 2001. Many practitioners have claimed the B-shares 
market has lost its basic function as a capital allocator and should be abolished at 
some time point. As China has made public regulations that allow overseas strategic 
investors to buy shares on the A-shares marke t, there are probably fewer reasons now 
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for the B-shares market to remain. The eventual cessation of the B-shares has been put 
on the agenda. Mr. Qibin Ren, the Head of Research Center of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, confirmed that the CSRC has been discussing possible 
solutions, with the options of keeping the development of the B-shares market and 
making it the place for foreign firms listing stocks in China, or abolishing the market 
by either repurchasing the B-shares or merging it with the A-shares market or even 
the H-shares market.  Whatever solut ions are adop ted eventually, it is necessary to get 
a clearer and more updated understanding of the nature of the Chinese segmented 
markets and pricing features therein. This thesis has tried to look at a puzzle that 
today is important and shed light on the puzzle in three separate but related 
investigations. 
7.1 Main Findings of the Thesis 
The organization of this thesis had been based on attempts to answer the three sets of 
research questions which were posed in Chapter 1. Thus, the key findings  are 
presented in the form of answers to these research questions.  
Question 1: Why there is large variation in the premium across firms? Are local 
Chinese investors really liquidity driven and care less about intrinsic value? Is the 
QFII programme successful in importing value investing preference to the local 
market? 
The findings in Chapter 4 indicate that the local Chinese investors and foreign 
investors do have different valuation preferences over certain firm fundamentals. 
Before 2001 when the Chinese individual investors were allowed to participate in the 
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B-shares market, the foreign investors value firms which are more efficient in 
generating profit from shareholders’ equities and firms which would like to return 
profit to shareholders. Unlike what has generally been believed in terms of local 
investors being shor t-run speculators, I found evidence that they do value firms’ 
future performance. The relationship between such fundamentals and the pr ice 
premium disappeared after the reform of 2001, indicating the preference difference 
diminished as the two markets became integrated. This could be the result of local and 
foreign investors ‘learning’ from their counterparts. However, the influence of the 
floating factor exists through the entire sample period, from 1994 to 2004. Foreign 
investors would like to pay more for firms with fewer shares kept in government’s 
hands. The consistent decreasing coefficient of the floating ratio in the Shanghai 
market suggests the deregulations were effective; however in the Shenzhen market, 
the QFII programme may not has been so successful.  
The decline of the premium around the 2001 open market reform is found to be 
concentrated in firms with lower financial risk,  suggesting local investors prefer firms 
with such a feature. Besides, a larger decline is also found to be associated with a 
lower return on equity and floa ting ratio for the Shenzhen- listed firms. Decline in the 
premium around the launch of the QFII programme is suggested to be concentrated in 
Shanghai- listed firms with lower financial risk, higher expected sales growth and 
lower relative liquidity of their A- and B-shares.  
Question 2: Are local Chinese investors really better informed than foreign investors 
as the information asymmetry hypothesis about the determinants of the price premium 
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argues? Has the linkage between the A- and B-shares markets strengthened as 
deregulations, which aim to remove the market segmentation, were introduced? 
The information asymmetry hypothesis of the Chinese A-shares premium is based on 
the foundation that Chinese local investors are better informed than foreign investor, 
thus foreign investors would only like to offer a lower price considering their 
information disadvantage about local assets. However, the argument that local 
Chinese investors are better informed than foreign investors about local assets itself is 
worthy of careful examination. The extensive previous literature has generated 
different results. I raised this question again by using a more appropriate and up-to-
date dataset, which includes only firms with dual- listed shares instead of commonly 
used official price index which includes all firms, and more appropriate econometric 
techniques, including the Toda-Yamamoto causality test, and a panel data approach.  
Pure time-series analyses suggest the Chinese stock markets are perfectly segmented 
under strict segmentation restrictions, and there is no information flow suggested 
between local and foreign investors. Since the restriction was partially removed, the 
two markets became more linked and an information flow between local and foreign 
investors was found: foreign investors in the Shanghai market were found to be have 
an information advantage over their foreign counterpart, as suggested by both a 
traditional Granger causality test and the Toda-Yamamoto type causality test; in the 
Shenzhen market, a traditional Granger causality test indicates there is double way 
feedback between local and foreign investors, while the Toda-Yamamoto causality 
test suggests the information flow is one way: from local investors to foreign investors. 
My study also covered data after the QFII programme introduced, and thus provided 
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evidence of how effective the programme was in removing segmentation between 
Chinese A- and B-shares markets. However the finding is surprising, as it suggests no 
information flow between the A- and B-shares investors at all in the Shenzhen market 
by either methodology; in the Shanghai market, foreign investors are found still to 
take the leading position. Following the above findings, it seems the founda tion of the 
information asymmetry argument does not even exist.  
More advanced and more powerful panel data analyses, which take into account of 
information in both time-series and cross-sectional dimensions, suggest the linkage 
between the A- and B-shares does strengthen after the QFII programme was 
introduced. The panel causality test confirms local investors are better informed than 
foreign investors before 2001, which is supportive of the information asymmetry 
hypothesis. After 2001, information is found to flow bi-directionally. Since the A-
shares premium, although it has continued to diminish, still persists after 
deregulations, and no certain group of investors are found significantly to have 
superior information, there may be other factors that cause the premium.  
Question 3: Why China is unique in foreign investors enjoying a price discount rather 
than the commonly observed premium in other segmented markets with similar 
market settings?  
This question has been mentioned a lot in earlier studies but has never been resolved 
satisfactorily so far. Facing a lot of empirical difficulties, e.g. limited literature, 
available sample countries and good quality data, I tried to provide some preliminary 
evidence to the puzzle by comparing China and Singapore and Thailand. This is the 
first cross-country comparison after Bailey et al. (1999). A surprising finding is that 
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the opposite Chinese premium should not be considered ‘unique’ as documented for 
decade, but the premium in Thailand is also positive sometimes, i.e., foreign investors 
pay less than local investors for identical assets, especially during 2001 and 2003. I 
did not find the positive premium in China and in Thailand is caused by same 
proposed factors. Among the four prevailing factors, i.e., differential risks, differential 
demands, differential liquidities and asymmetric infor mation, the demand factor and 
liquidity factor are found to be attributable to the cross-sectional deviation of the 
premium in China, while risk and asymmetric information factors are found 
significant in Thailand, before June 1997 and after 1999 respectively. As for  the 
reason of the oppos ite premium in China, I tried to trace the source from four aspects, 
i.e. the Chinese B-shares do not provide enough diversification value to attract 
investors from overseas, heavy demand of the A-shares from Chinese local investors; 
the Chinese B-shares are relatively illiquid, and foreign investors in the Chinese 
market are information disadvantaged, however none of these is found to be supported 
by the data.   
7.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
As mentioned in the former section, the research has not been set out to attempt to be 
the definitive work on the topic of Chinese stock market segmentation and the A-
shares premium, but rather to provide a more multi-angled insight. It is constrained by 
the following limitations and future research could be done to complete them: 
(i) In order to take account of possible effects the policy changes on the premium, I 
split the sample into sub-samples based on the date when the policies went into 
 -205- 
effect, however, no for mal econometric techniques regarding structural break were 
involved. Literature in structural breaks of panel data is still limited and there is 
not a widely accepted, established panel data structural breaks test so far. Further 
research could therefore be done in this area when a proper econometric treatment 
becomes available.  
(ii) Due to the change of the Chinese exchange rate regime in July 2005, the dataset 
used in the research only covers two years after the QFII programme was 
introduced. Especially in Chapter 4 when annual data is used, the number of the 
observations is relatively limited. Since the Chinese B-shares are traded in foreign 
currency, the premium after July 2005 incorporates the fluctuation in the exchange 
rate. Further research could be done in taking into account of the influence of the 
exchange rate changes.  
(iii)Although the Chinese A-shares premium has been decreasing, it still exists. The 
2001 deregulation, which removed the restrictions of local Chinese individuals in 
investing in the B-shares market, made the premium drop dramatically. This might 
suggest the premium is largely caused by the segmented market structure. When 
foreign institutional investors are allowed to trade the A-shares through the QFII 
programme, the segmentation is further removed. According to the result in 
Chapter 4, that local and foreign investors do have their own investment valuation 
preference, the premium would continue to persist even if ‘hard’ segmentation due 
to policy restrictions imposed by the government is removed, as it would be 
affected by the ‘soft’ segmentation caused by differential valuation preference. 
Further research could be done to confirm whether the ‘soft’ segmentation indeed 
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exists. In add ition, the valuation preference of different investors groups suggested 
in Chapter 4 is not stable, and further research could also be done to verify 
whether the preferences do indeed vary through time.  
(iv) The cross-country comparison conducted in Chapter 6 has some limitations, 
including the market segmentation and dual- listing system had be abolished in lots 
of countries when the new Chinese stock markets founded; literature and 
especially recent literature in such countries is extremely limited; sample countries 
are restricted due to data availability and quality. More accurate research could be 
undertaken in the future when necessary source and material is available. For 
example, the empirical results suggest the local class shares premium in China and 
the foreign class shares premium in other countries cannot be well explained by 
the same set of factors, suggesting there are other factors that contribute to these 
premia. The differential valuation preferences hypothesis could be a promising 
first hypo thesis here when necessary firm fundamentals data in other countries are 
available.   
(v) Although there is no fundamental difference between the Shanghai market and the 
Shenzhen marke t, and the two markets were subject to same regulations, I found 
the premia of firms listed in the two markets have certain different features, and I 
treated the two markets separately in my examinations.  It would also worthy to 
carry out investigations in the future to find out where the differences between the 
exchanges come from. 
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Appendix A: 
Notice on Issues related to Individual Domestic Residents Investing in Foreign 
Currency Stocks Listed on the Domestic Stock Markets (B-Shares Market) 
No. 22[2001] CSRC 
This notice is addressed to the following institutions: all the Securities Regulatory Offices, Sub-Offices, 
Representative Offices; all the branches, Beijing and Chongqing Departments of State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (“SAFE”); Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; all the commercial banks, securities companies 
and investment trust companies concerned. 
To facilitate the sound development of foreign currency stocks listed on the domestic stock markets (“B shares”), 
maintain the stability of both the B share and foreign exchange markets, protect investors’ rights, and regulate the 
conduct of all organizations and individuals in the stock market, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(“CSRC”) has made this notice with regard to the following issues: 
1. In accordance with Clause 4 of the Regulations of the State Council on Foreign Currency Stocks Listed on the 
Domestic Stock Market Issued by Limited Companies [the State Council Decree No. 189, 1995] and the Decision 
of CSRC on Domestic Residents May Invest in the B Share Market Issued on February 19, 2001, individual 
domestic residents may, in accordance with this notice, invest in B shares. 
2. Before June 1, 2001, domestic residents who want to invest in the B shares, can only use the foreign currency 
which had been deposited in domestic commercial banks, either in the foreign exchange account or foreign 
currency account, prior to February 19, 2001 (February 19 is inclusive and similarly hereinafter). However, those 
foreign currencies either in cash or transacted from any other sources other than from the foreign currency deposit 
account s as stated above will not be allowed to invest in the B shares. The foreign currency that had been 
deposited before February 19, 2001 in the domestic commercial banks and re-deposited after this date due to the 
expirations can be invested in the B shares. Domestic residents are allowed, after June 1, 2001, to invest in the B 
shares with foreign currencies which are deposited after February 19, 2001 or transferred from abroad to the 
Chinese domestic commercial banks. Foreign currency in cash can still not be used for investment in the B share 
market. 
3. Securities companies and investment trust companies which have been authorized by the CRSC to manage B 
shares business and authorized by SAFE to handle foreign currencies may bring the certificates issued by the 
CSRC for operating the B shares and the licenses authorized by State Bureau of Foreign Exchange Control for 
managing foreign currencies, and set up B share guarantee account s at all the domestic commercial banks and their 
branches which have been authorized to manage foreign currencies in the same city. The branches of the above-
mentioned securities companies and investment trust companies may set up the guarantee accounts for the same 
purpose by providing copies of the abovementioned certificates and licenses issued to their parent companies, on 
which the branches should put their own seals. Only one B share guarantee account is allowed for each securities 
company or investment trust company or their branches (“securities operating institutions”) with one domestic 
commercial bank within the same operating area and under no circumstances should more than one B share 
guarantee account under one securities or investment trust company be allowed to set up in one domestic 
commercial bank  within the same area. Securities operating institutions should, within three working days, submit 
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files to SAFE or its local branches (“Foreign Exchange Bureau”) about the banks holding their guarantee account s 
and release the information about their guarantee accounts to the public via media. 
4. Domestic residents who wish to open B share accounts should follow the procedures below: 
1) Transferring their foreign currencies: 
Individuals may transfer their foreign currencies from their deposit accounts into the B share guarantee account s 
set up by the securities operating institutions. Personal IDs are required for such transactions. For the time being, 
such transactions are restricted to the same banks and the same areas. Domestic commercial banks should provide 
bank statements to individuals for their money being transferred, and should also send the same statement to the 
securities operating institutions for them to verify. 
2) Setting up  B share capital account s with securities operating companies: 
Individuals then may open B share capital accounts with securities operating institutions. Personal IDs and bank 
statement of the transferred foreign currencies are required. The minimum B share account opening balance is 
1,000.00 US dollars or its equivalent. 
3) Setting up B share securities accounts: After setting up the B share capital accounts, individuals may open their 
B share securities account s with securities operating companies. 
5. Domestic commercial banks should strictly obey the rules in this notice and check the dates when domestic 
residents transfer foreign currency from their CD (certified deposit), the foreign currency should be deposited 
before February 19, 2001. When transferring foreign currency from the saving accounts, the amount being 
transferred should not be more than the balance of the accounts as of February 19, 2001. And when making the 
transactions, domestic residents should convert the foreign currency into the same currency as the B share 
guarantee account held by the securities operating institutions. 
6. The inflow to the B share capital accounts for domestic residents should be the foreign currency being 
transferred from foreign exchange accounts or foreign currency accounts, and the profit from B share trading. The 
outflow can only be used to buy B share stocks or transferred back to domestic commercial banks. However, 
foreign currency in B share capital accounts is not allowed to be transferred to foreign countries. All the foreign 
currencies transferred from B share capital accounts to their deposit accounts within domestic commercial banks 
shall be regarded as foreign currency within the country and be subjected to The Temporary Rules on Foreign 
Currency Regulations of Individual Domestic Residents and other rules whichever are applicable. Domestic 
residents shall not withdraw foreign currency cash from their B share capital account s at any  time. 
7. The inflow to the B share accounts for non-residents shall be foreign currency being transferred from abroad, 
foreign currency lawfully deposited with domestic commercial banks and profit from the B share trading. The 
outflow should be the foreign currency being transferred abroad, or being deposited in their legal accounts within 
domestic commercial banks and/or deducted for B share trading. Non-residents shall not withdraw foreign 
currency cash from their B share accounts. 
8. Transference of B shares between domestic residents and non-residents is forbidden. Domestic residents shall 
not put their B share holdings under trusteeship operated outside mainland China. 
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9. All domestic commercial banks which have set up B share guarantee accounts for the securities operating 
institutions are allowed to manage foreign currency payment and settlement associated with B share trading 
between securities operating companies and securities registration and settlement companies. 
10. All securities operating institutions, domestic commercial banks, domestic residents, non-residents shall strictly 
obey the rules laid out within this notice and any other rules and regulations made by the CSRC and the SAFE 
with regard to B share trading, in order to avoid transferring of foreign exchange abroad and illegal trading of 
foreign currencies. Those who are in breach of the rules and regulations shall be penalized by the CSRC and SAFE 
under the rules and regulations applied. 
This notice shall come into force on the date of its public release. Securities operating institutions may open B 
share guarantee accounts with domestic commercial banks from the date of this notice. However, domestic 
residents shall not transfer foreign currency for the purpose of opening B share capital accounts until February 26, 
2001. The Notice on Issues related to Strict Control of Opening B Share Accounts No. 75 (1996) by CSRC and 
The Notice of Clearing up B Share Accounts No. 1 (1996) CSRC shall be annulled at the same time as this notice 
comes into force. 
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Appendix B: 
 Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments of 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) 
China Securities Regulatory Commission 
People's Bank of China 
Decree No. 12  
The "Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII)", which will come into effect from 1 December 2002, is hereby promulgated.  
CSRC Chairman: Zhou Xiaochuan 
PBOC Governor: Dai Xianglong  
 
Chapter 1. General Provisions  
Article 1. Based upon China's relevant laws and administrative regulations, this Regulation was promulgated for 
the purpose of governing Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors' investments in China's securities market and 
promoting developments of China's securities market.  
Article 2. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (hereinafter referred to as "QFII" which can be a single or a 
plural, as the case may be) are defined in this Regulation as overseas fund management institutions, insurance 
companies, securities companies and other assets management institutions which have been approved by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as "CSRC") to invest in China's securities market and 
granted investment quota by State Administration of Foreign Exchange (hereinafter referred to as "SAFE").  
Article 3. QFII should mandate domestic commercial banks as custodians and domestic securities companies as 
brokers for their domestic securities trading.  
Article 4. QFII should comply with laws, regulations and other relevant rules in China.  
Article 5. CSRC and SAFE shall, in accordance with the laws, supervise and govern the securities investing 
activities undertaken by QFII within the jurisdiction of China.  
Chapter 2. Qualifications, Criteria and Approval Procedures  
Article 6. A QFII applicant should fall within the following criteria:  
(1) The applicant should be in sound financial and credit status, should meet the requirements set by CSRC on 
assets size and other factors; and its risk control indicators should meet the requirements set by laws and securities 
authorities under its home jurisdiction;  
(2) Employees of the applicant should meet the requirements on professional qualifications set by its home 
country/region;  
(3) The applicant should have sound management structure and internal control system, should conduct business in 
accordance with the relevant regulations and should not have received any substantial penalties by regulators in its 
home country/region over the last three years prior to application;  
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(4) The home country/region of the applicant should have sound legal and regulatory system, and its securities 
regulator has signed Memorandum of Understanding with CSRC and has maintained an efficient regulatory and 
co-operative relationship;  
(5) Other criteria as stipulated by CSRC based on prudent regulatory principles.  
Article 7. The criteria of assets scale and other factors as referred to in the aforesaid article are:  
For fund management institutions: Having operated fund business for over 5 years with the most recent accounting 
year managing assets of not less than US$10 billion;  
For insurance companies: Having operated insurance business for over 30 years with paid-in capital of not less 
than US$1 billion and managing securities assets of not less than US$10 billion in the most recent account ing year;  
For securities companies: Having operated securities  business for over 30 years with paid-in capital of  not  less 
than US$1 billion and managing securities assets of not less than US$10 billion in the most recent accounting year;  
For commercial banks: Ranking among the top 100 of the world in the total assets for the most recent accounting 
year and managing securities assets of not less than US$10 billion.  
CSRC may adjust the aforesaid requirements subject to the developments of securities market.  
Article 8. To apply for QFII qualification and investment quota, an applicant should submit the following 
documents to CSRC and SAFE respectively through its custodian:  
(1) Application Forms (including basic information on the applicant, investment quota applied for and investment 
plan, etc.); 
(2) Documents to verify that the applicant meets requirements set in Article 6; 
(3) Draft Custody Agreement signed with its expected custodian; 
(4) Audited financial reports for the most recent 3 years; 
(5) Statement on sources of the funds, and Letter of Undertaking promising not to withdraw funds during the 
approved period; 
(6) Letter of authorisation by the applicant; 
(7) Other documents as required by CSRC and SAFE.  
All the aforesaid documents, if written in languages other than Chinese, must be accompanied by their Chinese 
translations or Chinese extracts.  
Article 9. The CSRC shall, within 15 working days from the date the full set of application documents are received, 
determine whether to grant approval or not. Securities Investment Licences will be issued to those applicants 
whose applications have been approved whereas written notices will be given to those applicants whose 
applications have been rejected.  
Article 10. Applicants shall apply to the SAFE through their custodians for investment quotas after obtaining the 
Secur ities Investment Licences.  
SAFE shall,  within 15 working days from the date full set of application documents are received, determine 
whether to grant approval or not. Applicants whose applications have been approved will be notified in writing 
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their permitted investment quotas and Foreign Exchange Registration Certificates will be issued. Written notices 
will be given to those applicants whose applications have been rejected.  
The Securities Investment Licence will automatically become void if an applicant is unable to obtain the Foreign 
Exchange Registration Certificate within one year after the Secur ities Investment Licence is granted.  
Article 11. In order to encourage medium and long-term investments, preference will be given to the institutions 
managing closed-end Chinese funds subject to the requirements of Article 6 or pension funds, insurance funds and 
mutual funds with good investment records in other markets.  
Chapter 3. Custody, Registration and Settlement  
Article 12. A custodian should meet the following requirements:  
(1) Has a specific fund custody department;  
(2) With paid-in capital of no less than RMB 8 billion;  
(3) Has sufficient professionals who are familiar with custody business; 
(4) Can manage the entire assets of the fund safely; 
(5) Has qualifications to conduct foreign exchange and RMB business; 
(6) No material breach of foreign exchange regulations for the recent three years.  
Domestic branches of foreign-invested commercial banks with more than three years of continual operation are 
eligible to apply for the custodian qualification. Their paid-in capital eligibility shall be based on their overseas 
headquarters' capital.  
Article 13. Approvals from CSRC, People's Bank of China (hereinafter referred to as "PBOC") and SAFE are 
required for custodian status.  
Article 14. Domestic commercial banks should submit the following documents to CSRC, PBOC and SAFE to 
apply for custodian status:  
(1) Application Forms; 
(2) Copy of its financial business licence; 
(3) Management system in relation to its custody business; 
(4) Documents verifying that it has efficient information and technology system; 
(5) Other documents as required by CSRC, PBOC and SAFE.  
CSRC, together with PBOC and SAFE, will review application documents and decide whether to approve the 
applications or not.  
Article 15. A custodian shall perform the following duties: 
(1) Safekeeping all the assets that QFII put under its custody; 
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(2) Conducting all QFII related foreign exchange settlement, sales, receipt, payment and RMB settlement 
businesses; 
(3) Supervising investment activities of QFII, and reporting to CSRC and SAFE in case QFII investment orders are 
found to have violated laws or regulations; 
(4) Reporting to SAFE about foreign exchange remittance and repatriation of QFII, in two working days after QFII 
remits/repatriates its principal/proceeds ; 
(5) Reporting to CSRC and SAFE about the status of QFII's RMB special account, in five working days after the 
end of each month; 
(6) Compiling an annual financial report on QFII's domestic securities investment activities in the previous year 
and sending it to CSRC and SAFE in three months after the end of each accounting year; 
(7) Keep the records and other related materials on QFII's fund remittance, repatriation, conversion, receipt and 
payment for no less than 15 years; 
(8) Other responsibilities as defined by CSRC, PBOC and SAFE based on prudent supervision principles.  
Article 16. A custodian should strictly separate its own assets from those under its custody.  
A custodian should set up different accounts for different QFII, and manage those accounts separately.  
Each QFII can only mandate one custodian.  
Article 17. QFII should mandate its custodian to apply for a securities account on its behalf with securities 
registration and settlement institution. When applying for a securities account on behalf of the QFII, a custodian 
should bring the QFII' mandate and its Securities Investment Licence and other valid documents, and file with 
CSRC the relevant situation within five working days after opening a securities account.  
QFII should mandate its custodian to open a RMB settlement account on its behalf with securities registration and 
settlement institution. The custodian shall be responsible for the settlement of QFII's domestic securities 
investment, and shall file with CSRC and SAFE the relevant situation within five working days after opening a 
RMB settlement account.  
   
Chapter 4 Investment Operations  
Article 18. Subject to the approved investment quota, QFII can invest on the following RMB financial instruments:  
(1) Shares listed in China's stock exchanges (excluding B shares); 
(2) Treasuries listed in China's stock exchanges; 
(3) Convertible bonds and enterprise bonds listed in China's stock exchanges; 
(4) Other financial instruments as approved by CSRC.  
Article 19. QFII may mandate domestically registered securities companies to manage their domestic securities 
investments.  
Each QFII can only mandate one investment institution.  
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Article 20. For domestic securities investments, QFII should observe the following requirements:  
(1) Shares held by each QFII in one listed company should not exceed 10% of total outstanding shares of the 
company; 
(2) Total shares held by all QFII in one listed company should not exceed 20% of total outstanding shares of the 
company.  
CSRC may adjust the above percentages based on the developments of securities market.  
Article 21. QFII's domestic securities investment activities should comply with the requirements as set out in the 
Guidance for Foreign Investments in Various Industries.  
Article 22. Securities firms should preserve the trading and transaction records of QFII for at least 15 years.  
Chapter 5 Fund Management  
Article 23. Upon the approval of SAFE, a QFII should open a RMB special account with its custodian.  
Within five working days after the opening of the RMB special account, the custodian should report to CSRC and 
SAFE for filing.  
Article 24. Revenue articles in the RMB special account shall include: settlement of funds (foreign exchange funds 
from overseas, and accumulated settlement of foreign exchange should not exceed the approved investment quota), 
proceeds from the disposal of securities, cash dividends, interests from current deposits and bonds. Expense 
articles in the RMB special account shall include: cost of purchasing securities (including stamp tax and 
commission charges), domestic custodian fee and management fee, and payment for purchasing foreign exchange 
(to be used to repatriate principals and proceeds).  
The capital of special RMB account shall not be used for money lending or guarantee.  
Article 25. Within three months after receiving Securities Investment Licence from CSRC, QFII should remit 
principals from outside into China and directly transfer them into RMB special accounts after full settlement of 
foreign exchange. The currency of the principals from QFII should be exchangeable currency approved by SAFE 
and the amount of the principal should not exceed the approved quota.  
If QFII has not fully remitted the principals within three months after receiving Foreign Exchange Registration 
Certificate, the actual amount remitted will be deemed as the approved quota; thereafter the difference between 
approved quota and the actual amount shall not be remitted inward prior to the obtaining of a newly approved 
investment quota.  
Article 26. In the case that a QFII is a closed-end Chinese fund management company, it can mandate its custodian, 
with the submission of required documents to SAFE to apply for purchase of foreign exchange for the repatriation 
of principals by stages and by batches three years after its remittance of the principals. The amount of each batch 
of principal repatriation should not exceed 20% of the total principals, and the interval between two repatriations 
should not be shorter than one month.  
Other types of QFII can mandate their custodians, with the submission of required documents, to apply to SAFE to 
repatriate the principals by stages and by batches one years after their remittance of the principals. The amount of 
each batch of principal repatriation should not exceed 20% of the total principals, and the interval between two 
repatriations should not be shorter than three months.  
The overseas receivers of the above-mentioned repatriation should be the QFII themselves.  
Article 27. QFII whose principal of approved investment quota is remitted to China for less than one year but over 
three months, after the submission of transfer application form & transfer contract and upon approval of CSRC and 
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SAFE, may transfer the approved investment quota to other QFII or other applicants who have fulfilled the 
requirements of Article 6.  
After getting Securities Investment Licence from CSRC and investment quota from SAFE, the transferee can remit 
the difference as its principals if the value of the transferred assets is lower than the investment quota approved by 
SAFE.  
Article 28. If QFII intends to remit principals inwards again after it partially or fully repatriates its principals, it 
should re-apply for investment quota.  
Article 29. If QFII needs to purchase foreign exchange to repatriate their post-tax profits of the previous 
account ing year which have been audited by Chinese CPA, the QFII should mandate its custodian to apply to 
SAFE fifteen days prior to repatriation, together with the following documents:  
(1) Repatriation Application Form; 
(2) Financial reports of the accounting year in which the profits are generated; 
(3) Auditor's report issued by Chinese CPA; 
(4) Profits distribution resolutions or other effective legal documents; 
(5) Tax payment certificates; 
(6) Other documents as required by SAFE.  
The overseas receivers of the above-mentioned repatriation should be the QFII themselves. 
Article 30. SAFE may adjust the timeframe required for QFII to repatriate its principal and proceeds, subject to the 
needs of China's foreign exchange balance.  
Chapter 6 Regulatory Issues  
Article 31. CSRC and SAFE should annually review QFII's Securities Investment Licence and Foreign Exchange 
Registration Certificate.  
Article 32. CSRC, PBOC and SAFE may require QFII, custodians, securities companies, stock exchanges, and 
securities registration and settlement institutions to provide information on QFII's domestic investment activities, 
and may conduct on-site inspections if necessary.  
Article 33. Stock exchanges and securities registration and settlement institutions may enact new operation rules or 
revise previous operation rules on QFII's domestic securities investments, the implementation of which will be 
effective upon approval of the CSRC.  
Article 34. In the event of any of the followings, QFII should file with CSRC, PBOC and SAFE in five working 
days:  
(1) Change of custodians; 
(2) Change of legal representatives; 
(3) Change of controlling shareholders; 
(4) Adjustment of registered capital; 
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(5) Litigations and other material events; 
(6) Being imposed substantial penalties overseas; 
(7) Other circumstances as stipulated by CSRC and SAFE.  
Article 35. In the event of any of the followings, QFII should re-apply for its Securities Investment Licence:  
(1) Change of business name; 
(2) Acquired by or merged with other institution(s); 
(3) Other circumstances as stipulated by CSRC and SAFE.  
Article 36. In the event of any of the followings, QFII should surrender its Securities Investment Licence and 
Foreign Exchange Registration Certificate to CSRC and SAFE respectively:  
(1) Having repatriated all its principals;  
(2) Having transferred its investment quota; 
(3) Dispersion of authorised entities, entering into bankruptcy procedures, or assets being taken over by receivers;  
(4) Other circumstances as stipulated by CSRC and SAFE.  
If QFII fail to pass the annual review on Securities Investment Licences and Foreign Exchange Registration 
Certificates, as mentioned in Article 31, the Licences/Certificates will automatically be invalid. And the QFII 
should return these Licences/Certificates as required by the aforesaid Article.  
Article 37. In accordance with their respective authorities, CSRC, PBOC and SAFE will give warnings or penalties 
to QFII, custodians and securities companies, etc. who violate this Regulation. The same breach, however, should 
not be subject to two administrative penalties or more.  
Chapter 7 Supplementary Provisions  
Article 38. This Regulation is also applicable to institutional investors from Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan Region, who conduct securities investment businesses 
in Mainland China.  
Article 39. This Regulation will come into effect from 1 December 2002.  
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Appendix C: 
Licensed QFIIs (As of 31 December 2007) 
 Name Quota (Hundred million US$) 
1 UBS Warburg Ltd. 8 
2 CitiGroup Global Markets Ltd. 5.5 
3 CSFB 5 
4 Fortis Bank 5 
5 Nikko Asset Management 4.5 
6 Morgan Stanley  4 
7 HSBC Securities 4 
8 Deutsche Bank 4 
9 Nomura Securities 3.5 
10 ING Bank 3.5 
11 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 3 
12 Merrill Lynch 3 
13 INVESCO 2.5 
14 Lehman Brother 2 
15 BNP Paribas 2 
16 Goldman Sachs Asset Management International 2 
17 AMP 2 
18 Morgan Stanley Investment Management 2 
19 Prudential Asset Management (HK) 2 
20 Schroder Investment Management 2 
21 GE Asset Management 2 
22 UBS Global Asset Management 2 
23 HSBC Investment (HK) Ltd. 2 
2 Sumitomo Mitsui Asset Management Co. 2 
25 ABN AMRO 1.75 
26 JPMorgan Chase Bank 1.5 
27 JF Asset Management  1.5 
28 Scotia Bank 1.5 
29 Martin Currie Investment Management 1.2 
30 Hengseng 1 
31 Bill&Melinda Gates Foundation 1 
32 GIC Co. 1 
33 Temasek Fullerton Fund Management 1 
34 The Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company 1 
35 DBS 1 
36 KBC 1 
37 LCF Edmond de Rothschild Banque 1 
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38 Standard Chartered Bank (HK Br.) 0.75 
39 Barclays Bank 0.75 
40 Dresdner 0.75 
41 Calyon S. A. 0.75 
42 Dawa 0.5 
43 Societe Generale 0.5 
44 Power Corporation of Canada 0.5 
45 AIG Global Investment Corp. 0.5 
46 Yale University 0.5 
47 Stanford University 0.5 
48 United Overseas Bank 0.5 
49 Shinko Securities Co., Ltd. 0.5 
              Source: SAFE. 
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Appendix D: 
Companies Issuing Both A- and B-Shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange   
(As of End of 2006) 
A Code B Code Company 
600602 900901 SVA ELECTRON 
600604 900902 SHAI ERFANGJI 
600611 900903 DAZHONG TRANSPORTION 
600613 900904 SHAI WINGSUNG DATA TECHNOLOGY 
600612 900905 CHINA FIRST PENCIL 
600610 900906 CHINA TEXTILE MACHINERY 
600614 900907 SHAI SANJIU TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
600618 900908 SHAI CHLOR-ALKALI CHEMICAL 
600623 900909 SHAI TYRE&RUBBER 
600619 900910 SHAI HIGHLY GROUP 
600639 900911 SHAI JINQIAO EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE DEVELOPMENT 
600648 900912 SHAI WAI GAOQIAO FREE TRADE ZONE DEVELOPMENT 
600617 900913 SHAI LIAN HUA FIBRE COPORATION 
600650 900914 SHAI JIN JIANG TOWER 
600818 900915 SHAI FOREVER 
600679 900916 PHOENIX CO. 
600851 900917 SHAI HAIXIN GROUP 
600819 900918 SHAI YAOHUA PILKINGTON GLASS 
600695 900919 SHAI DAJIANG (GROUP) STOCK 
600841 900920 SHAI DIESEL ENGINE  
600844 900921 DAYING MODERN AGRICULTURE 
600689 900922 SHAI SANMAO TEXTILE 
600827 900923 SHAI FRIENDSHIP GROUP 
600843 900924 SHANGGONG.CO.,LTD. 
600835 900925 SHAI SHANGLING ELECTRIC APPLIANCES 
600845 900926 SHAI BAOSIGHT SOFTWARE 
600822 900927 SHAI MATERIAL TRADING CENTRE 
600848 900928 SHAI AUTOMATION INSTRUMENTATION 
600680 900930 SHAI POSTS&TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 
600663 900932 SHAI LUJIAZUI FINANCE&TRADE ZONE DEVELOPMENT 
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600801 900933 HUAXIN CEMENT 
600754 900934 SHAI NEW ASIA GROUP 
600295 900936 INNER MONGALIA EERDUOSI CASHMERE PRODUCTS 
600726 900937 HEILONGJIANG ELECTRIC POWER 
600751 900938 TIANJIN MARINE SHIPPING 
600094 900940 SHAI WORLDBEST 
600776 900941 EASTERN COMMUNICATIONS 
600054 900942 HUANGSHAN TOURISM DEVELOPMENT 
600272 900943 SHAI KAIKAI INDUSTRY 
600221 900945 HAINAN AIRLINES 
600698 900946 JINAN QINGQI MOTORCYCLE 
600320 900947 SHAI ZHENHUA PORT MACHINERY 
600190 900952 JINZHOU PORT 
600555 900955 SHAI MATSUOKA 
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Appendix E: 
Companies Issuing Both A- and B-Shares on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange   
(As of End of 2006) 
A Code B Code Company 
000002 200002 CHINA VANKE 
000011 200011 SHN PROPERTIES&RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
000012 200012 CSG TECHNOLOGY 
000016 200016 KONKA GROUP 
000017 200017 SHN CHINA BICYCLE 
000018 200018 SHN VICTOR ONWARD TEXTILE INDUSTRIAL 
000019 200019 SHN SHENBAO INDUSTRIAL 
000020 200020 SHN HUAFA ELECTRONICS 
000022 200022 SHN CHIWAN WHARF 
000024 200024 CHINA MERCHANTS SHEKOU HOLDINGS 
000025 200025 SHN TELLUS HOLDING 
000026 200026 SHN FIYTA HOLDINGS LTD. 
000028 200028 SHN ACCORD PHARMACEUTICAL 
000029 200029 SHN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE REAL ESTATE&PROPERTIES 
000030 200030 GUANGDONG SUNRISE HOLDINGS 
000037 200037 SHENZHEN NANSHAN POWER STATION 
000039 200039 CHINA INTERNATIONAL MARINE CONTAINERS 
000045 200045 SHN TEXTILE (HOLDINGS) 
000055 200055 CHINA FANGDA GROUP 
000056 200056 SHN INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
000058 200058 SHN SEG CO., LTD. 
000413 200413 SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELECTRONIC GLASS 
000418 200418 WUXI LITTLE SWAN COMPANY LTD. 
000429 200429 GUANGDONG PROVINCIAL EXPRESSWAY DEVELOPMENT 
000488 200488 SHANDONG CHENMING PAPER 
000505 200505 HAINAN PEARL RIVER 
000513 200513 LIVZON PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP INC. 
000521 200521 HEFEI MEILING 
000530 200530 DALIAN REFRIGERATION 
000539 200539 GUANGDONG ELECTRIC POWER DEVELOPMENT 
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000541 200541 FOSHAN ELECTRICAL AND LIGHTING 
000550 200550 JIANGLING MOTORS 
000553 200553 HUBEI SANONDA 
000570 200570 CHANGCHAI CO.,LTD. 
000581 200581 WEIFU HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
000596 200596 ANHUI GUJING DISTILLERY 
000613 200613 HAINAN DADONGHAI TOURISM CENTRE(HOLDINGS) 
000625 200625 CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE COMPANY 
000725 200725 BOE TECHNOLOGY GROUP 
000726 200726 LU THAI TEXTILE 
000761 200761 BENGANG STEEL PLATES 
000869 200869 YANTAI CHANGYU PIONEER WINE 
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Appendix F: 
Companies on the Stock Exchange  of Singapore Imposed Restrictions on Foreign 
Share Ownership and Reached the Limit (As of 30 June 1995) 
 
 Firm 
Limit on Foreign 
Share 
Ownership (%) 
Date of Separate 
Listing Industry 
1 ST AEROSPACE  15 16 Nov. 1990 Aerospace & Defense 
2 SINGAPORE AIRLINES  27.51 3 May 1988 Travel & Leisure 
3 ST AUTOMOTIVE  25 22 Sept. 1993 Travel & Leisure 
4 ST COMPUTER SYSTEMS 25 20 Apr. 1993 Software & Computer 
Services 
5 ST ELECTRONIC & ENGINEERING 15 27 Aug. 1991 Industrial Engineering 
6 SINGAPORE PETROLEUM CO. 49 25 Oct. 1990 Oil & Gas Producers 
7 SINGAPORE PRESS HOLDINGS  49 3 May 1988 Media 
8 SHIPBLDG. ENGR. LTD. 15 19 Nov. 1990 Industrial Engineering 
9 OVERSEAS UNION BANK 40 24 Jul. 1992 Banks 
10 KAY HIAN HOLDINGS 49 31 Oct. 1990 Financial Services 
11 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK 40 31 Jul. 1989 Banks 
12 OVERSEAS UNION TRUST 20 10 Oct. 1994 Financial Services 
13 OVERSEAS CHINESE BANKING 
CORP. 
40 31 Jul. 1989 Banks 
 
Source: Bailey et al., 2007. 
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Appendix G: 
Companies on the Stock Exchange  of Thailand Imposed Restrictions on Foreign 
Share Ownership and Reached the Limit  
 Company Industry 
1 Asia Fiber Personal Goods 
2 AYUDHYA CMG LF. ASR. Nonlife Insurance 
3 BANGKOK BANK Banks 
4 BANGKOK INSURANCE Nonlife Insurance 
5 BANGKOK RUBBER Personal Goods 
6 BANK OF AYUDHYA Banks 
7 CHAROONG THAI WIRE CAB. Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
8 CHAROEN POKPHAND FOODS Food Producers 
9 CMIC FINANCE AND SECS. Financial Services (Sector) 
10 DHANA SIAM FIN.& SECS. Financial Services (Sector) 
11 DUSIT THANI Travel & Leisure 
12 ICC INTERNATIONAL Support Services 
13 THANACHART CAPITAL Banks 
14 OHTL Travel & Leisure 
15 PADAENG INDUSTRY Industrial Metals & Mining 
16 PAN ASIA FOOTWEAR Personal Goods 
17 REGIONAL CONTAINERS LIN. Industrial Transportation 
18 SAHA PATH.INTER-HOLDING Financial Services (Sector) 
19 SAHA-UNION Personal Goods 
20 SANYO UNIVERSAL Household Goods & Home Constructions 
21 SIAM CEMENT Construction & Materials 
22 SIAM CITY CEMENT Construction & Materials 
23 SIAM COMMERCIAL BANK Banks 
24 SMC MOTORS General Retailers 
25 KASIKORNBANK Banks 
26 THAI PLASTIC CHM. Chemicals 
27 UNIVERSAL STARCH Food Producers 
28 ADVANCED INFO SER. Mobile Telecommunications 
29 BANGKOK LAND Real Estate Investment & Service 
30 FINANCE ONE Financial Services (Sector) 
31 LAND AND HOUSES Household Goods & Home Constructions 
32 MDX Real Estate Investment & Service 
33 PHATRA THANAKIT Financial Services (Sector) 
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34 SIAM CITY BANK Banks 
35 TMB BANK Banks 
36 BANPU PUBLIC  Mining 
37 QUALITY HOUSES Real Estate Investment & Service 
38 MATICHON Media 
39 SAHA PATHANAPIBUL Personal Goods 
40 UNION ASIA FINANCE Financial Services (Sector) 
41 AMER.STD.STYWR Construction & Materials 
42 HANA MICROELECTRONICS Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
43 INTERNATIONAL ENGR. Technology Hardware & Equipment 
44 KRUNG THAI BANK Banks 
45 LOXLEY Fixed Line Telecommunications 
46 NATION MULTIMEDIA GP. Media 
47 POST PUBLISHING Media 
48 PRECIOUS SHIPPING Industrial Transportation 
49 PROPERTY PERFECT Real Estate Investment & Service 
50 ROBINSON DEPT.STORE General Retailers 
51 SHIN Technology Hardware & Equipment 
52 SIAM MAKRO General Retailers 
53 SIAM PULP PAPER Forestry & Paper 
54 SYNTEC CONSTRUCTION Construction & Materials 
55 SOMPRASONG LAND Real Estate Investment & Service 
56 SRITHAI SUPERWARE Chemicals 
57 TRUE CORPORATION Mobile Telecommunications 
58 THAI GLASS INDUSTRY Leisure Goods 
59 THAI PRESIDENT FOODS Food Producers 
60 UNITED COMMUNICATIONS Mobile Telecommunications 
61 ELECTRICITY GENERATING Electricity 
62 PTT EXPLORATION & PRDN. Oil & Gas Producers 
63 MINOR FOOD GROUP Food & Drug Retailers 
64 THAI INDUSTRIAL GAS Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
 
 
